# Racialized Securitization K – GDI22

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## Notes

#### Thanks to Charles and Sasha for creating this file.

#### This file can be used as a standalone argument and in conjunction with the Security K file. This is especially true for the aff to pull additional answers, the realism debate, framework, etc.

#### There are multiple versions of the 1nc. The primary difference is the alternative with Abolition arguing that reforming security is impossible while Racialized Securitization calls for a rethinking of security.

# 1NC Shells

## Racialized Securitization 1NC Shell

#### International Relations and securitized crises are rooted in dominant norms of presumed whiteness and structural racism

**Peterson**, University of Arizona Professor of International Relations**, 21**  (V Spike, 2021, Security Dialogue2021, Vol. 52(S) 17–27, "Critical privilege studies: Making visible the reproduction of racism in the everyday and international relations", <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/09670106211017369>, page 5, accessed on 7-8-2022 hooch//cs)

Racism is the oil in the system of colonial power that makes a sustained discrimination of and violence against certain people not only possible but also invisible and acceptable. (Rutazibwa, 2016: 196, emphasis added) The world is undeniably in trouble. Crises and corollary insecurities are legible everywhere, marked by environmental degradation, healthcare panics, stark inequalities, militarized conflicts, and the rise of authoritarian movements and virulent alt-right populisms. That racism figures in producing and structuring these entwined crises is widely recognized, and, given its disciplinary remit, international relations is best positioned to examine ‘the link between race as a structuring principle and the transnational processes of accumulation, dispossession, violence and struggle that emerge in its wake’ (Anievas et al., 2015: 9). Yet international relations’ problematic engagement with race is now well-documented, including the discipline’s ‘origin’ as an imperial racist project (Vitalis, 2015), the ‘willful amnesia’ that this encouraged (Krishna, 2001: 401), and the legacy of ‘racist epistemological assumptions that inform much of contemporary mainstream and even critical analyses of world politics’ (Sajed, 2016a: 168; see also Grovogui, 1996; Hobson, 2012; Gruffydd Jones, 2016). Revisiting points made in his 1997 book, Charles Mills (2015b: 542) concludes that ‘the racial contract is very much alive and well . . . and the “epistemology of ignorance” that now guards it is as active as ever’.

But the problem is larger. Despite abundant evidence of institutionalized racism, international relations persists not only in habitual neglect and a deeply flawed theorization of race, but also in actively resisting, marginalizing, depoliticizing, and hence devalorizing anti-racist research and those who produce it (Bhambra et al., 2020; Chowdhry and Rai, 2009; El-Malik, 2015; Shilliam, 2020; Vitalis, 2015). Given epistemological priorities, we might expect this resistance by conventionally ahistorical, non-reflexive mainstream scholars. But it is unexpected and poses fundamental questions when ardent resistance to critique is practiced by self-identified critical scholars, whose objectives presumably extend beyond the production of ‘more accurate descriptions’ to include the reduction, or at least mitigation, of structural violence. How is it possible for those who claim a critical orientation to be so ill-prepared, and evidently unwilling, to address ‘the daily, structural racism that unmistakably continues to plague our societies’ (Rutazibwa, 2016: 192)? What taken-for-granted premises and practices reproduce the invisibility of racism and the apparent acceptance of its harms? What are we failing to ‘see’, and how does this compromise what critical security studies and international relations scholars have to offer, especially in the face of mounting crises and the urgency of developing more adequate analyses?

Taking the social violence of systemic (structural, institutionalized) racism as its starting point, my essay assumes that race ‘is a central organizing feature of world politics’ (Zvobgo and Loken, 2020), that ‘epistemic racism is intrinsic to Western knowledge structures’ and pervades international relations theorizing (Howell and Richter-Montpetit, 2020: 4; see also Gruffydd Jones, 2016; Sabaratnam, 2020), and that ‘taking the problem of racism seriously in the field of [international relations] means viewing it not merely as an issue of stereotypes or cultural insensitivities, but as a colonial technology of life and premature death built on ideologies of whiteness and white supremacy’ (Rutazibwa, 2020). My forum intervention, then, takes up Olivia Rutazibwa’s (2016: 199) call ‘to contribute to a radically different, anti- or non-racist [international relations] and everyday’, and I do so by examining how the everyday and everywhere power relations of white privilege make the reproduction of racism ‘not only possible but also invisible and acceptable’ (Rutazibwa, 2016: 196). While I address the forum’s focus on racism, I note that more adequate critical theorizing is undermined if the reciprocally constructed phenomena of structural inequalities and systems of privilege are treated in isolation.

#### NATO’s roots and ideological foundations are guided and sustained by racism and anti-Blackness

**Zvobgo**, assistant professor of government at the College of William & Mary and founder and director of the International Justice Lab **and Loken** assistant professor of political science at the University of Massachusetts**, 20** (Kelebogile and Meredith , 5-19-2020, , Foreignpolicy.com, "Why Race Matters in International Relations: Western dominance and white privilege permeate the field. It’s time to change that." https://foreignpolicy.com./2020/06/19/why-race-matters-international-relations-ir/ accessed on 7-11-2022 hooch//cs)

Race is not a perspective on international relations; it is a central organizing feature of world politics. Anti-Japanese racism guided and sustained U.S. engagement in World War II, and broader anti-Asian sentiment influenced the development and structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. During the Cold War, racism and anti-communism were inextricably linked in the containment strategy that defined Washington’s approach to Africa, Asia, Central America, the Caribbean, and South America. And today race shapes threat perception and responses to violent extremism, inside and outside the “war on terror.” Yet mainstream international relations (IR) scholarship denies race as essential to understanding the world, to the cost of the field’s integrity.

Take the “big three” IR paradigms: realism, liberalism, and constructivism. These dominant frames for understanding global politics are built on raced and racist intellectual foundations that limit the field’s ability to answer important questions about international security and organization. Core concepts, like anarchy and hierarchy, are raced: They are rooted in discourses that center and favor Europe and the West. These concepts implicitly and explicitly pit “developed” against “undeveloped,” “modern” against “primitive,” “civilized” against “uncivilized.” And their use is racist: These invented binaries are used to explain subjugation and exploitation around the globe

While realism and liberalism were built on Eurocentrism and used to justify white imperialism, this fact is not widely acknowledged in the field. For instance, according to neorealists, there exists a “balance of power” between and among “great powers.” Most of these great powers are, not incidentally, white-majority states, and they sit atop the hierarchy, with small and notably less-white powers organized below them. In a similar vein, raced hierarchies and conceptions of control ground the concept of cooperation in neoliberal thought: Major powers own the proverbial table, set the chairs, and arrange the place settings.

Constructivism, which rounds out the “big three” approaches, is perhaps best positioned to tackle race and racism. Constructivists reject the as-given condition of anarchy and maintain that anarchy, security, and other concerns are socially constructed based on shared ideas, histories, and experiences. Yet with few notable exceptions, constructivists rarely acknowledge how race shapes what is shared.

#### The security logics of the plan uphold the racialization practices of the colonial empire and is intrinsically rooted in white supremacy

**Machold,** University of Glasgow Lecturer in International Relations in Politics **and Charrett**, University of Westminster Senior Lecturer in Global Politics**, 21**  (Rhys and Catherine, 2021, Security Dialogue2021, Vol. 52(S) 38–48, "Beyond ambivalence: Locating thewhiteness of security", https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/09670106211031044, pages 7-8 accessed on 7-8-2022 hooch//cs)

Answering this question requires taking stock of how critical security studies’ orientation to security squares with wider questions concerning power and structure in global politics. In developing non-traditional approaches to security, critical security studies has cultivated an important critical distance from state security and (neo)realist accounts of war-making as security. Guided by an imperative to decentre material relationships, however, critical security studies has embraced a commitment to open-ended and ambivalent accounts of power, which unmoor security from histories and structures (Barkawi, 2011). As a result, critical security studies broadly (and its poststructuralist variants in particular) ‘fail[s] . . . to adequately situate security within complex entanglements with other technologies of power’ (Coleman and Rosenow, 2016: 203). This tendency to abstract security from wider power configurations, we suggest, has largely precluded critical approaches to security from apprehending racism as a structural form of power in global politics that serves capital and colonial prerogatives – albeit with notable exceptions (e.g. AbuBakare, 2020; Ali, 2020; Axster et al., 2021; Eastwood, 2019; Manchanda and Rossdale, 2021). This poses a specific problem for any critical engagement of racism in relation to security: Racism only makes sense as a form of power and technology of governing insofar as it does specific kinds of work, namely, (re)producing differences and hierarchies in the service of capital and empire. To imply that ‘security’ can be bracketed off from and thereby detached from its imbrication in long histories of race-making, capitalism and empire (Jelly-Schapiro, 2018; Singh, 2017) is naïve, untenable and complicit in the (re)production of structural white supremacy.

As a corrective to these tendencies, we suggest that security needs to be apprehended as a concept, a set of power relations and governing regimes that are dynamic but do specific work for capital, colonization and, hence, race-making. To this end, we call for a closer engagement with three sets of literature. First, we argue that Marxist critiques of security and pacification theory can help locate security materially within ongoing histories of imperial, colonial and capitalist domination. Yet, while these theorizations of security crucially foreground material and ideological considerations, their core texts engage only tangentially with questions of race and racism. Thus, second, we suggest that critical security studies needs to engage with theoretical traditions that situate race and racism as foundational to capitalism and the maintenance of the colonial/modern world system (Quijano, 2000, 2007). We detail some key insights from these literatures, which illuminate the particular work security does for racial domination and violent dispossession. Third, and finally, in contrast to longstanding currents in critical security studies that locate security as a source of emancipation (Booth, 1991), we argue that security needs to be dismantled by engaging with abolitionist thought and praxis.

Drawing on these literatures, we begin to unpack the foundationally raced precepts of security and offer some suggestions for critical security research. We argue that race cannot be ‘tacked on’ as a qualifier but needs to be addressed as a structure that informs how we apprehend security in the first instance. In doing so, we locate security as a justification for violence and the legitimation of the mechanisms through which this violence is waged. We suggest that critical security studies needs to reckon more seriously with how security projects and the kinds of social orders they enact are always already racial orders too, predicated on the production of racialized ‘Others’ in need of elimination. The focus should be on interrogating how processes of racialization work in relation to security, along with the structures they depend on and the ends they serve. ‘Security’, we argue, is the term used both to hide racial violence and Native dispossession and annihilation and to legitimate this same violence. Drawing on terminology from literature on the imperial origins and raced foundations of police (Singh, 2014), we call on critical security studies to contend with what we call the whiteness of security. This can assist efforts to locate the particular roles that security plays in the normalization of group-differentiated violence (Gilmore, 2002) and the forms of value accrued therein. Locating the whiteness of security, however, does not imply that racial categories and their attending power structures, sites and objects of violence are stable and totalizing – quite the contrary. While we spell out some new analytical and political avenues, there is much more to be said about how security is implicated in material dispossession and race-making beyond what we are able to detail here. We propose five starting points for apprehending the intersections of race–security.

#### Alternative – Only abandoning the epistemic core and infrastructural framework of international relations can open a new disciplinary agenda

Sen, Roskilde University International Development Studies Associate Professor, 21 (Somdeep, “Colouring critical security studies: A view from the classroom”, Security Dialogue, 2021, Vol. 52(S) 133-141, EBSCO, GDI access 7/12/22)

The question remains: What would a non-racist discipline look like? It is presumptuous to think that any number of reparative pedagogical strategies would allow us to simply escape international relations’ historically entrenched racist precepts. Aijaz Ahmad (1992: 77) once wrote that ‘history is not really open to correction through a return passage to an imaginary point, centuries ago, before the colonial deformation set in’. Ahmad was of course referring to the English language and the feasibility of effacing it as an integral facet of the colonized people’s identity (for further dis- cussion, see Sen, 2020b: 142-146). Without stretching this metaphor too far, I would argue that international relations’ racist history is not open to course correction either. But while we cannot change this history, we can choose what to do with it.

At the outset, then, this requires the recognition of a foundational dilemma, namely, that racism is not just an aspect of international relations: it characterizes the very nature and purpose of the discipline. A non-racist international relations would thus need to position itself as not just an endeavour to add a critical pillar within the existent white-supremacist disciplinary structures and norms. It would need be something else altogether. For one thing, cognizant of the racialized intel- lectual foundations of international relations as it is taught today, the non-racist international rela- tions would look elsewhere for the intellectual building blocks of a new epistemic core. To this end, it would need to draw on a well-established (albeit ignored and marginalized) legacy of scholarship within international relations that has deliberated the role of racism and white supremacy in the making of the global order. However, the purpose of this scholarly legacy in the non-racist disci- pline is not to simply speak to the mainstream from the outside in or languish in the category of ‘critical approaches’ that often appears at the back end of international relations curricula and textbooks. Instead, in a non-racist international relations, the works of, among others, Alain Locke ([1916] 1992), W. E. B. Du Bois (1903, 1915) and Merze Tate (1943, 1961), along with the more recent scholarly engagement with questions of race and racism,2 would be placed at the very top of the disciplinary hierarchy as the mainstream and recognized for their indispensable contribution to the scholarly agenda of international relations.

However, the racism of international relations is not just a matter of its core intellectuality ori- entation. It is equally reflected in the material consequences of its racist precepts, evident not least in hirings, tenure decisions and grant-giving practices. All of these act as the infrastructure that keeps up the colour line and function as a nexus of (dis)incentives that renders it professionally unwise to critique international relations’ racialized epistemic core. In contrast, in the non-racist international relations, practitioners of the discipline would not need to fear - as I did - the optics and consequences of critiquing international relations’ racist legacy. On the contrary, such efforts would be deemed an extension of the core purpose of the non-racist discipline. Seen together, what I propose here is the abandoning of international relations in its current form. However, theorizing ‘interstate relations’ (Weber, 2015: 29; for further discussion, see Wight, 1960; Cox, 1981) remains a worthwhile disciplinary agenda. And the non-racist international relations can make an invalua- ble contribution to this agenda by revealing the multiple, positioned ways in which politics is understood and experienced.

## Racialized Securitization 1NC Shell – Disinformation

#### International Relations and securitized crises are rooted in dominant norms of presumed whiteness and structural racism

**Peterson**, University of Arizona Professor of International Relations**, 21**  (V Spike, 2021, Security Dialogue2021, Vol. 52(S) 17–27, "Critical privilege studies: Making visible the reproduction of racism in the everyday and international relations", <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/09670106211017369>, page 5, accessed on 7-8-2022 hooch//cs)

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#### **Traditional disinformation scholarship encodes a frame white-racial neutrality reinforcing othering narratives.**

Reddi, Kuo and Kreiss, University Of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Center for Information Technology, and Public Life Graduate Fellow, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, and Principal Researcher, 21

(Madhavi Reddi, Rachel Kuo, and Daniel Kreiss, University Of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Center for Information Technology, and Public Life Graduate Fellow, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, and Principal Researcher, SAGE Journals, 7-17-2021, "Identity propaganda: Racial narratives and disinformation," New Media & Society, p. 9, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/14614448211029293, accessed 7-1-2022) SS:/

Attentiveness to othering as a form of identity propaganda is crucial to understanding the structure of these appeals. Indeed, in scholarship on misinformation, disinformation, and propaganda, scholars often categorize content targeting or featuring non-white subjects as “racial” while failing to code appeals to white subjects as “racial” (Kreiss, 2021). Researchers often avoid naming “whiteness” by masking it with codes such as “Southern Culture” or “Confederate History” (e.g. DiResta et al., 2018). Scholars from various fields across the social sciences (Bonilla and Silva, 2018; Corbin, 2017; Frankenberg, 1993; Sue, 2006) have pointed out that whiteness is immune to othering narratives because white identity is the standard against which non-white identity is othered. As a result, white racial frames in identity propaganda are less likely to be considered as racially targeted content—even as white subjects often serve as the primary audiences for othering narratives. By imparting the privilege of racial-neutrality on white racial identity, many researchers ignore the racial structures in place that enable the creation of this content in the first place. Centering racial analysis through the concept of identity propaganda—including analysis of whiteness—enables researchers to better see the underlying goals and coded rationales of identity propaganda.

#### The security logics of the plan uphold the racialization practices of the colonial empire and is intrinsically rooted in white supremacy

**Machold,** University of Glasgow Lecturer in International Relations in Politics **and Charrett**, University of Westminster Senior Lecturer in Global Politics**, 21**  (Rhys and Catherine, 2021, Security Dialogue2021, Vol. 52(S) 38–48, "Beyond ambivalence: Locating thewhiteness of security", https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/09670106211031044, pages 7-8 accessed on 7-8-2022 hooch//cs)

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As a corrective to these tendencies, we suggest that security needs to be apprehended as a concept, a set of power relations and governing regimes that are dynamic but do specific work for capital, colonization and, hence, race-making. To this end, we call for a closer engagement with three sets of literature. First, we argue that Marxist critiques of security and pacification theory can help locate security materially within ongoing histories of imperial, colonial and capitalist domination. Yet, while these theorizations of security crucially foreground material and ideological considerations, their core texts engage only tangentially with questions of race and racism. Thus, second, we suggest that critical security studies needs to engage with theoretical traditions that situate race and racism as foundational to capitalism and the maintenance of the colonial/modern world system (Quijano, 2000, 2007). We detail some key insights from these literatures, which illuminate the particular work security does for racial domination and violent dispossession. Third, and finally, in contrast to longstanding currents in critical security studies that locate security as a source of emancipation (Booth, 1991), we argue that security needs to be dismantled by engaging with abolitionist thought and praxis.

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Sen, Roskilde University International Development Studies Associate Professor, 21 (Somdeep, “Colouring critical security studies: A view from the classroom”, Security Dialogue, 2021, Vol. 52(S) 133-141, EBSCO, GDI access 7/12/22)

The question remains: What would a non-racist discipline look like? It is presumptuous to think that any number of reparative pedagogical strategies would allow us to simply escape international relations’ historically entrenched racist precepts. Aijaz Ahmad (1992: 77) once wrote that ‘history is not really open to correction through a return passage to an imaginary point, centuries ago, before the colonial deformation set in’. Ahmad was of course referring to the English language and the feasibility of effacing it as an integral facet of the colonized people’s identity (for further dis- cussion, see Sen, 2020b: 142-146). Without stretching this metaphor too far, I would argue that international relations’ racist history is not open to course correction either. But while we cannot change this history, we can choose what to do with it.

At the outset, then, this requires the recognition of a foundational dilemma, namely, that racism is not just an aspect of international relations: it characterizes the very nature and purpose of the discipline. A non-racist international relations would thus need to position itself as not just an endeavour to add a critical pillar within the existent white-supremacist disciplinary structures and norms. It would need be something else altogether. For one thing, cognizant of the racialized intel- lectual foundations of international relations as it is taught today, the non-racist international rela- tions would look elsewhere for the intellectual building blocks of a new epistemic core. To this end, it would need to draw on a well-established (albeit ignored and marginalized) legacy of scholarship within international relations that has deliberated the role of racism and white supremacy in the making of the global order. However, the purpose of this scholarly legacy in the non-racist disci- pline is not to simply speak to the mainstream from the outside in or languish in the category of ‘critical approaches’ that often appears at the back end of international relations curricula and textbooks. Instead, in a non-racist international relations, the works of, among others, Alain Locke ([1916] 1992), W. E. B. Du Bois (1903, 1915) and Merze Tate (1943, 1961), along with the more recent scholarly engagement with questions of race and racism,2 would be placed at the very top of the disciplinary hierarchy as the mainstream and recognized for their indispensable contribution to the scholarly agenda of international relations.

However, the racism of international relations is not just a matter of its core intellectuality ori- entation. It is equally reflected in the material consequences of its racist precepts, evident not least in hirings, tenure decisions and grant-giving practices. All of these act as the infrastructure that keeps up the colour line and function as a nexus of (dis)incentives that renders it professionally unwise to critique international relations’ racialized epistemic core. In contrast, in the non-racist international relations, practitioners of the discipline would not need to fear - as I did - the optics and consequences of critiquing international relations’ racist legacy. On the contrary, such efforts would be deemed an extension of the core purpose of the non-racist discipline. Seen together, what I propose here is the abandoning of international relations in its current form. However, theorizing ‘interstate relations’ (Weber, 2015: 29; for further discussion, see Wight, 1960; Cox, 1981) remains a worthwhile disciplinary agenda. And the non-racist international relations can make an invalua- ble contribution to this agenda by revealing the multiple, positioned ways in which politics is understood and experienced.

## Security Abolitionism 1NC Shell (Antiblackness)

#### The plan manifests as a political technology rooted in bourgeois values for the upholding of racialized capitalism

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In locating the material foundations of security, we take our cue from Marxist critiques of security, which illuminate the work that security performs for colonization and capital. In contrast to critical security studies’ ambivalent position on how security serves structures of domination, Marxist approaches locate security in relation to liberal thought and the emergence of capitalism, apprehending the key ideological and material roles that security plays in accumulation. Marxist critiques of security de-fetishize security as ‘a good thing’ – that is, ‘some kind of universal or transcendental value’ – instead situating it ‘as a mode of governing, a political technology that serves to “colonise” categories, places and spaces and through which individuals, groups, classes, and, ultimately, modern capital is reshaped and reordered’ (Neocleous, 2008: 3–4, emphasis in original). This work builds directly on Mark Neocleous’s (2000: 43) critical theorization of police power, which situates security as ‘the supreme concept of bourgeois society’, bound up with the fabrication of social order. ‘Fabrication’, in this account, concerns how policing and security work to produce social orders under capitalism, as well as the ideological, euphemistic and illusory dimensions of this work. As Neocleous (2016: 11) writes, ‘Security is ranged against us. But if today the world wants to be deceived, it wants to be deceived in the name of security.’ This literature has further developed the critical concept of ‘pacification’ to apprehend the linkages between historical colonial wars and contemporary security projects, offering ‘the potential to demonstrate how this history weighs on and is often perpetuated in the present’

Taken together, Marxist literatures offer a framework with which to apprehend security’s role in material accumulation by dispossession by situating policing and security in the longue durée of empire and capitalism. Crucially, this literature also opens space in which to mobilize against security’s pacifying and colonizing imperatives (Pasternak and Dafnos, 2018). Indeed, Marxists reject security wholesale, calling it out as a ‘dangerous illusion’ that serves as a ‘blockage on politics’ by evacuating a focus on exploitation, alienation and the material foundations of emancipation and spurning complicity in the exercise of police powers (Neocleous and Rigakos, 2011: 15, emphasis in original). Thus, in contrast to critical security studies’ longstanding attempts to rehabilitate security by deepening, broadening, humanizing and engendering it, or otherwise making it more palatable and inclusive, Marxist accounts radically reorientate the objectives of critical security research to inform new repertoires of struggle around an anti-security politics. While some of this work is widely cited within critical security studies, its calls to foreground material considerations and reject security per se are less reflected in the field’s orientation

However, core texts within Marxist literatures only tangentially engage with race and racism. They thereby elide the ways in which race-making is foundational to capitalism, empire (Quijano, 2000; Robinson, 2000) and, by extension, security. Recent interventions in Marxist security thinking have begun to rectify this blind spot. This work productively explores how projects of pacification and their material dispossession take place through race-making (McQuade, 2019; Schrader, 2019; Seigel, 2018; Wall, 2016). Nikhil Pal Singh (2017: 27) draws attention to a ‘racialized narrative of security’ that emerged in the settler-colonial project of the United States, which ‘invested every white person with the sovereign right to kill’. Such violence, he argues, was justified as ‘a humanizing endeavor, civilizing process, and security project’ (Singh, 2017: 43). Eli Jelly-Schapiro (2018: 30) stresses that ‘race is both that against which society must be secured and the means of its securing’. Scholars from outside pacification and anti-security literatures echo these claims, locating security and surveillance as distinctly racial projects (Amar, 2011; Browne, 2015; DunbarOrtiz, 2018; Kumar, 2020; Miller, 2017). In her work on Palestine/Israel, Nadera Shalhoub-Kevorkian (2015) argues that Israeli ‘security’ functions as a settler-colonial ‘theology’ that makes possible the demonization and elimination of Palestinians through their racialization.

These interrogations of race–security point toward two key things. First, security projects and the kinds of social orders they fabricate are always already racial orders predicated on the production of racialized Others in need of differentiation and/or elimination. Second, security works euphemistically as a political technology fundamentally tied to imperatives of white supremacy, which justify racialized violence as security. While highly instructive, these insights remain theoretically underdeveloped. In order to better theorize security’s roles in race-making and white supremacy, the next section illustrates how three key concepts (racial capitalism, coloniality of power and racialization) can help us think through the intersections of race-making, empire, capitalism and security more systematically.

#### Hence, security notions are founded upon the concept of the Universal Enemy and racial capitalism which make the violences of racism imperative to its existence

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Racial differentiation and its associated forms of violent dispossession are foundational of and intrinsic to historical capitalism, as elaborated by Cedric Robinson’s (2000) concept of ‘racial capitalism’ and Aníbal Quijano’s (2000) notion of the ‘coloniality of power’. Capitalism, race-making and empire must therefore be theorized in conjunction, yet without it being assumed that their violent structures are fixed. In unpacking the social construction of race and its relation to structures of power, critical race theory’s theorizations of racialization offer additional insights into race-making as ongoing processes involving ‘the extension of racial meaning to a previously unclassified relationship, social practice or group’ (Omi and Winant, 2014: 111). In this framework, race and racism are dynamic, yet guided by certain historical prerogatives. While importantly challenging the notion of race as based on biological essences, the racialization framework situates race as historically evolving but also as doing particular kinds of work. It is in this sense that Patrick Wolfe (2016) argues that race can be understood as a ‘trace of history’. Race is deeply ideological and works performatively in the service of empire and capital: ‘rather than simply describing human groups, [race] brings them into being as inter-relating social categories with behavioural prescriptions to match. Racialization refers to this active productivity of race, whereby colonialism refashions its human terrain’ (Wolfe, 2016: 10). This dual focus on race’s productivity and dynamism enables us to apprehend its continuities with historical forms of social differentiation as well as its ever-shifting targets and contradictions across time and space. Indeed, Singh (2012: 288–289) argues that racialization can help us to more fully grasp ‘the empty foundationalism and ceaseless reinventedness that seems to characterize the operation of race in modernity . . . “the changing same”’

Racialization addresses how racism functions to racialize and oppress certain populations, and how the vulnerabilities and forms of protection produced by racism work in governing. As Singh (2012: 284–285) proposes, to answer the vexing question, What is racism? one needs to begin not by identifying a set of preexisting, already categorized groups that are done to, but rather by delineating the formation and institutionalization of structures and situations of protection and vulnerability for which post hoc, descriptive accounts of dishonored group characteristics serve as a form of rationalization or justification.

A focus on racialization or ‘race in action’ thus allows us to address precursors of formal racial doctrine and apprehend how various ‘racializing practices’ attempt to preserve population-centric modes of colonial domination over time through racism (Wolfe, 2016: 10). Racism is produced through histories and structures, but also through a particular kind of violence, including the violence of demarcation. As Ruth Wilson Gilmore puts it, although ‘race has no essence, racism does. Racism is singular because, whatever its place-based particularities, its practitioners renew fatal power-difference couplings’ (Gilmore, 2002: 16, emphasis in original). This approach to racism locates the fatalities it produces – that is, ‘premature deaths’ – as constitutive of contemporary political power and subjectivities. As Gilmore (2002: 16) continues, ‘racism is a practice of abstraction, a death-dealing displacement of difference into hierarchies that organize relations within and between the planet’s sovereign political territories’. Following Singh and Gilmore, Stuart Schrader

(2019: 39–41) similarly explains: ‘Race is not racism’s predetermined object; it is what racism produces. . . . Racism produces the benefit from state projects of race-making’ – that is, whiteness. In other words, race produces racism through racialization, which in turn accrues particular material benefits to certain groups in the form of whiteness, through its denial to others. This enables identity and ‘community’ formation around racial hatred and the shared defence of whiteness (Ahmed, 2004: 118) and strategies to eliminate Blackness. Racism thereby (re)produces and naturalizes racial hierarchies as ‘commonsense’ markers of global difference and knowledge production (Quijano, 2000, 2007).

Bringing this literature on racialization together with critical concepts of racial capitalism and the coloniality of power provides an analytical framework for critically apprehending and situating race in the study of security. Rather than taking racial categories and their power structures, sites and objects for granted, these structural accounts of race and racism ask us to address: (1) what are the structural drivers of race-making, (2) how does racialization takes place across time and space, and (3) with what effects. Posing such questions is crucial for any critical interrogations of race–security going forward, offering opportunities to further Marxist theorizations of security. For instance, if we read Neocleous’s (2016) The Universal Adversary through the lenses of racial capitalism, the coloniality of power and racialization, it becomes visible how the enemies that animate security projects are constituted through structures of race. Neocleous situates the ‘Universal Adversary’ as the central figure against which security has been organized from its inception in liberal thought. ‘Bourgeois modernity’, Neocleous argues, ‘is oriented around the imagination of an Enemy. This is so because the fear of some kind of Enemy is a fundamental feature of the supreme concept of bourgeois society: security’ (Neocleous, 2016: 1, emphasis added). While The Universal Adversary is limited by its lack of direct attention to race, Neocleous’s account bears striking resemblance to Singh’s (2012: 288–289) references to the ‘empty foundationalism’ and ‘ceaseless reinventedness’ of race in modernity. Neocleous (2016: 4) argues that the Universal Enemy’s ‘ghostly emptiness’ is a central defining feature, leaving the ‘category of the Enemy open to endless modification’, thereby providing the ‘power to pronounce on what the Enemy is, where it can be found and how it behaves’.

We suggest that these similarities are not incidental and provide good reasons to suspect that the Universal Enemy cannot be understood outside of race-making.1 The Enemy is a figure that does work in organizing security in bourgeois society not merely as some kind of other but as a racial Other. This is illustrated by Darryl Li’s (2019) path-breaking The Universal Enemy, which aptly demonstrates how logics and practices of war, violence and dispossession, as well as struggles for justice against empire, are animated by racialization. Li shows that the universalist aspirations of these projects work with and through the production of differences, including racial difference that are in processes of reformation.

#### Thus we affirm abolitionist praxis and anti-security- Only by looking beyond the formations of violence under racial capitalism can we undo structures of race which constitute security logics

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Implicit in our discussion are questions about how to articulate a more radical and anti-racist agenda in critical security studies. Here, the Marxist anti-security ethos lays crucial groundwork by rejecting security and opening spaces in which to ‘fight for an alternative language that takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and its police powers’ (Neocleous and Rigakos, 2011: 21). This imperative dovetails with core strands of abolitionist thinking. Brendan McQuade (2018: 5) argues that pairing abolitionist traditions with Marxist critiques of security is politically and analytically productive: ‘Abolition is the foil of bourgeoisie security. Where security discourses are concerned with fabrication of capitalist forms of social order, abolition is a way of thinking about producing social order outside of the logic of capital and private property, state violence, and racialized subjectivity.’ We agree.

From the outset, abolitionist thought and praxis have apprehended capitalism, race-making, empire and violence as conjoined and developed strategies to fight them accordingly. Abolitionist thinking rejects liberal reformist paradigms of trying to make carceral and policing institutions more humane, recognizing that the racialized domination these institutions mete out serves structural imperatives (Gilmore, 2007). The violence of the carceral state cannot be abstracted from other aspects of domination under capitalism and empire. The central ‘challenge’ of abolitionist thinking, Gilmore (2017: 228) writes, ‘is to keep the entirety of carceral geographies – rather than only their prison or even law-enforcement aspects – connected, without collapsing or reducing various aspects into each other’. While contending with how capitalism works in conjunction with race-making, abolitionism refuses to reify carceral structures’ totalizing pretences, in part by challenging their self-implied necessity, desirability and economic efficiency. Abolitionist thinkers centre how structures of racialized violence are both reproduced and disrupted by human interaction. As Gilmore (2017: 238) stresses, ‘abolition geography takes feeling and agency to be constitutive of, no less than constrained by, structure’. Indeed, one of Gilmore’s most important contributions is to foreground the ‘flesh-and-blood perspective on incarceration and the unexpected alliances that might be forged in the face of dispossessed isolation’ (McKittrick, 2011: 958)

Abolitionist work is concerned with developing strategies to dismantle carceral technologies and their geographies. It does so by establishing community networks outside of the racialized hierarchies that underpin capitalism and empire, providing concrete strategies for redirecting resources for policing, prisons and war towards developing more humane and liberated ways of living (McQuade, 2018: 4). Abolitionist praxis emerges from the inspiration and strategies of the flight and fugitivity of maroon communities that escaped slavery, established new communities and organized to upend the structures of slavery (Du Bois, [1935] 2017). It recovers the histories of ‘community building, where the terror and violence of racial capitalism and white supremacy were temporarily suspended, free men and women negotiated their own terms of living, and, in the process, negated the terms of order’ (Quan, 2017: 174–175). Abolitionist thought and praxis thereby provide visions beyond racial capitalism and the group-differentiated violence it reproduces.

We argue that traditions of abolitionism offer conceptual and practical strategies for undoing the structures of race that animate security projects by providing models for ungovernability (Quan, 2017), both the existence of a consciousness outside of domination and the possibility of refashioning communities around this consciousness. Moreover, these traditions provide fertile ground on which to build alternative futures beyond prevailing states of (in)security, yet on a distinctly different footing than prevailing horizons of emancipation within critical security studies. Simply put, rather than seeking to cultivate security otherwise, abolitionist thought and praxis expand the horizons of anti-security’s challenge to security per se. If security enforces violent capitalist and imperial orders underpinned by race and racism, then the prospects of security as emancipation are fanciful at best. An abolitionist disposition clarifies the political and material stakes of our investments in ‘security’ as academic producers of knowledge.

# Links

### Link – “Security”

#### Security projects produce racial ordering (1nc racial capitalism link)

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#### Security is predicated on the genocide of Black bodies and is reliant upon the construction of boundaries between who is truly human

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Today we know that ‘security’ is just another word for extinction and genocide. Every discourse of securing implies that there is a ground to be secured, a ‘home’, a way of being that is threatened or that requires saving, sustaining and being located within a temporality and spatiality. It is precisely this security that is denied in an anti-Black world. As Saidiya Hartman argues, only recognized subjects have something to secure; for others, ‘home’ is an impossibility: ‘We stay there, but we don’t live there’ (Hartman, 2007: 87). As has already been stated, every ground of this discourse is built on anti-Blackness. However inclusive the space that is secured, it will always require a boundary, a delineation of an outside that is inhabited by those who cannot be full human subjects. Every cut between that to be secured and that which can be left or seen as expendable or without value necessarily depends on ‘questions of race and racism’.

#### Security is reliant on anti-black narratives in which Blackness is ontologically essential to constitute a threat to the white settler subject

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Security Dialogue’s call comes out of a wider move to include race in discussions of international relations, amid calls to ‘decolonize’ a discipline that has always been at the heart of colonial power structures (Sabaratnam, 2017). Yet, in order to understand what is at stake in this move to include race in a discipline that formerly seemed to ignore it, we must consider the relationship between Blackness and the world, the ontological condition that makes anti-Blackness inextricable from security. In short, we must realize that questions of race and racism have always been the ground that critical security studies stands on

The idea that racism can be isolated and extracted from an academic discipline while its effects are therapeutically addressed is challenged by the weight of Afropessimist scholarship, critical Black feminist and anti-colonial thinking. The urge to ‘decolonize’ academia suggests that coloniality is a condition that can be uprooted within the university without addressing the broader antiBlack world that universities are in. Some prominent decolonial scholars have challengingly argued that ‘decolonization is not a metaphor’ (Tuck and Yang, 2012), and others have suggested the need for pluriversal approaches to security that allow for inclusion of a multitude of nonWestern ontologies (Escobar, 2018). However, even pluriversal approaches risk retaining parts of the edifice of modernity without addressing its anti-Black foundations, leaving open the possibility of ‘re-enchanting and pluralising [international relations]’ (Rothe, 2019: 9), assuming that redemption and reparation is possible. The temporality at stake is that which seeks to salvage ‘critique’ through an imaginary telos of progress – learning the lessons and moving onwards, ever opening and exploring new avenues and new approaches – hence the appeal to an ethico-political ‘openness’ that the making of reparative politics is held to enable. This attempt to move ‘beyond’ the problem of ‘the spectres of race and racism’ is laudable but, we argue, misguided. It is precisely critical narratives of ‘progress’ that critical Black studies and Afropessimism seek to problematize (Ray et al., 2017).

Rather than considering anti-Blackness as an epiphenomenon of modernity, a glitch in our system that needs to be fixed, it may be understood as constitutive of a modern ontology (Wilderson, 2010). As Nahum Dimitri Chandler (2014: 130) states, ‘there is no contemporary discourse that is free or independent of the itinerary of the concept of race’. The existence of Blackness is ontologically crucial in providing the boundaries of humanity, in creating the Outside, the Other, that is necessary to define the inside of modernity, civil society and human subjectivity (Warren, 2018). As Saidiya Hartman (2017: 33) argues, ‘the texture of freedom is laden with the vestiges of slavery, and abstract equality is utterly enmeshed in the narrative of black subjection’. Thus, for Afropessimists, it is not merely the contemporary order of humanity that is enmeshed with antiBlackness, but also the struggles for emancipation by those within that order. This does not mean that there is no oppression among those who are recognized as human, but that their struggles for freedom within this space are of a different order from that of Black people, as the space of these internal conflicts is constituted by anti-Blackness. In order for there to be security for humanity, in order for the liberal subject, civil society and a world of progress to function, Blackness must remain outside, as the counterpoint to the telos of modernity.

This throws into question calls for inclusion, for justice and for reparation, as well as the ability for the global system to be accountable for the suffering and death of Black people. If anti-Blackness is a structural necessity for the system to exist, then there can be no justice, no end to violence against Black people if the current system persists. The drive to include Black people in civil society, to promote multiculturalism, diversity and inclusion, leaves untouched the ontological condition of Blackness, which is required to maintain the borders of humanity. The radical force of Black liberation movements was blunted by the drive to assimilate them, to include Black people in the political sphere, to recognize and celebrate their ‘ethnic identity’, without addressing the fundamental condition of Blackness. In the USA, anti-Black violence remains a necessity to maintain security, despite the inclusion of Black people at all levels of government. Inclusivity does not ameliorate the problem; it merely obfuscates it. As Frank Wilderson (2010: 103) argues, ‘few characters aestheticize White supremacy more effectively and persuasively than a Black male cop’. American governance is not ‘haunted’ by race, it is constituted through race.

Thus the line between humanity and Blackness is not shattered through the inclusion of some Black people in the space of civil society; rather, it is reinforced. In South Africa, the Black inhabitants of townships continue to endure state violence and poverty despite the formal end of apartheid. Black activists now protest against their government by ‘black boers’ (settlers), those who have crossed the line into humanity only to fortify it against their former compatriots (Madlingozi, 2017). This is because, as Tsepho Madlingozi (2017: 14) argues, ‘the main edifice of the ontological structure of colonial-apartheid . . . remains in place’. In order to ensure the security of settler society, those few who have been inducted into it must maintain the violence of the anti-Black order that is said to be overturned.

Security, then, is sustained through anti-Blackness, for if the abject non-subject of the Black experience does not exist as a point of contrast, then humanity cannot be safe. The subjectivity of the (non-Black) human is imperilled, without the safety of anti-Black violence that ensures its ontological integrity. If this is the case, then we must re-read the call to bring considerations of race and racism into critical security studies and question the feasibility of achieving an ethico-political reparation in a discipline that relies on the structure of an anti-Black system.

#### Security discourse and the eurocentrist project of the affirmative is rooted in anti-Black racism

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Second, securitization theory’s Eurocentrism has been challenged by scholarship that asks whether applying securitization theory to the non-West upends or modifies the theory (Bilgin, 2010, 2011; Wilkinson, 2007), a question echoed by some of securitization theory’s original proponents (see Greenwood and Wæver, 2013). However, securitization theory has never ignored the ‘non-West’. As we will show, it draws heavily on racist accounts of spaces outside Europe that reify a stark division between ‘West’ and ‘non-West’ without examining colonial relationalities. Critics of securitization theory’s Eurocentrism assert that we cannot assume a (functioning, democratic) European state in non-West spaces, but ignore the (settler-)colonial underpinnings of the state system and border cartographies. Seeing the issue solely as the analytical exclusion of the ‘non-West’, they decry ‘Eurocentrism’ while retaining racist political thought. We adopt a more robust analysis (see Sabaratnam, 2013) that views Eurocentrism as involving the ideas that: (1) ‘Europe’ or ‘the West’ is ontologically distinctive; (2) European development was endogenous; and (3) European cultural and political achievements were subsequently diffused across the world. Additionally, we deploy concepts beyond Eurocentrism (civilizationism, methodological whiteness, and antiblack racism) to grapple with the role of racist political thought in securitization theory.

Third, an emerging body of scholarship has moved significantly beyond a thin interpretation of Eurocentrism to inquire into how securitization theory can better account for colonialism (Bertrand, 2018) and racism (Amin-Khan, 2012; Ibrahim, 2005; Mofette and Vadasaria, 2016). This work has highlighted how ‘securitizations’ are animated by racialized threat imaginaries (Ibrahim, 2005; Mofette and Vadasaria, 2016). At times, work in this field acknowledges that securitization theory relies on a norm/exception binary that risks minimizing the racial violence of normal (liberal) politics. However, the retention of securitization theory’s methodology means the focus remains on speech acts. This risks limiting our understanding of racism and colonialism to a matter merely of (racist) language. For example, in examining migration, the literature on race and securitization focuses primarily on politicians or other authoritative speakers framing migrants as security threats. What then tends to fall out of view is how the control of the movement of racialized people has been and continues to be constitutive of the ‘normal’ liberal order (Gutiérrez Rodríguez, 2018). Even when a historical approach is taken, the focus is on historical instances of speech acts or the ‘securitization’ of migration, instead of, for example, the impacts of colonial drawing of borders or ongoing settler-colonial occupation. Merely ‘adding’ race to securitization theory is insufficient to account for the raciality and coloniality of global politics. By instead excavating the fundamental racism of securitization theory’s concepts and methods, and its reliance on an eclectic canon of racist political thought, we can more fully explore the operations of racialization in security theory and practice.

### AT: No Link/Link of Omission – “Security”

#### Link of Commission – “security” cannot be disentangled from racial violence - The security logics of the plan are intrinsically rooted in white supremacy

**Machold,** University of Glasgow Lecturer in International Relations in Politics **and Charrett**, University of Westminster Senior Lecturer in Global Politics**, 21**  (Rhys and Catherine, 2021, Security Dialogue2021, Vol. 52(S) 38–48, "Beyond ambivalence: Locating thewhiteness of security", https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/09670106211031044, pages 7-8 accessed on 7-8-2022 hooch//cs)

Answering this question requires taking stock of how critical security studies’ orientation to security squares with wider questions concerning power and structure in global politics. In developing non-traditional approaches to security, critical security studies has cultivated an important critical distance from state security and (neo)realist accounts of war-making as security. Guided by an imperative to decentre material relationships, however, critical security studies has embraced a commitment to open-ended and ambivalent accounts of power, which unmoor security from histories and structures (Barkawi, 2011). As a result, critical security studies broadly (and its poststructuralist variants in particular) ‘fail[s] . . . to adequately situate security within complex entanglements with other technologies of power’ (Coleman and Rosenow, 2016: 203). This tendency to abstract security from wider power configurations, we suggest, has largely precluded critical approaches to security from apprehending racism as a structural form of power in global politics that serves capital and colonial prerogatives – albeit with notable exceptions (e.g. AbuBakare, 2020; Ali, 2020; Axster et al., 2021; Eastwood, 2019; Manchanda and Rossdale, 2021). This poses a specific problem for any critical engagement of racism in relation to security: Racism only makes sense as a form of power and technology of governing insofar as it does specific kinds of work, namely, (re)producing differences and hierarchies in the service of capital and empire. To imply that ‘security’ can be bracketed off from and thereby detached from its imbrication in long histories of race-making, capitalism and empire (Jelly-Schapiro, 2018; Singh, 2017) is naïve, untenable and complicit in the (re)production of structural white supremacy.

As a corrective to these tendencies, we suggest that security needs to be apprehended as a concept, a set of power relations and governing regimes that are dynamic but do specific work for capital, colonization and, hence, race-making. To this end, we call for a closer engagement with three sets of literature. First, we argue that Marxist critiques of security and pacification theory can help locate security materially within ongoing histories of imperial, colonial and capitalist domination. Yet, while these theorizations of security crucially foreground material and ideological considerations, their core texts engage only tangentially with questions of race and racism. Thus, second, we suggest that critical security studies needs to engage with theoretical traditions that situate race and racism as foundational to capitalism and the maintenance of the colonial/modern world system (Quijano, 2000, 2007). We detail some key insights from these literatures, which illuminate the particular work security does for racial domination and violent dispossession. Third, and finally, in contrast to longstanding currents in critical security studies that locate security as a source of emancipation (Booth, 1991), we argue that security needs to be dismantled by engaging with abolitionist thought and praxis.

Drawing on these literatures, we begin to unpack the foundationally raced precepts of security and offer some suggestions for critical security research. We argue that race cannot be ‘tacked on’ as a qualifier but needs to be addressed as a structure that informs how we apprehend security in the first instance. In doing so, we locate security as a justification for violence and the legitimation of the mechanisms through which this violence is waged. We suggest that critical security studies needs to reckon more seriously with how security projects and the kinds of social orders they enact are always already racial orders too, predicated on the production of racialized ‘Others’ in need of elimination. The focus should be on interrogating how processes of racialization work in relation to security, along with the structures they depend on and the ends they serve. ‘Security’, we argue, is the term used both to hide racial violence and Native dispossession and annihilation and to legitimate this same violence. Drawing on terminology from literature on the imperial origins and raced foundations of police (Singh, 2014), we call on critical security studies to contend with what we call the whiteness of security. This can assist efforts to locate the particular roles that security plays in the normalization of group-differentiated violence (Gilmore, 2002) and the forms of value accrued therein. Locating the whiteness of security, however, does not imply that racial categories and their attending power structures, sites and objects of violence are stable and totalizing – quite the contrary. While we spell out some new analytical and political avenues, there is much more to be said about how security is implicated in material dispossession and race-making beyond what we are able to detail here. We propose five starting points for apprehending the intersections of race–security.

### Link – NATO

#### NATO’s roots and ideological foundations are guided and sustained by racism and anti-Blackness

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Race is not a perspective on international relations; it is a central organizing feature of world politics. Anti-Japanese racism guided and sustained U.S. engagement in World War II, and broader anti-Asian sentiment influenced the development and structure of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. During the Cold War, racism and anti-communism were inextricably linked in the containment strategy that defined Washington’s approach to Africa, Asia, Central America, the Caribbean, and South America. And today race shapes threat perception and responses to violent extremism, inside and outside the “war on terror.” Yet mainstream international relations (IR) scholarship denies race as essential to understanding the world, to the cost of the field’s integrity.

Take the “big three” IR paradigms: realism, liberalism, and constructivism. These dominant frames for understanding global politics are built on raced and racist intellectual foundations that limit the field’s ability to answer important questions about international security and organization. Core concepts, like anarchy and hierarchy, are raced: They are rooted in discourses that center and favor Europe and the West. These concepts implicitly and explicitly pit “developed” against “undeveloped,” “modern” against “primitive,” “civilized” against “uncivilized.” And their use is racist: These invented binaries are used to explain subjugation and exploitation around the globe

While realism and liberalism were built on Eurocentrism and used to justify white imperialism, this fact is not widely acknowledged in the field. For instance, according to neorealists, there exists a “balance of power” between and among “great powers.” Most of these great powers are, not incidentally, white-majority states, and they sit atop the hierarchy, with small and notably less-white powers organized below them. In a similar vein, raced hierarchies and conceptions of control ground the concept of cooperation in neoliberal thought: Major powers own the proverbial table, set the chairs, and arrange the place settings.

Constructivism, which rounds out the “big three” approaches, is perhaps best positioned to tackle race and racism. Constructivists reject the as-given condition of anarchy and maintain that anarchy, security, and other concerns are socially constructed based on shared ideas, histories, and experiences. Yet with few notable exceptions, constructivists rarely acknowledge how race shapes what is shared.

### Link – Biotech

#### Biotechnical apparati exist for the sole purpose of the propagation of race and the optimization of bodies which are exploited by capitalism

**Ahuja,**University of California professor of feminist studies **18** (Neel, 2018, Google Books, "Control Culture", https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=CzpJEAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PA34&dq=anti+blackness+and+biotechnology&ots=4n3luLhwU4&sig=KU056MZ7VcXQOu\_-vdc2kvUnnxk#v=onepage&q&f=false accessed on 7-10-2022 hooch//cs)

Control names a dynamic mode of power which seeks to proliferate difference in order to modulate and contain its disruptive force. ‘Thus, one starting point for a critique of control is to think with and through its dependency on difference, including difference marked as racial. From this premise, its possible to pursue how racial assemblages constitute the ideological grounds for accounts of control, and explore why control might become an increasingly salient metaphor for racial power as the political centrality of race intensifies with the global rise of ethnonationalism and outright fascism. Although thinking of race as a matter of technical control of bodies involves working through posthumanist and new- materialist methods for social analysis, it also involves retrospectively interpreting the role of racial difference in the constitution of control theory’s paranoid figuration of technology and the state. In the works of William Burroughs and Gilles Deleuze, control exhibits a desire for the destruction of subjectivity through constant modulations of difference and the integration of individuals into networked aspirations of capitalist accumulation. This rhetoric on the technological penetration of the body by the state, I will argue, reflects a generalization of existing forms of race war into the Cold War state form, allowing for control theory to appear deracinated and globalized. Nonetheless, the critique of control demonstrates the importance of the concept for grappling with deter- ritorialised models of empire, in which race is affectively modulated across media environments, biotechnologies and war apparatuses. From this vantage point, the engagement of race and control charts.a different path for critical race theory than do the largely polemical critiques by some Deleuzeans of the structuralism and representationalism of racial formation theory. The intersection of race and control poses questions of whether and how contemporary forms of empire are able to take hold of race’s plastic potential for differentiation.

‘The horror of control emerges not in the active attempt of a commanding operator to overcome resistance, but in the dream of a total realisation of the ‘operator’s control. At that point control itself vanishes. In William Burroughs’ 1978 essay “The Limits of Control’, the capability of the state to exercise control over a population is presented as inherently limited by the agency of subjects who potentially resist the control order. However, the imagined realisation of control also marks control’s vanishing point, as the transformation of a responding subject into an object of domination also marks its release from a dynamic of control into one of mere use: Control also needs opposition or acquiescence; otherwise it ceases to be control ... I control a slave, a dog, a worker; but if I establish com- plete control somehow, as by implanting electrodes in the brain, then my subject is little more than a tape recorder, a camera, a robot, You don’t control a tape recorder — you use it .. . All control systems try to make control as tight as possible, but at the same time, if they succeeded completely, there would be nothing left to control, Suppose for example a control system installed electrodes in the brains of all prospective workers at birth, Control is now complete. Even the thought of rebellion is neurologically impossible, No police force is necessary. No psycho- logical control is necessary, other than pushing buttons, (Burroughs 1978: 38)

### Link – Artificial Intelligence

#### Anti-Black narratives are ingrained in Artificial Intelligence and get perpetuated throughout the fields in which they’re utilized

**Marinucci et al.** Cognitive Sciences and Technologies National Research Council**, 22** [Ludovica, Claudia Mazzuca, and Aldo Gangemi, Institute of, Department Department of Dynamic, Clinical Psychologyand Health, Sapienza University of Rome, Department of Classical and ItalianPhilology, University of Bologna, 13-4-2022, SpringerLink, "Exposing implicit biases and stereotypes in human and artificial intelligence: state of the art and challenges with a focus on gender - AI & SOCIETY", [https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00146-022-01474-3 accessed on 7-10-2022](https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s00146-022-01474-3%20accessed%20on%207-10-2022) hooch//cs]

In the past few years, many researches unambiguously showed that gender biases, as well as racial biases, are found in Artificial Intelligence (AI). The AI-generated patterns, predictions, and recommended actions reflect the accuracy and reliability of the datasets used for training, as well as the assumptions and biases of the developers of the algorithms employed. Therefore, algorithms and devices have the potential of spreading and reinforcing harmful stereotypes. Such biases expose women, and especially women of color, at the risk of being left behind in economic, political, and social life. In fact, not only machine algorithms make movie recommendations, suggest products to buy, and perform automatic language translation, but they are also increasingly used in high-stakes decisions in health care systems (Obermeyer et al. 2019), bank loan applications (Mukerjee et al. 2002), hiring (Peng et al. 2019), and even in courts to assess the probability that a defendant recommits a crime. An example is the COMPAS (Correctional Offender Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions)1 software, used in the United States (US) to decide whether to release or not an offender. An investigation into the software found a bias against African-Americans such that COMPAS was more likely to assign higher risk scores to African-American offenders than to Caucasians with the same profile (Dressel and Farid 2018). While AI poses significant threats to gender and racial equality, it is important to recognize that it also has the potential to make positive changes in our societies by showing us, and thus making us aware of, that the same automatic processes of our mind are embedded in the external objects we design

### Link – CyberSecurity

#### Cyber-”security” is predicated on anti-black racism and is underpinned by colonialist thought

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Securitization theory has unquestionably made a significant impact. Its founding texts are among the most widely cited international relations scholarship (see Buzan and Wæver, 2003; Buzan et al., 1998; Wæver, 1995; Wæver et al., 1993), spawning active research programs and new ‘generations’ of securitization theory. The concept of securitization has travelled to disciplines beyond international relations, and even entered public discourse. What is so appealing about this theory? Perhaps the most tempting aspect of securitization theory is its methodological rigor. It provides a clear set of steps and standards for identifying how referent objects (e.g. migration, health, cyberspace) become security problems and deciding whether they should indeed be ‘securitized’. This readymade methodology can be applied to all sorts of empirical areas. However, students and scholars of security ought to resist this temptation of a readymade approach and inquire more deeply into securitization theory’s core theoretical assumptions and methodology

This article argues that racist thought is fundamental and integral to classic securitization theory’s conceptual and methodological project. While other scholarship has worked either to incorporate analysis of race into securitization theory (Amin-Khan, 2012; Ibrahim, 2005; Mofette and Vadasaria, 2016) or to overcome securitization theory’s Eurocentrism (Bilgin, 2010, 2011; Wilkinson, 2007), this article offers something different. It is the first to excavate the foundations of securitization theory in racist thought. We demonstrate that classic securitization theory is fundamentally and inextricably structured not only by Eurocentrism but also by civilizationism, methodological whiteness, and antiblack racism

What does it mean to excavate the racist foundations of a theory? That we use the ‘r-word’ and white supremacy as categories of analysis is sure to raise eyebrows. Even sympathetic readers might wonder if the problem we identify is more appropriately characterized as Eurocentrism. Critique of the Eurocentric character of much Western scholarship and cultural production has made significant inroads across academic disciplines, including international relations (Hobson, 2012; Sabaratnam, 2013). Our analysis is inspired by this research and extends some of its insights. Yet there is more to be said. Black studies and decolonial scholarship demonstrate that much orthodox and critical Western social and political thought is predicated upon epistemological and ontological premises that are not simply Eurocentric but racist, specifically white supremacist. In international relations, recent debates have addressed the question of whether postcolonial international relations should proceed solely through an analytic of Eurocentrism or whether we need to more specifically address racism and white supremacism (Gruffydd Jones, 2016; Hozić, 2016; Rutazibwa, 2016; Sajed, 2016). Sajed (2016: 168) suggests that the term ‘Eurocentric’ potentially neutralizes the foundational and continuing racism of the discipline. Rutazibwa (2016: 192) asks, ‘what existing power structure does this reluctance [to name racism] serve?’

Echoing these concerns, we ask: What is at stake in the reluctance to name racism in analyses of international security? Racism is a fundamental system of power that has profoundly shaped the world for the past several hundred years. Moreover, as is now well established, international relations emerged to provide intellectual support for the imperial and (settler-)colonial ambitions of Western states (Agathangelou and Ling, 2004a; Krishna, 2001; Vitalis, 2000, 2015). Drawing on black studies, indigenous studies, and decolonial scholarship, we illustrate the racist modes of thought that underpin classic securitization theory by deploying three concepts beyond Eurocentrism: civilizationism, methodological whiteness, and antiblack racism

### Link - Disinformation

#### Strategic appeals to combating disinformation that don’t account for identity propaganda are premised on pre-existing hierarchies that underlie social orders and reaffirm marginalizing structures of power.

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(Madhavi Reddi, Rachel Kuo, and Daniel Kreiss, University Of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Center for Information Technology, and Public Life Graduate Fellow, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, and Principal Researcher, SAGE Journals, 7-17-2021, "Identity propaganda: Racial narratives and disinformation," New Media & Society, p. 5-6, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/14614448211029293, accessed 7-1-2022) SS:/

Identity propaganda exploits social orders as communication strategically designed to undermine or manipulate target populations in pursuance of a political goal through appeals about identity or identities that accord with racial and other power structures. By “identity,” we mean broadly the understanding that individuals and groups have of who they are fundamentally in relation to others and in relation to systems of power (Combahee River Collective Statement, 1977; Lorde, 1984). Identity is premised on social differences and hierarchies. People, along with organizations and institutions, draw forms of distinction and boundaries between self and others and groups, including to advocate for or safeguard political interests. For example, as Cheryl Harris (1993) observes, white racial identity emerges as an exclusionary and contingent property where systems of racial classification operate in ways to protect power. Actively constructed over time, identity categories can dynamically and flexibly shift and evolve and, as such, are not simply static constants (Nash, 2008). However, identities can also become historically enduring social facts through persistent stories, symbols, rituals, and institutions, such as legal categories (Browne, 2015; Harris, 1993). At the same time, individuals possess many overlapping identities—racial and ethnic, citizenship, geographic, religion, partisan, and so on—that can be made salient for political affiliations and alignments. Indeed, the communicative construction of identities and process of making them politically and collectively salient as the basis of symbolic and social action is a central aspect of political leadership, social movements, and public life more broadly (Daniels, 2009; Jackson, 2016; Kido Lopez, 2016; Kreiss et al., 2020; Peck, 2019; Polletta and Jasper, 2001).

Actors strategically use identity propaganda to construct, make salient, or undermine aspects of identities in accord with larger structures of power—for example, white supremacy, heteronormativity, or patriarchy. Many Black feminist scholars have pointed out the simultaneity of multiple structures of domination (Collins, 2009; Crenshaw, 1989; Davis, 1981; Lorde, 1984). Social hierarchies are organized through a “matrix of domination” (Collins, 2009) where intersecting oppressions structure agency and autonomy for individuals and groups. As a theory and method, intersectionality analyzes how different structures of domination connect and emerge through social processes (Nash, 2008). Examining identity propaganda through an intersectional lens reveals how strategic appeals are premised on pre-existing hierarchies that underlie national, regional, and global social orders. Various scholars have characterized these long-standing (and normalized) relations of domination and subordination in different ways (Du Bois, 1903; Hesse, 2016; Quijano, 2000; Said, 1978; Wynter, 2003). In accounting for cross-cutting structures of class, gender, sexuality, race, and ethnicity within social orders, identity propaganda works to reveal how symbolic articulations of power are structured by and shape political relations. In addition, our conceptualization of identity propaganda historicizes the problem of disinformation as one that far predates the 2016 elections by also drawing attention to the ways it unfolds through campaigns or sets of appeals that have underlying logics and forms.

#### Anti-disinfo measures fail to protect individual identity and reduces focus on combating violent power structures

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As with essentializing narratives, strategic campaigns and appeals that contest the authenticity of an individual’s or group’s identity are difficult to analyze under the standard umbrella of mis- or disinformation because they often lack a factual basis, referring more to normative constructions of difference. The authenticity of someone’s claim to racial and ethnic identity (particularly in the case of a multiracial person) or gender identity is subjective and layered, and cannot be assessed as true or false. Authenticating narratives reduce identity back down to the individual, drawing attention away from structural formations of power, whereas individual people, regardless of identity, may still align with dominant interests and the preservation of existing hierarchies of power. An identity propaganda framework enables researchers to examine these claims through the lens of both historical race relations and constructions, as well as structures of power behind these appeals

### Link – International Relations

#### IR is rooted in dominant norms of presumed whiteness and structures itself around racism (1nc shell link)

**Peterson**, University of Arizona Professor of International Relations**, 21**  (V Spike, 2021, Security Dialogue2021, Vol. 52(S) 17–27, "Critical privilege studies: Making visible the reproduction of racism in the everyday and international relations", <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/09670106211017369>, page 5, accessed on 7-8-2022 hooch//cs)

Racism is the oil in the system of colonial power that makes a sustained discrimination of and violence against certain people not only possible but also invisible and acceptable. (Rutazibwa, 2016: 196, emphasis added) The world is undeniably in trouble. Crises and corollary insecurities are legible everywhere, marked by environmental degradation, healthcare panics, stark inequalities, militarized conflicts, and the rise of authoritarian movements and virulent alt-right populisms. That racism figures in producing and structuring these entwined crises is widely recognized, and, given its disciplinary remit, international relations is best positioned to examine ‘the link between race as a structuring principle and the transnational processes of accumulation, dispossession, violence and struggle that emerge in its wake’ (Anievas et al., 2015: 9). Yet international relations’ problematic engagement with race is now well-documented, including the discipline’s ‘origin’ as an imperial racist project (Vitalis, 2015), the ‘willful amnesia’ that this encouraged (Krishna, 2001: 401), and the legacy of ‘racist epistemological assumptions that inform much of contemporary mainstream and even critical analyses of world politics’ (Sajed, 2016a: 168; see also Grovogui, 1996; Hobson, 2012; Gruffydd Jones, 2016). Revisiting points made in his 1997 book, Charles Mills (2015b: 542) concludes that ‘the racial contract is very much alive and well . . . and the “epistemology of ignorance” that now guards it is as active as ever’.

But the problem is larger. Despite abundant evidence of institutionalized racism, international relations persists not only in habitual neglect and a deeply flawed theorization of race, but also in actively resisting, marginalizing, depoliticizing, and hence devalorizing anti-racist research and those who produce it (Bhambra et al., 2020; Chowdhry and Rai, 2009; El-Malik, 2015; Shilliam, 2020; Vitalis, 2015). Given epistemological priorities, we might expect this resistance by conventionally ahistorical, non-reflexive mainstream scholars. But it is unexpected and poses fundamental questions when ardent resistance to critique is practiced by self-identified critical scholars, whose objectives presumably extend beyond the production of ‘more accurate descriptions’ to include the reduction, or at least mitigation, of structural violence. How is it possible for those who claim a critical orientation to be so ill-prepared, and evidently unwilling, to address ‘the daily, structural racism that unmistakably continues to plague our societies’ (Rutazibwa, 2016: 192)? What taken-for-granted premises and practices reproduce the invisibility of racism and the apparent acceptance of its harms? What are we failing to ‘see’, and how does this compromise what critical security studies and international relations scholars have to offer, especially in the face of mounting crises and the urgency of developing more adequate analyses?

Taking the social violence of systemic (structural, institutionalized) racism as its starting point, my essay assumes that race ‘is a central organizing feature of world politics’ (Zvobgo and Loken, 2020), that ‘epistemic racism is intrinsic to Western knowledge structures’ and pervades international relations theorizing (Howell and Richter-Montpetit, 2020: 4; see also Gruffydd Jones, 2016; Sabaratnam, 2020), and that ‘taking the problem of racism seriously in the field of [international relations] means viewing it not merely as an issue of stereotypes or cultural insensitivities, but as a colonial technology of life and premature death built on ideologies of whiteness and white supremacy’ (Rutazibwa, 2020). My forum intervention, then, takes up Olivia Rutazibwa’s (2016: 199) call ‘to contribute to a radically different, anti- or non-racist [international relations] and everyday’, and I do so by examining how the everyday and everywhere power relations of white privilege make the reproduction of racism ‘not only possible but also invisible and acceptable’ (Rutazibwa, 2016: 196). While I address the forum’s focus on racism, I note that more adequate critical theorizing is undermined if the reciprocally constructed phenomena of structural inequalities and systems of privilege are treated in isolation.

### Link – Global Order

#### Race and Identity are inextricable from hegemonic power regimes which makes a break between the colonial and postcolonial inconceivable

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Having grasped the nature of the relationship between anti-Blackness and security, let us reflect on the assumptions underpinning the desire to rejuvenate the criticality of the field through reparative approaches to race. We see a potential problem with the argument that the recent important work by the scholars like Sabaratnam (2020) and Rutazibwa (2020) on security’s racial underpinnings has cleared the ground for a project of accounting and reparation while maintaining existing academic fields recognizably intact. Indeed, recent work on race in security and global politics has highlighted many potential issues, demonstrating the substantial challenge facing reparative projects. As Anna Agathangelou and Kyle Killian (2016) demonstrate, considered ontologically, coloniality is much more than a set of space- and time-specific policy practices, but rather a world-making (and worlds-destroying) practice through which our understanding of global space and time is constructed (see also Grovogui, 2014; Jackson, 2020; Silva, 2007). Moreover, critical sociological accounts of security and international relations argue that the imposition of racial difference is intimately tied to colonial and settler-colonial power as a technique of control and regulation that naturalizes and reproduces differential powers and capacities (e.g. Henderson, 2013; Nisancioglu, 2020). Race and white supremacy are thus inextricable from hegemonic regimes of power and imposition, at the heart of the discipline, despite the abstract categories of liberal political theory that structurally operate to occlude the centrality of race to contemporary political divisions and understandings. As Gurminder Bhambra argues (2017), the location of race is often displaced – to claims to identity and difference, seen to be racial – while white-coded framings of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘class’ obscure their racialized grounding. This important work on the nature of race and racism in security studies shows that the problem is not so much one of a lack of incorporation of questions of race and racism, but rather that of a thoroughgoing saturation in issues of race. This ontological saturation implies that there can be no definitive temporal break between the colonial past and a postcolonial present. Coloniality remains in the present not only in residue, but rather as an ‘ongoing and quotidian atrocity’, inevitably problematizing attempts at reparation (see discussion in Sharpe, 2016: 20). We are thereby fully sympathetic to Howell and Richter-Montpetit’s (2019) understanding that ‘questions of race and racism’ cannot be disentangled from critical security studies or, for that matter, the broader field of international relations. As Jared Sexton (2008: 22) powerfully notes, any attempt to separate ‘questions of race and racism’ from systems, structures and institutions of power already risks disavowing the centrality of race and its reduction to a secondary or contingent aspect.

### Link - Nuclear war

#### Racist narratives and the “love of the bomb” sit at the heart of whiteness and eurocentrism- their nuclear sword-shaking manifests as racist violence

**ICAN,**international campaign to stigmatise, prohibit & eliminate nuclear weapons **21** (The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons,., 12-16-2021, , ICAN, "Racism and nuclear weapons", [https://www.icanw.org/racism\_and\_nuclear\_weapons accessed on 7-10-2022](https://www.icanw.org/racism_and_nuclear_weapons%20accessed%20on%207-10-2022) hooch//cs)

Systemic racism plagues all levels of society, and the international level is certainly no exception. National and international security priorities have been dominated by white Western elite, at the expense of peoples of colour around the world. While indigenous people and peoples of colour have borne the brunt of Western militarism, their contributions to international peace and security are too often overlooked.

This is clearly the case with nuclear weapons. Indian author and activist Arundhati Roy said nuclear weapons were at ‘the very heart of whiteness’.1 Racism is embedded in history and doctrine of nuclear weapons. Indigenous peoples and communities of colour across the world have been disproportionately harmed by these weapons. While Indigenous peoples and peoples of colour have played a key role in nuclear resistance movements for decades, established nuclear weapons teachings too often ignore their contributions and perspectives.

Racism is at the core of fundamental assumptions about nuclear weapons policy: who is permitted to develop nuclear weapons, who is listened to and on whom the United States has considered dropping its nuclear weapons.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) codified what has been described as a “nuclear apartheid” which divides states parties into nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear weapons states. The five nuclear-armed states – China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States position themselves as responsible nuclear powers, while deeming other countries, including countries predominantly of colour and former colonies, as irresponsible and illegitimate, including North Korea, India and Pakistan.

The non-nuclear majority of states are too often sidelined in conversations about nuclear weapons dominated by the five nuclear-weapon states recognised by the NPT. At the United Nations, the majority of countries who do not have nuclear weapons are often deemed irrelevant and less serious than the permanent five members of the UN Security Council in international fora. A pertinent example of this was the 2017 negotiations of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), where non-western negotiating states were often portrayed as “irrational”, “emotional” and somehow “less capable” of negotiating a Treaty than Western governments.

U.S. presidents have contemplated a nuclear first strike on predominantly populations of colour: the Taiwan Straits, North Korea, North Vietnam and China.2 In the only place where the United States did use nuclear weapons in wartime, the public widely supported the bombing partly due to anti-Japanese racism, depicting Japanese people in ‘subhuman terms, in some cases fit for extermination

Nuclear-armed states consistently tested their nuclear weapons in spaces they wrongly deemed ‘distant’ and ‘empty’, that were away from national metropoles where decision-makers lived.4 This led to many nuclear nations testing their weapons in their dependent territories or colonies in which Indigenous peoples were situated with ancestral connections to their lands and waters, such as in New Mexico, Nevada, the Marshall Islands, Montebello Island, Maralinga and Emu Field in Australia, Kiribati (formerly the Gilbert and Ellice Island Colony), Kazakhstan, Xinjiang, Algeria and French Polynesia. For decades, Indigenous peoples were displaced and relocated, suffering devastating humanitarian consequences, including cancers and mental illness, irradiated environments and food sources. This has also dramatically impacted how Indigenous peoples have been able to tread the road to independence.

In the Pacific, over 315 nuclear tests were held across the region, many of which were many times larger than the ones used in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The U.S. government purposefully allowed a cloud of radioactive fallout to descend upon Rongelap atoll with its peoples present to later conduct human experiments on the impacts of testing.5

In Kazakhstan, Soviet elites chose the “uninhabited” land around Semipalatinsk, which was the source of livelihood for thousands of people, who grazed livestock in the area and sold meat thought the Soviet Union, as well as culturally significant for the Kazak people.6 The disproportionate impact of nuclear-weapon activities on indigenous peoples is recognised in the preamble of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.7

### Link – Democracy

#### Global democracy upholds anti-Black violence - in even the “freest” democracy, governance is still steeped in racism

**Quarcoo,**Harvard University MPA, International Relations **20** (Ashley Quarcoo, 7-15-2020, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "Global Democracy Supporters Must Confront Systemic Racism", [https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/07/15/global-democracy-supporters-must-confront-systemic-racism-pub-82298 accessed on 7-10-2022](https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/07/15/global-democracy-supporters-must-confront-systemic-racism-pub-82298%20accessed%20on%207-10-2022) hooch//cs)

The global narrative on the use of police violence against Black people rightly centers around the problem in the United States: the country’s incarceration rate is the highest in the world, Black people make up one-third of the entire prison population but only 12 percent of the total population, and the recent murder of George Floyd has accentuated a history of brutal killings of Black people. Moreover, Floyd’s death finally seems to have moved public opinion. In a recent survey by the Pew Research Center, two-thirds of Americans now express support for the Black Lives Matter movement.

Yet focusing exclusively on the United States neglects the extent to which systemic racism deeply permeates law enforcement and criminal justice in other highly developed Western democratic countries. A study in Canada on fatal police encounters from 2000 to 2017 found that Black people made up nearly 37 percent of the victims in Toronto, even though they comprised only 8 percent of the population. In Australia, Black Lives Matter solidarity protests sparked protests against the police killings of indigenous Australians, who are also grossly overrepresented in Australia’s prisons relative to their small population size. And like in the United States, there is rarely any accountability for police brutality; in the United Kingdom, for example, there has not been a successful prosecution for a death in police custody in over fifty years.

Racial profiling of Black people is also widespread, even in countries often held up as models of democratic governance by the international community. For example, for the last three years, Freedom House has rated Finland as one of the freest countries in the world, earning a perfect score in the Freedom in the World Index. However, according to the “Being Black in the EU” survey, administered by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights across all twenty-eight EU member states in 2018, Finland recorded the highest rates of race-based harassment and violence. Participants in a separate three-year study of racial profiling in Finland described in detail their experiences of being stopped in public spaces predominantly because of their race or ethnicity—including in railway and metro stations, cars, shops and parks, and restaurants and bars and on the way to work and school. The study notes the variety of state security actors engaged in profiling, including the police, border guards, and customs officers, as well as private security guards, bouncers, and salespeople. Such pervasive levels of harassment and surveillance of Black people in many Western democracies stand in sharp contrast to the accolades often given to these “free” societies.

In the United States, racial bias in policing and the violence it can generate have eroded the state’s relationship with Black communities, diminishing trust and lowering expectations for what residents of a democratic country should expect from their government. There are signs that similar trends are also occurring in other Western democracies, where Black people who experience policy brutality or other kinds of racial discrimination feel they have no recourse. According to the “Being Black in the EU” survey, a majority of victims of racist physical attacks by police officers did not report the most recent incident because they felt doing so would not change anything or because they did not trust or were afraid of the police. Because of a lack of trust, Europeans of African descent are also not reporting incidents of discrimination, such as being unable to obtain access to employment or housing. According to the survey, only 14 percent of victims of race-based harassment reported their experiences to the police, human rights institutions, or any other authority, despite knowing about such institutions and the relevant antidiscrimination laws.

### Link – State Failure

#### Discourse of civilizational collapse is irredeemably rooted in imperial and racialized imagination

**Howell** Rutgers University **and Richter-Montpetit** University of Sussex**, 19** (Allison and Melanie, 2019, Security Dialogue1–20, "Is securitization theory racist? Civilizationism, methodological whiteness, and antiblack thought in the Copenhagen School", [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333420811\_Is\_Securitization\_Theory\_Racist\_Civilizationism\_Methodological\_Whiteness\_and\_Antiblack\_thought\_in\_the\_Copenhagen\_School accessed on 7-11-2022](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333420811_Is_Securitization_Theory_Racist_Civilizationism_Methodological_Whiteness_and_Antiblack_thought_in_the_Copenhagen_School%20accessed%20on%207-11-2022) hooch//cs)

Discourses of state failure are ‘irredeemably rooted in an imperial and racialized imagination’ (Gruffydd Jones, 2015: 65; see also Grovogui, 2001; Shilliam, 2013; Wai, 2012a, 2012b). While they may avoid overt reference to race, they operate within a lineage of racial discourse that emerged to justify colonialism and continuing trusteeship. This racial hierarchy is fully represented in securitization theory’s list of weak and failing states: Nigeria under Abacha, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Liberia, and ‘various parts of Africa’, the USSR under Stalin, Bosnia, Colombia, Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and so on (see Buzan et al., 1998: 28, 50, 69, 146). This is a racial discourse: ‘primal anarchy’ is primarily located in ‘brown’ (‘Afghanistan’) and ‘black’ (‘parts of Africa’) regions

Copenhagen School theorists sometimes seem to be aware of how this division falls. This does not lead them to question it. On the contrary, they warn against Western-centrism, but only in order to emphasize that it is in the West that ‘normal’ civilized politics exists: ‘if domestic and international were fixed, there would be a risk of generating a cozy Western view of politics: Domestic politics is normal and without security, whereas the extreme is relegated to the international space. In other parts of the world, domestic is not cozy’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 47n7). For securitization theory, primal anarchy exists, not only in the international realm, but also in non-Western ‘other parts of the world’, where a failure of normal politics leads to ‘“tribalist” forms of association’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 69).

Securitization theory refuses to seriously consider the role of modern colonialism and ongoing imperial warfare in ‘failed states’. Such consideration might reveal the significance of Western colonial divide-and-rule policies, extraction of resources and labor, imposition of state borders, and military and covert intervention. Instead, securitization theory frames ‘failed states’ as evidence of a primal state of nature.

Civilizationism is not just a collateral, detachable, part of securitization theory’s imaginary, or a sadly unattended-to implication of its Kaplanesque view of anarchy or its Arendtian model of politics. The idea that there has been (white) civilizational progress away from (racialized) primal anarchy is omnipresent in securitization theory because it is fundamental to securitization theory’s opposition between politicization and securitization. Ungrounded in the racist and civilizationist narrative that ‘normal politics’ emerged from ‘primal anarchy’, this opposition would look as arbitrary as it in fact is.

### Link – K Affs

#### Attempts at criticality rely of grammars of suffering which construct the human as an autonomous subject and are rooted exclusion of Blackness

**Chandler,** University of Westminster Professor of International Relations, **and Chipato**, University of Ottawa CIPS postdoctoral fellow,**21**  (David and Farai, 2021, Security Dialogue 2021, Vol. 52(S) 60–68,"A call for abolition: The disavowal and displacement of race in critical security studies", [https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/09670106211024413 accessed on 7-9-2022](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/09670106211024413%20accessed%20on%207-9-2022), hooch//cs)

Being critical necessitates having a standpoint, being a subject in relation. For the white world of modernity, critical standpoints enabled the overturning of the relation, freeing the subject from its oppression, alienation or exploitation. As Frank B. Wilderson (2010: 37) notes, these ‘grammars of suffering’ are grounded upon anti-Blackness, grounded upon the construction of the human as an abstract, autonomous, interest-bearing, rational subject. Wilderson argues that the exclusion of Blackness from humanity was required as a counterpart, an outside that allowed for the construction of the modern human subject. Thus, critique, in the sense of striving for emancipation under the conditions of modernity, is ontologically grounded in anti-Blackness. For ‘critique’, then, ‘questions of race and racism’ are problems of management and damage limitation, problems of experience not problems of ontology. Addressing ‘questions of race and racism’ is the form that governance takes, the practice of grounding this governance itself. Critique is what puts antiBlackness to work in its ceaseless desire to reproduce itself, to improve, to better, to be more adaptive, to be more inclusive – ever changing, ever learning, ever transforming. Therefore, the mere inclusion of questions of race and racism, which maintain the ontological structure of anti-Blackness, must perpetuate an anti-Black world. Critique is the endless search for the emancipation of the human, the quest for the realization of the full potential of an anti-Black world. The flight of critique today can be rewritten as the perpetual denial of and war on Blackness, that which enables and ‘makes invisible’ its grounds of violence.

# Impacts

### Impact – Root Cause of War

#### Anti-blackness manifests as the constructing force of international conflict, exploitation, and war

**Koomen,**Willamette University professor of international relations **19** (Jonneke, 8-2-2019, Oxford University Press, "International Relations/Black Internationalism: Reimagining Teaching and Learning about Global Politics", https://academic.oup.com/isp/article-abstract/20/4/390/5542978?redirectedFrom=fulltext accessed on 7-9-2022, hooch//cs)

“Should you not discuss racial prejudice as a prime cause of war?” (Du Bois 1915) The first unit of “International Relations/Black Internationalism” examines the causes of war and introduces students to key concepts in the field of international relations, including levels of analysis, the Westphalian nation-state, and anarchy. We first examine texts by realist and liberal thinkers, including debates about the democratic peace. We then turn to Du Bois’s “African Roots of War” (1915).9 “Should you not discuss racial prejudice as a prime cause of war?” Du Bois begged an audience in St. Louis and the readers of the Atlantic Monthly (1915, §29). He wrote, “today most men assume that Africa lies far afield from the center of our burning social problems, and especially from our present problem of World War” (1915, §1). This analysis remains pertinent for students and scholars of international relations more than one hundred years later—and at least as controversial.

Much more than a straightforward critique of Eurocentric thinking, Du Bois’s account of World War I offers alternative ways of thinking about international relations. Centering Africa in the study of world politics, past, present, and future, Du Bois writes, “in the Dark Continent are hidden the roots, not simply of war today but of the menace of wars tomorrow” (1915, §2). “The African Roots of War” offers a sharp contrast to both disciplinary and common sense accounts of war. To illustrate this point to students who are new to international relations, we read Du Bois alongside Stoessinger’s (1990) rich history of World War I, an explicitly Eurocentric narrative that employs a first-level analysis, and Mearsheimer’s (2001) offensive realism, which introduces students to the abstractions of structural realism, its understandings of anarchy, unitary actors, and the security dilemma. “The African Roots of War” expands the questions students can ask about international violence. Rather than focusing on the immediate causes of the outbreak of war in July 1914, Du Bois’s account delves into the history of imperial violence around the globe, from the “sinister traffic” of the slave trade, through the Concert of Europe, the Berlin Conference of 1884–85, to the “new imperialism” of the late 1800s.

Du Bois allows us to critically interrogate the “House of IR.” Du Bois’s international relations simultaneously engages and displaces ostensibly “race-neutral” guiding concepts of anarchy and social contract at the heart of realist and liberal accounts (Henderson 2014, 19). Du Bois describes the “world’s greed scurrying down the hot, mysterious coasts of Africa to the Good Hope” (1915, §5) in search of the continent’s “golden joys” (1915, §4). This centers the transatlantic slave trade, which “cost black Africa no less than 100,000,000 souls” and “the wreckage of its political and social life,” and which “left the continent in precisely that state of helplessness which invites aggression and exploitation” (Du Bois 1915, §8).

Moreover, “The African Roots of War” provokes a robust and critical engagement with the scholarly literature on the democratic peace. Du Bois (1915, §9) describes how European elites employed social-contract claims and appeals to democracy and citizenship to gain mass support for the “new imperialism” of the late nineteenth century. He writes: With the waning of the possibility of the Big Fortune, gathered by starvation wage and boundless exploitation of one’s weaker and poorer fellows at home, arise more magnificently the dream of exploitation abroad… Soon, however, the mass of merchants at home demanded a share in this golden stream; and finally, in the twentieth century, the laborer at home is demanding and beginning to receive a part of his share (1915, §12).

Du Bois’s brief account of the global history of white supremacy is instructive to many students. With the transatlantic slave trade, he proposes, “the world began to invest in color prejudice. The ‘Color Line’ began to pay dividends” (1915, §9, emphasis added). This point is worth stressing. Undergraduate students immersed in readings about the security dilemma may map common sense understandings of racism onto ahistorical, abstracted accounts (see discussion in Henderson 2014). Instead, Du Bois’s offers a political economy of white supremacy: The white workingman has been asked to share the spoil of exploiting “~~chinks and niggers.”~~ It is no longer simply the merchant prince, or the aristocratic monopoly, or even the employing class, that is exploiting the world: it is the nation; a new democratic nation composed of united capital and labor. The laborers are not yet getting, to be sure, as large a share as they want or will get, and there are still at the bottom large and restless excluded classes. But the laborer’s equity is recognized, and his just share is a matter of time, intelligence, and skillful negotiation (1915, §15).

Finally, Du Bois provides a manifesto for peace centered on land (1915, §34), education (1915, §35), self-determination (1915, §36) as a means to “economic power” (1915, §37), radically repurposing the liberal-imperialist lexicon of civilization and democracy. Du Bois calls explicitly on his US audience: Our duty is clear. Racial slander must go. Racial prejudice will follow. Steadfast faith in humanity must come. The domination of one people by another without the other’s consent, be the subject people black or white, must stop. The doctrine of forcible economic expansion over subject people must go. Religious hypocrisy must stop (1915, §40).

Racism, the fuel of the global economic system, is at the heart of Du Bois’s theory of international relations.11 Du Bois’s autobiography reinforces his scholarly contributions. Du Bois was a graduate student at Harvard, as well as in Berlin in 1892 (Du Bois 1968). As a student, he faced discrimination and struggled to finance his education. Our course follows Du Bois’s life and political work, inextricably tied to his scholarship. We follow him from the Pan-African Congresses from 1900 onward, his observations of the Versailles Conference, his presence at the founding of the United Nations, his petitions to the UN Human Rights Commission (where he pushed Eleanor Roosevelt to consider the limits of her vision), to his experience of US government repression, and his final years in Ghana. Some of these events are captured on photograph and film, which we examine in class

### Impact – Racism

#### security and notions of “community” are rooted in racialization, the otherizing force of the empire which generates the violence of racism

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Racial differentiation and its associated forms of violent dispossession are foundational of and intrinsic to historical capitalism, as elaborated by Cedric Robinson’s (2000) concept of ‘racial capitalism’ and Aníbal Quijano’s (2000) notion of the ‘coloniality of power’. Capitalism, race-making and empire must therefore be theorized in conjunction, yet without it being assumed that their violent structures are fixed. In unpacking the social construction of race and its relation to structures of power, critical race theory’s theorizations of racialization offer additional insights into race-making as ongoing processes involving ‘the extension of racial meaning to a previously unclassified relationship, social practice or group’ (Omi and Winant, 2014: 111). In this framework, race and racism are dynamic, yet guided by certain historical prerogatives. While importantly challenging the notion of race as based on biological essences, the racialization framework situates race as historically evolving but also as doing particular kinds of work. It is in this sense that Patrick Wolfe (2016) argues that race can be understood as a ‘trace of history’. Race is deeply ideological and works performatively in the service of empire and capital: ‘rather than simply describing human groups, [race] brings them into being as inter-relating social categories with behavioural prescriptions to match. Racialization refers to this active productivity of race, whereby colonialism refashions its human terrain’ (Wolfe, 2016: 10). This dual focus on race’s productivity and dynamism enables us to apprehend its continuities with historical forms of social differentiation as well as its ever-shifting targets and contradictions across time and space. Indeed, Singh (2012: 288–289) argues that racialization can help us to more fully grasp ‘the empty foundationalism and ceaseless reinventedness that seems to characterize the operation of race in modernity . . . “the changing same”’

Racialization addresses how racism functions to racialize and oppress certain populations, and how the vulnerabilities and forms of protection produced by racism work in governing. As Singh (2012: 284–285) proposes, to answer the vexing question, What is racism? one needs to begin not by identifying a set of preexisting, already categorized groups that are done to, but rather by delineating the formation and institutionalization of structures and situations of protection and vulnerability for which post hoc, descriptive accounts of dishonored group characteristics serve as a form of rationalization or justification.

A focus on racialization or ‘race in action’ thus allows us to address precursors of formal racial doctrine and apprehend how various ‘racializing practices’ attempt to preserve population-centric modes of colonial domination over time through racism (Wolfe, 2016: 10). Racism is produced through histories and structures, but also through a particular kind of violence, including the violence of demarcation. As Ruth Wilson Gilmore puts it, although ‘race has no essence, racism does. Racism is singular because, whatever its place-based particularities, its practitioners renew fatal power-difference couplings’ (Gilmore, 2002: 16, emphasis in original). This approach to racism locates the fatalities it produces – that is, ‘premature deaths’ – as constitutive of contemporary political power and subjectivities. As Gilmore (2002: 16) continues, ‘racism is a practice of abstraction, a death-dealing displacement of difference into hierarchies that organize relations within and between the planet’s sovereign political territories’. Following Singh and Gilmore, Stuart Schrader

(2019: 39–41) similarly explains: ‘Race is not racism’s predetermined object; it is what racism produces. . . . Racism produces the benefit from state projects of race-making’ – that is, whiteness. In other words, race produces racism through racialization, which in turn accrues particular material benefits to certain groups in the form of whiteness, through its denial to others. This enables identity and ‘community’ formation around racial hatred and the shared defence of whiteness (Ahmed, 2004: 118) and strategies to eliminate Blackness. Racism thereby (re)produces and naturalizes racial hierarchies as ‘commonsense’ markers of global difference and knowledge production (Quijano, 2000, 2007).

### Impact - Negation of Black life

#### Global capital and policy thrive on the societal insistence of Black inhumanity which enables infinite violence upon Black bodies

**Bledsoe and Wright**, Florida State University**, 18** (Adam and Willie, 2018, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space2019, Vol. 37(1) 8–26, "The anti-Blackness of global capital", https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0263775818805102, accessed on 7-11-2022 hooch//cs)

Violent forms of domination accompany (and make possible) the reproduction of global capitalism. This violence targets all manner of people, specifically those who do not exhibit a form of humanity normalized under Western modernity (e.g., lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) and gender nonconforming folk, Muslims, Latinx, and undocumented immigrants) or a manner of spatiality that adheres to the tenets of capitalist notions of individual ownership (Mitchell, 2003). Under this new phase of capitalism, ever-expanding groups of people are subjected to precarious life (Mbembe, 2017). Still, experiences of anti-Blackness remain unique, as the openness of Black people to violence and the assumed a-spatial nature of Black populations remain constitutive factors of the modern world. The logics underpinning anti-Black violence are inheritances of chattel slavery. These logics cast Black geographies as empty and threatening, open to occupation, and subject to surveillance and assault. Indeed, capitalism’s perpetuation relies as much on anti-Blackness as it ever has. The following section seeks to clarify the ways in which antiBlackness makes capital accumulation possible.

The increasing globalization of capital and spatial marginalization of “superfluous” populations is fundamentally tied to the negation of Black life and assumptions of Black nonbeing. The treatment of Black lives as the embodied absence of value, or, “the very condition of existence and the determination of value,” underpins Black non-being and the assumed lack of Black cartographic capacity in the dominant spatial imaginary, making global capitalism possible (Ferreira da Silva, 2017: 1). The interconnected nature of capitalism and race is a well-worn topic. Scholars have theorized race as an ideological outgrowth of the economy (Hall, 1996); as an apparatus used to facilitate flows of people and commodities (Lowe, 2015); as a central component of capitalist maturation (James, 1989); and as a phenomenon necessary for the establishment of the world system (Robinson, 2000), among countless other approaches. Geographers, too, have unpacked the ways in which regimes of capitalism employ racialized concepts to reproduce. Geographic interrogations of racial capitalism have analyzed the role of racist assumptions in implementing neoliberal reforms in the wake of a natural disaster (Derickson, 2014); the manipulation of racial distinction to prevent labor organizing (Wilson, 2000); how resistance to Black landownership underpinned early 20th-century industrial agriculture (Williams, 2017); the role of capitalism in perpetuating environmental racism (Pulido, 2017); and the centrality of plantation relations to numerous variations of capitalism (Woods, 1998)

Nonetheless, we must push further to explicate the ways in which capitalism is actually dependent on anti-Blackness to realize itself, instead of understanding anti-Black racism as a secondary effect of the economy or a phenomenon that emerges periodically. That is to say, reflections on the interlinked nature of race and capitalism must move beyond an assumption of economic causality and grapple with the ways in which anti-Blackness is actually an always-present precondition for capital accumulation. In explicating anti-Blackness, we draw on an Afro-Pessimist framework, as Afro-Pessimism makes distinct claims about the nature of Blackness in the modern world. An Afro-Pessimist analysis of antiBlackness does not treat anti-Black racism as a contingent phenomenon (Wilderson, 2011: 3–4) but rather as a global, ever-present factor that exists as the basis “for expansion and unending space within the symbolic economy of settlement” (King, 2014). Such an approach forces us to recognize how anti-Blackness punctuates the modern epoch by identifying the underlying logics that inform concrete manifestations of anti-Black racism around the world. In this way, Afro-Pessimism adds new dimensions to already-existing work on the connections between anti-Blackness and political economy by recognizing that, while capitalism exploits all of the world’s populations, it does not dominate all of them in the same way. With regard to the question of space, anti-Blackness helps us understand how the afterlife of slavery (Hartman, 2007: 6) leads to Black populations being conceptually unable to legitimately create space, thereby leaving locations associated with Blackness open to the presumably “rational” agendas of dominant spatial actors. Black populations, then, serve as the guarantor of capitalism’s need to constantly find new spaces of accumulation. In this section, we offer an explanation of how capitalism relies on anti-Blackness by foregrounding anti-Blackness as a phenomena with its own internal logics and concrete expressions.

Capitalism is rooted in violent forms of captivity and murder unleashed on indigenous and Afro-descendant populations the world over (Ferreira da Silva, 2004; James, 1989; Rodney, 1972; Williams, 2014; Wynter, 1995). At its origin and in its contemporary manifestations, then, capitalism is systemically related to slavery and its various global permutations (Robinson, 2000: 313–314). The assumption that Black populations lack both humanity and “space, that is ethno- or politico-geography,” defines the treatment of enslaved Black peoples. Today, the assumed a-spatiality that defined conditions of chattel slavery continues to imprint the socio-spatial relations that reproduce global capital (Robinson, 2000: 81, 200).

Black populations are deemed a-spatial as a result of the fact that modern notions of space and practices of spatial production are rooted in specific relations of power (Massey, 2005: 64, 100–101). These power relations are themselves organized around logics that have particular historical roots (Santos, 2008: 21). In the colonial epoch, chattel slavery—the social, legal, and political reduction of Africans to the status of nonhumans—produced the figure of the Black, which had a nullified spatial capacity (Wilderson, 2010: 279), was disavowed as a human being (Ferreira da Silva, 2015: 91), and was a priori structurally prevented from enacting “rational” spatial expressions (Santos, 2009: 24). Locations associated with Black populations became wholly “unhallowed” spaces, which would never receive recognition as legitimately occupied (Wynter, 1976: 81). This is not to suggest that Black peoples were or are understood as not physically present. Black bodies are certainly recognized as existing in exteriority (Raffestin, 2012: 129). Still, this recognition of physical presence does not signify that Black populations’ are understood as establishing legible space. Despite physical presence, Black populations nonetheless remain rendered “ungeographic” in dominant understandings of space (McKittrick, 2006: x). Hence, the geographic locations in which Black populations reside are treated as open to the varied agendas espoused by dominant spatial actors

Capitalism’s new rounds of accumulation require access to spaces that previously had different relations to capitalist practices. The assumed a-spatiality of Black populations often leads to purveyors of capitalism treating locations inhabited by Black people as available for emerging modes of accumulation. Put another way, spaces that were once marginal or peripheral to the perpetuation of capital accumulation become sites of appropriation precisely because the (Black) populations occupying them receive no recognition as viable spatial actors. The spaces necessary for new forms of accumulation are thus conceptually open because of this assumed a-spatiality and subsequently physically opened via the spatial removal and dispersal of Black residents. This dispersal entails violent actions that are a priori legitimate because of the assumed lack of Black spatial agency. In other words, new spaces of “investment have been mapped onto previous racial and colonial (imperial) discourses and practices” evidencing an inextricable relationship between anti-Black notions of space, capitalism’s logic of perpetual expansion, and the acceptable subordination of Black physical presence (Chakravartty and Silva, 2012: 368). This is what Frank Wilderson terms the “deterritorialisation of Black space” (2003: 238) that is necessary for accumulating capital vis-a`-vis emerging political economic practices. Katherine McKittrick similarly notes that Black geographies are cast as “the lands of no one” and “emptied out of life” in order that “suitable capitalist life-support systems” be put into place and globally propagated (McKittrick, 2013: 7).

A number of present-day practices demonstrate the reliance of capital on this notion of empty, lifeless, Blackened spaces, such as capital disinvestment, white flight, gentrification, urban renewal, incarceration, and policing. These spatial arrangements identify Black peoples as inhuman and locations associated with Black populations as lacking a legitimate form of occupation and usage. Such assumptions contribute to the subordination of Black populations and spaces to dominant notions of “appropriate” uses of space, while “illegitimate” spaces of Blackness remain under siege by purveyors of capital. As this occurs, new spaces of accumulation open in areas formerly peripheral to the capitalist agenda. At the same time that these new rounds of accumulation take place, sovereign expressions of power serve to forcibly remove Black people and ensure they remain separated from these new spaces of accumulation. Subsequently, Black people are routinely harassed for existing in the communal spaces in which they have resided for generations.

Along with public policy shifts, policing, incarceration, and extrajudicial killings simultaneously disqualify Black spatial agency and remove Black bodies from spaces deemed open for appropriation by capitalism’s purveyors, thereby simultaneously spatializing antiBlackness and reproducing global capital. The systemic casting of Black spaces as lifeless and open to appropriation for the continuation of capital breathes new life into “civil society’s political economy: [the Black body] kick-starts...capital at its genesis and rescues it from its over-accumulation crisis at its end—black death is its condition of possibility” (Wilderson, 2003: 238). Put simply, the endless accumulation of capital and its legitimating sovereign practices are, in part, made possible through the continued societal insistence on Black inhumanity and a Black lack of cartography, which casts Black spaces as empty.

#### Security is predicated on the genocide of Black bodies and is reliant upon the construction of boundaries between who is truly human

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Today we know that ‘security’ is just another word for extinction and genocide. Every discourse of securing implies that there is a ground to be secured, a ‘home’, a way of being that is threatened or that requires saving, sustaining and being located within a temporality and spatiality. It is precisely this security that is denied in an anti-Black world. As Saidiya Hartman argues, only recognized subjects have something to secure; for others, ‘home’ is an impossibility: ‘We stay there, but we don’t live there’ (Hartman, 2007: 87). As has already been stated, every ground of this discourse is built on anti-Blackness. However inclusive the space that is secured, it will always require a boundary, a delineation of an outside that is inhabited by those who cannot be full human subjects. Every cut between that to be secured and that which can be left or seen as expendable or without value necessarily depends on ‘questions of race and racism’.

### Impact – Takes out Solvency (Disinformation)

#### Attempts to counter misinformation must overcome legacies of imperialism and militarism in local diasporas.

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In initial interviews and informal conversations with different organizers and community groups, four themes emerged as hurdles to overcome in order to conduct critical, transnational, and community-oriented research on the spread and impact of misinformation on diasporic communities:

1. Legacies of imperialism and militarism and ongoing geopolitical tensions across diasporas*:* Mis- and disinformation spreads across cultural, socio-linguistic, and geographic contexts and impacts communities differently according to pre-existing power structures and unequal distributions of informational resources (Thakur & Hankerson, 2021). In order to adequately examine the ways in which mis- and disinformation circulates in Asian diasporic communities, a grounding in the histories of these communities is needed to contextualize the multiple layers of power interests. This may include legacies of British imperialism such as in India, Spanish and U.S. imperialism such as in the Philippines, or even intra-Asian imperialist pursuits such as Japan’s rule of Korea. In other words, race “in the national”, or race as understood within national boundaries such as the U.S., is also situated within conditions of empire and transnational contexts (Reddy, 2011, p. 19). The predominance of English-language research is also underpinned by academia’s colonial legacy and Anglophone Western foundations in knowledge production (Chakravartty et. al, 2018; Mejia et al., 2018; Geeraert, 2018)—dominant in empirical research. The resulting theoretical frameworks privilege whiteness and fail to address the geopolitical contexts of mis- and disinformation in immigrant and diasporic communities, as well as the ways legacies of imperialism structure media systems (Aouragh & Chakravartty, 2016).

2. Transnational news networks and information infrastructures*:* Transnational ties refer to the affective, communicative, and economic relationships that migrant families build between the societies of origin and destination. They are complex multidirectional, multilayered, and multilingual networks with intergenerational connections established through continual global migration (Wakabayashi & O’Hagan, 2021). Within the context of mis- and disinformation, it becomes important to look further than a primary relational stream (i.e., U.S. plus the rest of the world) via the dominant language (e.g., English), which fails to account for the dynamism of language and culture, geographically and temporally.

Many first-generation immigrants with limited English proficiency turn to ethnic media, including print, broadcast, and social media, as primary sources of information (Fang, 2021; Nguyen & Solomon, 2021). For example, in the context of Indian immigrants, Somani (2013) finds that first-generation Indians in the diaspora often prefer Indian television channels over local channels. Not only does it keep them abreast with happenings in India from an Indian perspective, but it also “reinforc[es] their group identification” (Somani, 2013, p. 61). This trend is reproduced online: YouTube in the Vietnamese diaspora is an information-rich space for community, news, entertainment, and business, as well as a site of ideological polarization (Dien, 2017; Anh, 2018; H. Nguyen, 2021; P. Nguyen, 2021). Information propagates through various channels across multiple disparate nations and languages with individuals disseminating ideas rapidly through social circles and across platforms (Zeng et al., 2016)—making “local” problems “global” ones.

3. Lack of data access*:* Private forms of communication, such as mobile messaging apps, facilitate the spread of mis- and disinformation and necessitate culturally informed and relational modes of study, beyond simple challenges of data access (Malhotra, 2020). According to a 2020 voter survey, nearly one in six Asian Americans use messaging applications such as WeChat, WhatsApp, and KaKao to discuss politics (APIA Vote, AAPI Data, and Asian Americans Advancing Justice, 2020). Access to data on these applications is difficult to obtain without direct consent from users and raises additional questions over data ethics and surveillance (Barbosa & Milan, 2019). This means less empirical study and public evidence about how and what types of mis- and disinformation spread within Asian diasporic communities due to information sharing within closed, private networks.

Often, this evidence comes from first-hand observations that occur through informal discussions, such as screenshots sent to family and friends. Additionally, information networks are geographically siloed, making it difficult for U.S. scholars doing transnational research to access data eclipsed by the dominance of U.S. media. This does not mean that currently available observations are not significant, nor does this mean a lack of robust knowledge-sharing activity. Several community organizations, such as Viet Fact Check3 and Equality Labs,4 have been undertaking their own forms of research within their own diasporic communities, including developing customized media monitoring techniques, creating community surveys, and making in-language toolkits and platforms for community-specific interventions. However, this research can pose issues for scholarly replicability and also pose high individualized and collective risks given ongoing nationalisms and authoritarianism within countries of origin.

4. Issues of language interpretation and translation*:* Translation in mis- and disinformation research is complicated, given the limitations of automated transcription and machine-based translation to offer contextual interpretation, as well as at times limited monetary resources for human translation and transcription. We understand translation and language as political, considering what is or is not translated, how it is translated, how interpretations are altered between languages, and how the impact of translation on information spreads. Importantly, translating services such as Google Translate favor Eurocentric interpretations of texts that do not adequately address the contexts from which they come (Nasser, 2017). For example, community activists working on 2020 Get Out the Vote (GOTV) campaigns within Hmong communities5 in California highlighted frustrations around mistranslations on voter registration websites. While government landing pages offered options to translate the page into Hmong, the translations offered up contained significant mistranslations, embedding a sense of exclusion for Hmong voters (Ryan-Mosley, 2021). Researchers need to look beyond verbatim translations to the historical and socio-cultural factors that shape the way information is crafted and distributed.

### Impact – Turns Democracy (Disinformation)

#### Impact Turn - Computational modes of defense fail to address the structural hegemonic norms that construct identity-based disinformation which undermines democracy.

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We believe it is imperative that scholars of mis- and disinformation and propaganda consider not just the epistemological status of claims, but also how strategic attempts to undermine and weaponize people’s social identities and group membership for political gains happen in accord with racial and other structures that underlie social differentiation. Computational means alone do not get at the latent meaning embedded in propagandistic appeals. In particular, we hope the field invests more energy into the examination of the social and racial structures that constitute social division and social power, which, in turn, provide identity propaganda with its forms and structures and makes it legible as political symbolism. Only by doing the interpretive work of analyzing this content via these deeper social hierarchies can scholars shine light on the structure of appeals and how power gets reproduced. We also look forward to future research that looks more deeply at how identity propaganda is mediated across different contemporary digital platforms.

The broader stakes of identity propaganda concern the undermining of democracy. Our theoretical intervention aims to open opportunities for incisive empirical analyses that critically interrogate structural antagonisms embedded in societies. Politics is about relations of and to power (Cohen, 1997). By analyzing relations of power rather than individual identities, we can also be better positioned to make the necessary, generative, critical, and nuanced arguments that push for the political transformations needed to undo the structural hegemonic norms and inequalities so deeply embedded in political systems.

#### Fear of foreign actors leads to curtailing the flow of information and that leads to increased xenophobia

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(Gabrielle, 8-7-2020, Centre for International Governance Innovation, "The Risks of Exaggerating Foreign Influence Operations and Disinformation ", https://www.cigionline.org/articles/risks-exaggerating-foreign-influence-operations-and-disinformation/, accessed on 7-7-2022, SR)

Second, **the fear of foreign speech could exacerbate ongoing tensions between states in a way that will likely hurt civil society and press freedom**. Although influence operations have little (if any) actual impact on a state’s national security, governments may use the fear of foreign speech to expel, control and surveil foreign journalists and civil society. Take China and the United States, for example. Both accuse one another of interfering in each other’s domestic affairs, citing influence operations and collusion that may be detrimental (although rarely articulated in specifics or evidence). As such, retaliatory measures have been carried out by both states through the expulsion of journalists and by forcing media workers to register personal information with government officials. Hua Chunying, a spokeswoman for the Chinese foreign ministry, defended the expulsion of journalists from The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal and The Washington Post, tweeting: “We reject ideological bias against China, reject fake news made in the name of press freedom, reject breaches of ethics in journalism.” And as Harvard Law School’s Evelyn Douek shows in her chapter for the forthcoming book, “Combating Election Interference: When Foreign Powers Target Democracies,“ the way social media companies and governments are moderating foreign content amounts to a “free speech blind spot,” due to their seemingly ad hoc and inconsistent enforcement. The ongoing rhetoric of fear surrounding foreign influence operations and espionage is now expanding to include foreign students and businesses. **In addition to curtailing the flow of information and intellectual collaboration, such actions may also contribute to increasing xenophobia**.

# Alternative

### Alternative

#### Alternative – Only abandoning the epistemic core and infrastructural framework of international relations can open a new disciplinary agenda

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The question remains: What would a non-racist discipline look like? It is presumptuous to think that any number of reparative pedagogical strategies would allow us to simply escape international relations’ historically entrenched racist precepts. Aijaz Ahmad (1992: 77) once wrote that ‘history is not really open to correction through a return passage to an imaginary point, centuries ago, before the colonial deformation set in’. Ahmad was of course referring to the English language and the feasibility of effacing it as an integral facet of the colonized people’s identity (for further dis- cussion, see Sen, 2020b: 142-146). Without stretching this metaphor too far, I would argue that international relations’ racist history is not open to course correction either. But while we cannot change this history, we can choose what to do with it.

At the outset, then, this requires the recognition of a foundational dilemma, namely, that racism is not just an aspect of international relations: it characterizes the very nature and purpose of the discipline. A non-racist international relations would thus need to position itself as not just an endeavour to add a critical pillar within the existent white-supremacist disciplinary structures and norms. It would need be something else altogether. For one thing, cognizant of the racialized intel- lectual foundations of international relations as it is taught today, the non-racist international rela- tions would look elsewhere for the intellectual building blocks of a new epistemic core. To this end, it would need to draw on a well-established (albeit ignored and marginalized) legacy of scholarship within international relations that has deliberated the role of racism and white supremacy in the making of the global order. However, the purpose of this scholarly legacy in the non-racist disci- pline is not to simply speak to the mainstream from the outside in or languish in the category of ‘critical approaches’ that often appears at the back end of international relations curricula and textbooks. Instead, in a non-racist international relations, the works of, among others, Alain Locke ([1916] 1992), W. E. B. Du Bois (1903, 1915) and Merze Tate (1943, 1961), along with the more recent scholarly engagement with questions of race and racism,2 would be placed at the very top of the disciplinary hierarchy as the mainstream and recognized for their indispensable contribution to the scholarly agenda of international relations.

However, the racism of international relations is not just a matter of its core intellectuality ori- entation. It is equally reflected in the material consequences of its racist precepts, evident not least in hirings, tenure decisions and grant-giving practices. All of these act as the infrastructure that keeps up the colour line and function as a nexus of (dis)incentives that renders it professionally unwise to critique international relations’ racialized epistemic core. In contrast, in the non-racist international relations, practitioners of the discipline would not need to fear - as I did - the optics and consequences of critiquing international relations’ racist legacy. On the contrary, such efforts would be deemed an extension of the core purpose of the non-racist discipline. Seen together, what I propose here is the abandoning of international relations in its current form. However, theorizing ‘interstate relations’ (Weber, 2015: 29; for further discussion, see Wight, 1960; Cox, 1981) remains a worthwhile disciplinary agenda. And the non-racist international relations can make an invalua- ble contribution to this agenda by revealing the multiple, positioned ways in which politics is understood and experienced.

### Alternative – Security Abolition

#### Thus we affirm a rejection of the security logics of the plan and engage in an unstitching of racialized security through abolition

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Here, we identify five points that can guide critical security studies debates vis-a-vis race. Our suggestions are far from exhaustive but touch upon, as we see things, matters that are in need of pressing attention. We situate these as part of furthering methodological thinking in critical security studies (Aradau et al., 2015; De Goede et al., 2019; Salter and Mutlu, 2013), which only addresses race and the coloniality of power tangentially.

Security’s violent histories and raced foundations should inform how we approach security per se. ‘Race’ has been approached as an optional category of analysis that certain specialists of race attend to and others can ignore. However, following Alison Howell’s (2018: 120) questioning of the idea of liberal politics as ‘un-security or un-military’, we argue that we should similarly question the notion of security as un-raced. We need to begin from the premise of the always already connectedness of race–security.

Taking race seriously in critical security studies means locating security within its material conditions of possibility and actively de-fetishizing it. Racism is an abstraction that produces fetishes (Gilmore, 2002), and security is one such fetish (Neocleous, 2008). Security is fetishized and normalized through histories of anti-Black racism whose ‘central concern [is] of the libidinal and affective economies that animate historical capitalism’ (McQuade, 2018: 13). De-fetishizing security means beginning to situate behaviours and meanings in their social, historical and cultural contexts, as a means of challenging essentialist and deterministic analysis. When we anchor security projects in specific milieus, we begin to understand the work they do in hiding racial violence and dispossession, their impacts and the complicity of academics therein

We can never apprehend the intersections of race–security as somehow exceptional or geographically isolated. Rather, the focus needs to be on how race is produced through transnational and transtemporal encounters, in the sense that ‘racial ideas, meanings, exclusionary and repressive practices in one place are influenced, shaped by and fuel those elsewhere’ (Goldberg, 2009: 1274). Nevertheless, we should anticipate that the relationships between racialization and security are highly varied, which requires that they be investigated in local articulations. Such an approach develops a historical sensitivity to how security’s racializing imperatives travel and push peripheral states or groups to perform the ‘dirty work’ of capital and national (in)security (Agathangelou, 2004: 2).

Rejecting security as a fabrication, a myth and a lie requires refusing and actively unstitching the categories that security takes as given. Against the prevailing tendency in critical security studies to focus on how racialized communities are further disenfranchised or ‘securitized’, we cannot take othered populations as given. Rather, the focus needs to be on how security regimes, ideas and prerogatives work to render populations as ‘out of place’ (Wolfe, 2016: 17) and therefore in need of targeting, erasure or removal through security. We must address how specific technologies of security help to make race and racial subjugation rather than reproducing ‘epistemological organization through which some bodies are damned, and others are not’ (McKittrick, 2011: 958). 5. If we take the imperatives of de-fetishization and abolitionism seriously, how we refer to the key actors involved in ‘security’ matters. This prompts us to ask new questions: Should we, for instance, reproduce their own self-presentation as ‘security professionals’ (Bigo, 2002) or instead try to rename them in a way that foregrounds the raced and violent foundations of their work? Here, some have notably proposed that ‘law enforcement’ officers be renamed ‘violence workers’ (Seigel, 2018) and security practitioners as ‘security fuckers’ (James Kelman, cited in Neocleous, 2008: 1)

#### alternative is a total rejection of security on the grounds of its inseparability from race and racism

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What, then, does it mean for the field if the grounds of critical security studies are the grounds of anti-Blackness? Not ‘just’ the ‘foundations’ but the grounds that enable the divide between the ‘foundations’ and the ‘novel and ethico-politically committed ways’ (Security Dialogue, 2020) to be discovered in the present or in the future. The grounds that enable the authorized critical security studies subject to articulate the desire for ‘reparation’ and for ‘ethico-politically committed ways’ to enable the continuation of a project that has no ground of its own. The investigation of antiBlackness we have presented suggests that, at an ontological level, only questions of race and racism exist, and critical security studies is a form of their expression. To reiterate our position: we have sought to make two fairly straightforward points. First, on the questions of race and racism, there is a possibility that no reparative ethico-political openings can be made from within the subject position of critical security studies. To pursue this reparative project would require the reinstatement of the series of closures and exclusions that constitute the hegemonic imaginaries of the discipline. Second, critical security scholars should consider whether in fact there can be any repair-ation or repair of critical security studies. We build on the important existing critiques of race in security studies to argue that to take seriously the question of race and racism would clarify the difficulty, perhaps even the impossibility, of any reparation. Indeed, perhaps the only possibility of a truly novel and ethical future lies in abolition of the entire intellectual, institutional, ontological edifice that critical security studies is embedded in. As Harney and Moten (2013: 152) argue, for the field of critical or radical thought more generally, ‘what it is that is supposed to be repaired is irreparable. It cannot be repaired. The only thing we can do is tear this shit down completely and build something new.’

### Alternative - Recognize whiteness

#### we call for a naming and recognizing of whiteness within security studies in an effort to enable a restructuring of security scholarship. The alt is the first step to dismantling racism in academia

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In this short intervention, I aimed to highlight how whiteness and white privilege, although notably unnamed and unmarked, are structural and structuring categories in critical security studies practices and understandings. Therefore, naming and racializing whiteness in the field is a necessary first step if we are to be able to imagine reparative possibilities within it. As Philip Howard (2004: 75) highlights: it is vitally important that racially dominant bodies that would take up anti-racist work and live out oppositional whiteness realize that their choice to do so does not stop the privilege of whiteness from converging upon their bodies, nor does it guarantee that they have escaped the looming possibility that whiteness will find expressions through their bodies and work. Dominant anti-racist scholars need to consciously and continuously take responsibility for their implication in whiteness regardless of their personal politics.

Hence, to recognize the racial implications of our whiteness and privileges does not mean an ‘arrival’ at an absolute anti-racist awareness. Rather, it means assuming our involuntary complicity with a system of structural racial oppression and acknowledging the necessity of maintaining a ‘constant vigilance’ (a term that will certainly provoke goosebumps in some critical security studies scholars) on our practices, works, and social relations.

As Grada Kilomba (2019: 11) puts it, ‘this path of collective conscience-taking . . . is not a moral path, but a responsibility-taking path. The responsibility of creating new forms of power and knowledge’. To take this responsibility, then, demands that we ‘stop asking the classical moral question “Am I a racist?” and wait for a comfortable answer, and start asking “How can I dismantle my own racism?” This question, by itself, already starts the process’ (Kilomba, 2019: 46). To that, Djamila Ribeiro (2019b: 13) adds: ‘racism was invented by whiteness, so that white people must take responsibility for it. . . . That does not mean that one should feel guilty for being white: the point is to take responsibility. Guilt drives to inertia, responsibility drives to action’

In this process of taking responsibility, to name, recognize, and constantly confront the racism that we inevitably reproduce as white scholars is important, but only the first step towards anti-racist/abolitionist knowledges and practices. Being aware of our positions in systems of power and privilege and how they reverberate in our work, we should aim to disturb and disrupt these very positions, for it is ‘only when power structures are reconfigured that many marginalized identities may finally reconfigure our notions of knowledge’ (Kilomba, 2019: 13). We are not exempt from the possibility of making mistakes in the process of confronting our privileged positions in knowledge production. In my own effort to name and disturb whiteness in critical security studies, I may have reproduced several racist and racially problematic assumptions, alongside a set of privileged positions and ignorance. The point, I think, is that we can no longer afford not to face the question of whiteness and white privilege and their constant reproduction in our field.

### Alt Solves - Disinformation

#### International perspectives are key to account for the localized development of disinformation.

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In June 2021, a subscriber of Vietnamese conservative influencer Sonia Ohlala1 sent the following message via encrypted messaging app Telegram: “Black Lives Matter is a movement set up by all the communists to loot, oppress people, and cheat money from donors.”2 The message’s focus on “communists” makes salient how the historical context of socialism and communism within Vietnamese diasporic groups has been weaponized to stoke negative sentiment around Black Lives Matter—leveraging historical frameworks to increase the saliency of particularized misinformation. Moreover, the sharing of the message on the encrypted messaging app Telegram warrants further attention, given that the platform has increasingly been used to host communities and conversations that have been subjected to moderation and flagging on mainstream communications platforms (Murphy, 2021).

Mis- and disinformation traverses platforms, borders, and languages, and acquires cultural saliency as content moves through localized information infrastructures. Understanding the spread and impact of problematic information necessitates contextual grounding within the socio-historical and political contexts of different communities. Mis- and disinformation exploits nationalism, identity-based appeals, historical and contemporary traumas, and root structures of power (Reddi et al., 2021; Kuo & Marwick, 2021). Meanwhile, the bulk of empirical research and theorization around the spread, impact, and strategies to counter mis- and disinformation focuses predominantly on English (or native-language) mis- and disinformation (e.g., Pennycook & Rand, 2019; Pérez-Rosas et al., 2017). The Ohlala anecdote mentioned above illustrates why we must expand the focus of mis- and disinformation research beyond Anglocentrism (knowledge production centered on and dominated by English language and Anglo-American contexts) and pushes us to consider the transnational dimensions of mis- and disinformation.

# Framework

### Framework Exclusionary

#### Traditional framework interpretations are exclusionary

**Peterson**, University of Arizona Professor of International Relations**, 21**  (V Spike, 2021, Security Dialogue2021, Vol. 52(S) 17–27, "Critical privilege studies: Making visible the reproduction of racism in the everyday and international relations", <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/09670106211017369>, page 5, accessed on 7-8-2022 hooch//cs)

Critical privilege studies foregrounds the invisibility of privilege as a singularly powerful mechanism for reproducing dominant–subordinate relations. On the one hand, invisibility ‘permits’ those with privilege to be unaware of, habitually disregard, and/or deny responsibility for how they systemically benefit from and variously contribute to oppressive conditions. Reproducing this core problem is the common assumption that harmful effects depend on willful intent; that oppressive conditions are caused solely by ‘bad’ people consciously intending to harm, discriminate, or exclude. This familiar reasoning confuses intentions with consequences. In systems based on structural inequality, simply adhering to societal norms – acting as culturally expected – reproduces harms and oppression whether they are intended or not (Diangelo, 2018: xiii).6 This common assumption has the insidious effect of encouraging those with privilege to presume that they are neither ‘being oppressive’ nor implicated in reproducing oppression unless the intention to harm (discriminate, exclude, oppress) is present. Most people – and presumably critical theorists – deny this intention, and, when a systemic sensibility is absent, will ardently defend themselves against any claim of their implication in or responsibility for perpetuating oppressive conditions

On the other hand, invisibility not only disables privileged group awareness but also shapes how those without privilege understand and respond to oppressive social practices – including internalized inferiority as well as intense resentments and extensive resistance. The point here is that ignorance to privilege by those who have it shifts responsibility for explaining, criticizing, and transforming oppression to those who suffer the most from it and have the fewest resources to fight it. We have abundant evidence that critics and protesters meet myriad forms of resistance, including not only opposition to specific proposals for change but also personal, sociocultural, and physical attacks on those who persist in challenging the status quo.7

These dynamics exemplify how structural positioning matters: while those experiencing subordination cannot afford to ignore oppressive conditions – and pay numerous ‘costs’ for protesting – those with privilege enjoy what Allan Johnson (2006: 22) calls the ‘luxury of obliviousness’ – the extraordinary advantage of being free to ‘choose’ whether and to what extent they ‘notice’ injustice, engage in critical reflection, and/or participate in ways that challenge status quo inequalities. I submit that this ‘luxury’ is particularly present among multiply privileged academics and figures in the ‘masking’ of power relations, ‘acceptance’ of racialized inequalities, and persistent marginalization of dissenting, critical voices

The invisibility of power relations reflects processes of normalization, the second key dimension of privilege. The argument here is that qualities, characteristics, and priorities of dominant groups become systemic norms that shape everyone’s participation in unjust systems (Wildman, 1996). This includes habituated ways of identifying, thinking, and acting, and written and unwritten societal ‘rules’ that establish patterned social expectations. The latter constitute ‘paths of least resistance’ that most of us follow most of the time, and mostly unconsciously, because to do otherwise is literally ‘unexpected’ and meets varying forms of resistance – from curious stares, verbal challenges, and threatening behavior to physical and even lethal attacks (Johnson, 2006: 80). In effect, what dominant groups deem normal and preferred becomes the systemwide expectation and the presumed standard of comparison – the basis for measuring success and failure – for everyone.

### Framework – White Epistemic Control

#### The aff’s framework manifests as white epistemic control- regulating which knowledge models can or cannot be debated in an effort to maintain white denial of privilege

**Guerra,**Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro Senior Field Assistant **21** (Lucas, 2021, Security Dialogue 2021, Vol. 52(S) 28–37 "Security as white privilege: Racializing whiteness in critical security studies", https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/09670106211027797?journalCode=sdib accessed on 7-9-2022, hooch//cs)

To sum up the contributions mentioned above, then, we have white privilege as the central fulcrum of white racial identities and whiteness as a system of power. Regardless of white people’s ‘racial awareness’ and refusal to subscribe to social structures of racial oppression, we unavoidably benefit from them (Mills, 1999). Moreover, it is important to highlight, with Barbara Applebaum (2010), that there is an indivisible continuum between benefiting from and contributing to structural and systemic racism. Willingly or not, when we enjoy white privilege, we contribute to the maintenance of systems of racial oppression.

This is the reason why, according to Peggy McIntosh’s (1988: 2) oft-quoted work, white privilege may be described as ‘an invisible package of unearned assets that I can count on cashing in each day, but about which I was “meant” to remain oblivious’. We are ‘meant to remain oblivious’ to white privilege because it radically disturbs white people’s perceptions of ourselves, our accomplishments, and what we believe we are entitled to. Hence, to recognize white privilege is to activate anxieties from our colonial past (Kilomba, 2019), to face the fact that many of our social, cultural, and economic comforts are ‘based on the legacy of the conquest’ (Mills, 1999: 73). Given the stressful implications of confronting whiteness and white privilege, white people invent a set of strategies for preventing acknowledging our convenience with systems of racial oppression. One of these ‘strategies’ is white epistemic control over knowledge production (Mills, 1999; Ribeiro, 2019a). By epistemologically controlling which knowledges are authoritative and which narratives are legitimate, whites can ‘fit within a collective, solid formation, a denial community, which denies and excludes from reality everything deemed as unimportant’ (Bento, 2014: 18).

Here, we come to the role of academia in the production and mediation – by exclusion – of what one should consider legitimate knowledge and important elements for analysis. In this sense, Grada Kilomba makes the point that ‘the academic center is not a neutral place. It is a white space where the privilege of speaking has been denied to People of Color . . . a space of v-i-o-l-e-n-c-e’ (Kilomba, 2019: 51, emphasis added). It is important to note that the reproduction of fundamentally racist knowledge within academia is not simply a non-reflected consequence of the dominant whiteness in this space. Rather, we need to insist on the fact that we, white researchers, despite our self-perception as racially aware and anti-racist, are constantly benefiting from – and therefore contributing to – the structural and systemic racism that allows our voices to be heard in positions of authority (Applebaum, 2010; Garner, 2007; Howard, 2004; Kilomba, 2019; Ribeiro, 2019a).

This is especially important in discussions on international relations – and, by extension, security studies and critical security studies – a discipline founded amid Great Powers colonialism that reproduces racist traces of the modern international in most of its analysis and theoretical frameworks (Anievas et al., 2015; Persaud and Sajed, 2018; Sabaratnam, 2020). As Sankaran Krishna (2001) pointed out some years ago, it is only by assuming a systematic ‘politics of forgetting’ towards its racist and colonial foundations that international relations may sustain its legitimacy as an academic discipline. It is important to highlight that this ‘politics of forgetting’ enacts violent epistemicidal practices against subaltern peoples and their systems of knowledge

### AT: Policymaking Good – Testing

#### To “Study” is the violence which enables sustained discrimination and manifests as anti-blackness

**Chandler,** University of Westminster Professor of International Relations, **and Chipato**, University of Ottawa CIPS postdoctoral fellow,**21**  (David and Farai, 2021, Security Dialogue 2021, Vol. 52(S) 60–68,"A call for abolition: The disavowal and displacement of race in critical security studies", [https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/09670106211024413 accessed on 7-9-2022](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/09670106211024413%20accessed%20on%207-9-2022), hooch//cs)

It is perhaps the most harmless of the ‘three little words’, but ‘studies’ contains all we need to know of hierarchies and cuts – of the ‘human’ from the world, of the knowing subject from the object to be known and ‘studied’. For critical security studies, the study itself is already the violence that enables the violence of ‘sustained discrimination’, the violence that we are told is both ‘invisible and acceptable’ (Security Dialogue, 2020). Study is a practice of the world of the subject, the world of critical security, the world of anti-Blackness. Yes, ‘study’ as a concept could be reclaimed for a world beyond anti-Blackness, but this would not be the ‘study’ that demarcates one ‘field’ from another. Fred Moten and Stefano Harney (2013: 118), for example, talk of study as the disruption of the grounds that would enable the study of ‘studies’. This form of study is the refusal of the settled order of academia, the flight from the institutional demands of disciplinarity, the embrace of dissonance instead of clarity. Study is the reason for the abolition of critical security studies, the reason why you would leave the world of policy and academia, not why you would seek to expand it. Study is the work and the interaction and the care that is in the world. ‘Study’ is not the product of critical security studies; it can only be what critical security studies sets itself against, to carve itself out of, to separate itself from. Critical security studies can no more undertake this form of study than it can engage with ‘questions of race and racism’.

### AT: Policymaking Good - Research

#### The affirmatives research model manifests as a eurocentric project which upholds the white supremacist structuring of the global system

**Guerra,**Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro Senior Field Assistant, **21** (Lucas, 2021, Security Dialogue 2021, Vol. 52(S) 28–37 "Security as white privilege: Racializing whiteness in critical security studies", https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/09670106211027797?journalCode=sdib accessed on 7-9-2022, hooch//cs)

We live in a world which has been foundationally shaped for the past five hundred years by the realities of European domination and the gradual consolidation of global white supremacy. In making the above claim, the Jamaican Black philosopher Charles Mills calls attention to a distinctive feature of modernity: the structuring of a white supremacist global system, a process advanced by Europe through colonialism and genocide against the rest of the world. This is not a trivial matter, nor an already overcome legacy from the past. On the contrary, Mills (1999: 13–14) argues that the sociopolitical, moral, economic, cultural, and epistemic racial hierarchies established with modernity still resonate within contemporary politics, reproduced in a ‘racial polity, a racial state, and a racial juridical system’ that ‘maintain and reproduce this racial order, securing the privileges and advantages of the full white citizens and maintaining the subordination of nonwhites’.

One of the consequences of this encompassing racial system of power is that it takes whiteness as the natural and universal condition of humanity (Kilomba, 2019; Mills, 1999; Ribeiro, 2019a). Hence, whiteness is ‘neither problematized nor particularized within discourses on race because it assumes a status of normalcy’ (Hayes and Juárez, 2009: 731). As the Panamanian philosopher Linda Alcoff (2005: 205) puts it, ‘given its simultaneous invisibility and universality, whiteness has until recently enjoyed the unchallenged hegemony that any invisible contender in a ring full of visible bodies would experience’. Thus, it remains, in the words of Ruth Frankenberg (1993), an unmarked and unnamed dominant position in racial systems of oppression (see also Ribeiro, 2019a, 2019b).

Nonetheless, Black Brazilian psychologist Cida Bento (2014) reminds us that whiteness is oftentimes hidden, but always strongly operating. In this sense, critical race theorists argue that whiteness operates as ‘the fulcrum of power relations’ (Garner, 2007: 43) in modern societies structured by racism and racial privilege (Applebaum, 2010; Ribeiro, 2019b). Hence, whiteness is a location of ‘structural advantage’ (Frankenberg, 1993: 1), one that invests those positioned in it with the notion of full entitlement and belonging regarding economic, political, and social privileges and spaces (Harris, 1993; Kilomba, 2019; McIntosh, 1988).

Thus, as conceived here, whiteness has nothing to do with any fundamental biological or genetic truth. Nor is it about individual racial/cultural identity. As Noel Ignatiev (1997: 1) acutely puts it, ‘whiteness has nothing to do with culture and everything to do with social position. It is nothing but a reflection of privilege and exists for no reason other than to defend it. Without the privileges attached to it, the white race would not exist’. Ignatiev’s quote points directly to the dimension of material structural privilege inherently attached to white racial identity. As David Roediger (2002: 23) adds, rather than biological or cultural, ‘white identity is decisively shaped by the exercise of power and the expectation of advantages in acquiring property’.

In her groundbreaking and now classic work, Cheryl Harris (1993) also emphasizes the material and structural dimension of whiteness. She argues that, in the USA, whiteness became by law a position of social status and privilege, legitimizing the property obtained through centuries of white colonial expropriation of indigenous lands and Black enslaved work. As Aníbal Quijano (2000) and Charles Mills (1999) remind us, this is not an exclusive feature of US history. Whiteness as a position of dominance in racial social hierarchies is a structural part in the ordering of the modern capitalist world economy (and modernity itself) as a whole. According to the particularities of each national context, then, whiteness became ‘a form of racialized privilege ratified in law. Material privileges attendant to being white inhered in the status of being white. . . . [R]elative white privilege was legitimated as the status quo’ in modern polities around the world

# Answers To

## Permutations

### AT: Perm - Links to the K

#### The reparation of the permutation is doomed to its own devices- the attempt to imagine a non-racist version of the affirmative is only accessible to those whom the world of the aff is open to

**Chandler,** University of Westminster Professor of International Relations, **and Chipato**, University of Ottawa CIPS postdoctoral fellow,**21**  (David and Farai, 2021, Security Dialogue 2021, Vol. 52(S) 60–68,"A call for abolition: The disavowal and displacement of race in critical security studies", [https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/09670106211024413 accessed on 7-9-2022](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/09670106211024413%20accessed%20on%207-9-2022), hooch//cs)

We have seen above that disavowal operates on the basis of stipulating that the problem of race and racism is one that can be located in the past, intimating that the problem is a difficult one of ‘spectres’ or legacies that must and can be overcome. This is possible because the assumption is that questions of race are somehow separable from the field of critical security studies itself, rather than constitutive of it. The successful accomplishment of disavowal, then, enables a focus upon how critical security studies might move forward. This leap, we argue, is a displacement that then puts questions of the future of critical security studies at the forefront of concern. The displacement accomplishes the inversing of the problematic: critical security studies is now the solution rather than the problem. The precondition for reparative work is the disavowal that race and racism are inextricably entangled with critical security studies. The shift of displacement is the move to reparation, the imaginary of an anti- or non-racist critical security studies.

The problem with this move of displacement is that the ethico-political stance of reparation is necessarily an affirmative one. As Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick (2003: 150–151) suggests, it is through this displacement that we can learn from the ‘ways selves and communities succeed in extracting sustenance from the objects of a culture – even of a culture whose avowed desire has often been not to sustain them’. As Tiffany Lethabo King powerfully argues, while it is the case that reading ‘for what is generative and provides openings’ (King, 2019: 230n74) is vital for coalition and collaboration, reparative work advocated in LGBT and queer theory presupposes the positionality of a shared humanist sexual subject position. As Fred Moten (2018: 11–12) notes in his essay on race and the work of Levinas, the reparative stance of being ‘open to the world’ or ‘available to the world’ can only work as a critical project for those for whom the world is accessible in these ways. For those structurally excluded from this political ontology of the subject, this openness would be critical only insofar as relationality is understood to be an expression of power, structured by the givenness of a transcendental subjectivity that the black cannot have but by which the black can be had; a structural position that he or she cannot take but by which he or she can be taken

### AT: Perm - Racism

#### Perm fails under the weight of the racism which is amalgamated within critical security scholarship

**Chandler,** University of Westminster Professor of International Relations, **and Chipato**, University of Ottawa CIPS postdoctoral fellow,**21**  (David and Farai, 2021, Security Dialogue 2021, Vol. 52(S) 60–68,"A call for abolition: The disavowal and displacement of race in critical security studies", [https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/09670106211024413 accessed on 7-9-2022](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/09670106211024413%20accessed%20on%207-9-2022), hooch//cs)

Any project of reparative work for generative ethico-political openings would have to be undertaken after the abolition or dismantling of critical security studies, not as a substitute for this, displacing the problem to that of the repair of the disciplinary field. Reparative work proffered from within a system where race is not merely the ‘oil’ in the engine but the engine itself offers little hope of real change. How can critical security studies offer a space for a new antiracist political ethics, from within the wider ‘prison of colonial modernity’ (Blaney and Tickner, 2017)? Surely, if reparative work is to be undertaken, it should be carried out on the terms of those who are wronged, rather than on the grounds of the perpetrator of the offence. If critical security studies exists on the ground of the ‘human’, as a science of the humanity from which Blackness has always been excluded, then it cannot ameliorate the oppression that was required to clear that ground (Wynter, 2003). Instead, we might follow Alexander Weheliye (2014: 137) in arguing that humanity, the idea of the ‘human’, can only be overhauled from without, transformed by those who, he argues, ‘live behind the veil of the permanent state of exception’. Thus, we might argue that reparation ultimately leads us back to subjection (see Coulthard, 2007: 453). ‘Questions of race and racism’ are not the spectre haunting critical security studies, they are its life blood, its arteries and the muscles that power it. Critical security studies can have no reparative access to ‘questions of race and racism’ no matter how hard or how genuinely it tries. ‘Questions of race and racism’ are what enable the cuts and binaries, the world, the subjects, the concerns, the practices, the methods, the understandings of critical security studies. Critical. Security. Studies. What is it about these three words, singularly, together, in whatever order, that could make anyone think, in today’s world, there was a way beyond their imbrications in ‘questions of race and racism’? Critical of what? On what grounds? Security of what? On what grounds? Study of what? On what grounds? Answer: the grounds of anti-Blackness or ‘questions of race and racism’.

#### The perm is baked in racism- there can be no reconciliation

**Howell** Rutgers University **and Richter-Montpetit** University of Sussex**, 19** (Allison and Melanie, 2019, Security Dialogue1–20, "Is securitization theory racist? Civilizationism, methodological whiteness, and antiblack thought in the Copenhagen School", [https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333420811\_Is\_Securitization\_Theory\_Racist\_Civilizationism\_Methodological\_Whiteness\_and\_Antiblack\_thought\_in\_the\_Copenhagen\_School accessed on 7-11-2022](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333420811_Is_Securitization_Theory_Racist_Civilizationism_Methodological_Whiteness_and_Antiblack_thought_in_the_Copenhagen_School%20accessed%20on%207-11-2022) hooch//cs)

This article has illustrated that classic securitization theory is structured not only by Eurocentrism, but also by civilizationism, methodological whiteness, and antiblack racism. This is evident in its conception of politics, borrowed from Arendt, which it defines as a sphere of (white) civilized dialogue where reason triumphs over irrational securitizations. This perspective is only made possible by ignoring colonial history, ongoing (settler-)colonial relations, and the racial violence of normal liberal politics. Securitization theory’s racism is also evident in its methodology, which examines securitizing speech acts in order to defend this (European, civilized) ‘normal politics’. Under cover of ostensibly neutral terms, securitization normatively prioritizes the defense of order over justice, positioning the securitization theorist as the defender of (white) civilized politics against (racialized) ‘primal anarchy’. We have further demonstrated the role of antiblack thought in securitization theory: its racist imaginaries of Africa serve as an indispensable foil, setting up a contrast between normal politics and securitization.

One question beyond the scope of this article is whether this is similarly true of ‘second-generation’ and more empirical applications of securitization theory – or, indeed, the mere use of the word ‘securitization’. Postcolonial literature has long deliberated whether it is possible to rework theories built on racist precepts. For example, vigorous debate has surrounded whether the works of Marx (Coulthard, 2014; Rao, 2017; Robinson, 1983) or Foucault (Mbembe, 2003; Stoler, 1995; Thobani, 2007) can be adapted and made to work for anti-racist/anti-colonial purposes. Are there ‘reparative possibilities’ (Sedgwick, 1997; in relation to international relations, see Rao, 2017) for classic securitization theory? Can it excise or surmount its racist foundations? Our analysis suggests that securitization theory’s racism is not an incidental feature, nor ‘merely’ a matter of (empirical) application. Rather, it is baked into securitization theory’s conceptual apparatus and, in particular, its core concepts of politics and security. These problems cannot be remedied by applying classic securitization theory to non-Western spaces (as typically suggested by critics of its Eurocentrism), or by simply adding race or colonialism to its accounts. The retention of securitization theory’s concepts and methods leads to a primary focus on instances of overtly racist speech acts. Global racism is then treated as a matter of mere language. This elides the constitutive role of racist and colonial relations of force and expropriation in the making of the modern order, including ongoing security projects (see Howell and Richter-Montpetit, 2019).

Once classic securitization theory is stripped of its racist conceptual and methodological apparatus, including its concepts of ‘normal politics’, its conservative deployment of speech act theory, its view of excessive securitization as threatening a racially encoded lower level of civilization, its faith in the social contract, and so on, there is very little left. Perhaps what remains is simply the word ‘securitization’. But even this word is potentially problematic, because inherent in it is a temporal move from normal politics towards the (exceptional) violence of security. Authors attempting to recuperate the term ‘securitization’ must take care not to indulge in white nostalgia for a better, more innocent time: a time that does not exist for those who have been subject to colonialism or the racial contract on scales from the local to the global – that is to say, the majority of the world’s people. Such a recuperative intellectual project, if at all possible, has yet to be articulated.

### AT: Permutation - Ontology

#### Discipline Turn – Permutation cannot access the teleological suspension of the discipline itself, including the plan cannot challenge the ontological underpinnings

Coleman, University of Sussex International Relations Professor, 21 (Lara Montesinos, “Racism! What do you mean? From Howell and Richter-Montpetit’s underestimation of the problem, towards situating security through struggle”, Security Dialogue 2021, Vol. 52(S) 69-77, EBSCO, GDI access 7/12/22)

How might we move past this? It will not do, as Howell and Richter-Montpetit (2020: 17) empha- size, to simply ‘add race and colonialism to existing conceptual apparatuses’. However, there are also limits to what can be done by seeking to dismantle those conceptual apparatuses by reference to canonical texts on race and coloniality, without attention to the ontological assumptions that make it seem natural to centre security. We should be wary of any project of ‘decolonizing security studies’ that seeks to work decolonial insights into the fabric of the discipline in this way (e.g. Adamson, 2020). ‘That knowledge has been colonized’, Lewis Gordon (2011: 95) reminds us, ‘raises the question of whether it was ever free’. Given the acrimony that has animated responses to Howell and Richter-Montpetit, it is worth emphasizing that the epistemic conditions in which all of us work are confined within institutionalized parameters and that the process of inquiry always means seeking to work past these. ‘Any discipline or generated system for the organization of real- ity faces the problem of having to exceed the scope of its object of inquiry’, Gordon writes. ‘There is, in other words, always more to and of reality. Failure to appreciate reality sometimes takes the form of recoiling from it. . . . The discipline becomes, in solipsistic fashion, the world’ (Gordon, 2011:98). This is the challenge for any attempt to undermine the implicit ontological assumptions that focus attention onto particular objects of study, to the exclusion of ways in which humanity is hierarchically ordered and disciplined within extractive-productive relations predicated upon colo- niality and racism. Taking that challenge seriously requires not just asking what scholarship on race and coloniality has to say to the discipline, but something more like what Gordon (2011: 99) calls a ‘teleological suspension of disciplines’ that is itself‘an epistemic decolonial act’. Otherwise, there is a risk that the racial foundations of security are acknowledged, but without being situated within these wider dynamics of extraction and production, coloniality and racism. It is necessary to de-centre security, to address the relations between security and political economy, between self- declared means of managing risk, threat or vulnerability and technologies through which ‘normal politics’ is produced and contained. While the latter might look benign, they nevertheless serve to discipline humanity (or regulate admission to the category of human) within acceptable parameters for the continuation of capitalist extraction.

### AT: Permutation - AntiBlackness

#### Perm fails – reparative work within the system cannot transform AntiBlackness

**Chandler,** University of Westminster Professor of International Relations, **and Chipato**, University of Ottawa CIPS postdoctoral fellow,**21**  (David and Farai, 2021, Security Dialogue 2021, Vol. 52(S) 60–68,"A call for abolition: The disavowal and displacement of race in critical security studies", [https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/09670106211024413 accessed on 7-9-2022](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/09670106211024413%20accessed%20on%207-9-2022), hooch//cs)

Any project of reparative work for generative ethico-political openings would have to be undertaken after the abolition or dismantling of critical security studies, not as a substitute for this, displacing the problem to that of the repair of the disciplinary field. Reparative work proffered from within a system where race is not merely the ‘oil’ in the engine but the engine itself offers little hope of real change. How can critical security studies offer a space for a new antiracist political ethics, from within the wider ‘prison of colonial modernity’ (Blaney and Tickner, 2017)? Surely, if reparative work is to be undertaken, it should be carried out on the terms of those who are wronged, rather than on the grounds of the perpetrator of the offence. If critical security studies exists on the ground of the ‘human’, as a science of the humanity from which Blackness has always been excluded, then it cannot ameliorate the oppression that was required to clear that ground (Wynter, 2003). Instead, we might follow Alexander Weheliye (2014: 137) in arguing that humanity, the idea of the ‘human’, can only be overhauled from without, transformed by those who, he argues, ‘live behind the veil of the permanent state of exception’. Thus, we might argue that reparation ultimately leads us back to subjection (see Coulthard, 2007: 453). ‘Questions of race and racism’ are not the spectre haunting critical security studies, they are its life blood, its arteries and the muscles that power it. Critical security studies can have no reparative access to ‘questions of race and racism’ no matter how hard or how genuinely it tries. ‘Questions of race and racism’ are what enable the cuts and binaries, the world, the subjects, the concerns, the practices, the methods, the understandings of critical security studies. Critical. Security. Studies. What is it about these three words, singularly, together, in whatever order, that could make anyone think, in today’s world, there was a way beyond their imbrications in ‘questions of race and racism’? Critical of what? On what grounds? Security of what? On what grounds? Study of what? On what grounds? Answer: the grounds of anti-Blackness or ‘questions of race and racism’.

### AT: Perm – Do Both (Disinformation)

#### Addressing identity propaganda requires centering social issues to address the politics of power, not just adding identity as a coding category.

Reddi, Kuo and Kreiss, University Of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Center for Information Technology, and Public Life Graduate Fellow, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, and Principal Researcher, 21

(Madhavi Reddi, Rachel Kuo, and Daniel Kreiss, University Of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Center for Information Technology, and Public Life Graduate Fellow, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, and Principal Researcher, SAGE Journals, 7-17-2021, "Identity propaganda: Racial narratives and disinformation," New Media & Society, p. 6, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/14614448211029293, accessed 7-1-2022) SS:/

As such, the concept of identity propaganda usefully adds to the distinctions that researchers can draw between the types of manipulative appeals that political actors make for strategic gain. For example, an emerging line of work has clearly demonstrated how accounting for identity, and especially race and ethnicity, is central to understanding disinformation. Deen Freelon et al.’s (2020) computational analysis of 5.2 million tweets by the Russian Internet Research Agency during the 2016 US presidential election revealed that bots presenting as Black activists received the highest levels of engagement through retweets, likes, and replies. As Freelon et al. (2020) conclude, “race is a critical variable in the analysis of disinformation uptake and should be a key focus area in future research on the topic.” These findings, among others (Daniels, 2009; Ong and Cabañes, 2019; DiResta et al., 2018), speak to the need for the concept of identity propaganda as a means to center questions of social and political identities alongside analysis of power, not just include them as a coding category. This follows other work that has found identity-based differences and structural antagonisms to be at the forefront of political and social life, particularly in information processes (Flores- Yeffa et al., 2011; Hesse, 2016 Mason, 2018; Murthy and Sharma, 2019).

While not all identity propaganda focuses on constructing and exploiting racial differences, race functions as the dominant means of organizing societies (Hall, 1999; Hesse, 2016). The construction of race continues to be a strategy to create and maintain the position of dominant, ascendant, and voiced groups against that of subordinate, marginalized, and unvoiced groups (Hall, 1999). For example, as we detail below, to understand Kamala Harris’s identities as Black and Asian against the backdrop of white supremacy, researchers must analyze the triangulation of propagandistic racial positionings along two axes of “superior or inferior” and “insider or foreigner” that relatively valorize or ostracize Black and Asian communities (Kim, 1999). Often, these racial positionings are constructed as being at odds with one another. The model minority myth, a racial narrative that describes Asian Americans as hard-working and high-achieving, has often been used as a “weapon in the war against Black America” to deflect demands for racial justice and sow discord between the two racial groups (Prashad, 2000: 6). Furthermore, this myth also serves as a way that marginalized groups are rewarded for upholding existing racial hierarchies and assimilating to whiteness. This is the way that dominant racial structures become reified: “discursive technologies of power encourage affiliation with dominant discourses” through forms of “identification and repudiation” (Tomlinson, 2013: 994). White supremacy foments a competitive politics of scarcity over seemingly limited resources. In the next section, we develop these ideas further as we apply our conceptual framework of identity propaganda to cases concerning Kamala Harris and discuss different narrative forms.

#### Conventional disinformation debunking efforts focus on individual identity to sow division and draw attention away from combating violent power structures.

Reddi, Kuo and Kreiss, University Of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Center for Information Technology, and Public Life Graduate Fellow, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, and Principal Researcher, 21

(Madhavi Reddi, Rachel Kuo, and Daniel Kreiss, University Of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Center for Information Technology, and Public Life Graduate Fellow, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, and Principal Researcher, SAGE Journals, 7-17-2021, "Identity propaganda: Racial narratives and disinformation," New Media & Society, p. 12, https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/14614448211029293, accessed 7-1-2022) SS:/

As with essentializing narratives, strategic campaigns and appeals that contest the authenticity of an individual’s or group’s identity are difficult to analyze under the standard umbrella of mis- or disinformation because they often lack a factual basis, referring more to normative constructions of difference. The authenticity of someone’s claim to racial and ethnic identity (particularly in the case of a multiracial person) or gender identity is subjective and layered, and cannot be assessed as true or false. Authenticating narratives reduce identity back down to the individual, drawing attention away from structural formations of power, whereas individual people, regardless of identity, may still align with dominant interests and the preservation of existing hierarchies of power. An identity propaganda framework enables researchers to examine these claims through the lens of both historical race relations and constructions, as well as structures of power behind these appeals.

Returning to the example of Harris, it is no surprise that right-wing narratives sought to elevate Harris’s Indian identity to question her Blackness. In essence, the claim is that Harris cannot call herself Black if she is reaping the benefits of her Asian background that scholars have argued to hold a higher place in America’s racial order (Bonilla Silva and Glover, 2004; Kim, 1999). This is the utilization of a white racial frame (or model minority myth) that pits Asian Americans against Black Americans, where structural racism and “the ordering power of white supremacy forces groups against each other” (Washington, 2017: 100). Furthermore, Harris’s Brahmin (upper caste) background structurally positions her family for access to upward mobility and the ability to achieve an “American Dream” success story. The narrativization of her successes continue to legitimate the hegemonic “model minority” myth of immigrant uplift, as well as “authenticates” her Indian-ness in accordance with dominant frameworks of power. Scholar Nitasha Sharma (2020), for instance, points out that Harris’s advantageous Brahmin background “overlays Indians’ pride in her.” At same time, upper-class and caste Indian immigrants’ embrace of model minority narratives sow divisions among communities of color, particularly Black communities, who this narrative is wielded against.

#### Identity Propaganda creates essentializing narratives that force the performance of identity through the perspective of dominant groups.

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Harris’s intersecting identities as a Black woman centrally feature within essentializing identity propaganda campaigns. Soon after Kamala Harris was announced as Joe Biden’s running mate in August 2020, a slew of racist and sexist identity propaganda became prevalent from the right. These were essentializing narratives that exploited generalized stereotypes of non-dominant groups. “Essentialism,” as we use it, refers to the “attribution of a fixed essence” (Grosz, 1990: 334) on an individual’s or group’s identity, be it racial or ethnic, gender, or class identities, or a combination of multiple identities. Several articles portrayed Harris as sexually promiscuous, raising unfounded questions about her previous professional and personal relationship with famous San Francisco Democratic politician Willie Brown (Casiano, 2019; Post, 2019). Right-wing figures such as Tomi Lahren stated that Harris slept her “way to the top,” and the “Joe and the Hoe” slogan (a portmanteau of “Joe” and the slang term for prostitute “Hoe”) was popularized by rightwing celebrities such as Rush Limbaugh and NBA photographer Bill Baptist (Levenson, 2020; Niemietz, 2020). The circulation of a slogan such as “Joe and the Hoe” trades on the cultural availability of essentializing tropes of Black women as hypersexualized (Noble, 2013; hooks, 1992) as well as the convergence of anti-Blackness, whorephobia, and misogyny. Another stream of racist and sexist identity propaganda on the right that has attempted to undermine Harris is the “angry Black women” trope. Former President Trump characterized Harris as “unlikable” and called her a “monster” (Summers, 2020). White right-wing media personalities such as Tucker Carlson, who has scant regard for pronouncing her name correctly (a form of “othering”) (Sullivan, 2020), promoted the idea that “she’ll bulldoze her elderly, sentimental boss” with her hidden and radical agenda for the presidency (Astor, 2020) that will take power away from white people.

All of these examples of identity propaganda reflect how communities of color are often reduced to essentializing assumptions about cultural and social traits. For example, while women are sexualized and objectified by a dominant masculine culture (Szymanski et al., 2011), Black women in particular are disproportionately targets of the essentialization of their sexuality (Epstein et al., 2017; Holmes, 2016; hooks, 1992; Pilgrim, 2002; Woodard and Mastin, 2005). This tendency to essentialize certain identities and cultures counters the arguments of scholars that identity is ever changing based on numerous contextual factors (Bhabha, 1994; Hall, 1994). Like the othering narrative, essentializing narratives provide the purveyors of identity propaganda with culturally-available lines of attack to exploit in the attempt to subvert those with marginalized identities. Where othering narratives reinforce a divide between a dominant center and subordinate others, essentializing narratives make use of stereotypes of non-dominant groups. In this, it is different from attempts by non-dominant groups to utilize “strategic essentialism” to gain political power (Lowe and Yuk-Ha Tsang, 2018). Marginalized individuals and groups are expected to both respond to these tropes and perform their identities in essentialist terms mediated through the perspective and power of dominant groups.

Accounting for essentializing narratives would greatly benefit researchers analyzing the structure of mis- and disinformation and propaganda in leading them to consider who and what groups are the targets and audiences of these symbolic attacks and why they take the form that they do. It is not a coincidence that white candidates, such as Sarah Palin or Hillary Clinton, are unlikely to be referred to as “hoes.” Tropes such as these capitalize on non-dominant racial and gender categories and pre-existing social stigmas to contribute to the subordination of Black women. Kamala Harris’s experience as a Black woman politician is a “prime example” of the exploitation of intersecting marginalized identities (Astor, 2020) in the attempt to de-legitimate her for higher office.

## Case Outweighs

### AT: Nuclear War Impacts

#### Nuclear discourse flows neg- whitewashed analysis obscures the fact that their impacts are a manifestation of anti-blackness

**Thompson,**Reporter and author, **18** (Nicole Thompson, 4-23-2018,  Racebaitr, "Why I will not allow the fear of a nuclear attack to be white-washed", https://racebaitr.com/2018/04/06/2087/ accessed on 7-12-2022, hooch//cs)

I shook my head, willing the meal to be over, and was grateful when the check arrived just as someone was asking me about my hair. My thinking wasn’t all too different from Michael Harriot’s ‘Why Black America Isn’t Worried About the Upcoming Nuclear Holocaust.” While the meal was partly pleasant, I departed thinking, “fear of nuclear demolition is just some white shit.”

Sadly, that thought would not last long.

I still vibe with Harriot’s statement, “Black people have lived under the specter of having our existence erased on a white man’s whim since we stepped onto the shore at Jamestown Landing.” However, a friend—a Black friend—ignited my nuclear paranoia by sharing theories about when it might happen and who faced the greatest threat. In an attempt to ease my friend’s fear, I leaned in to listen but accidentally toppled down the rabbit hole too. I forked through curated news feeds. I sifted through “fake news,” “actual news,” and foreign news sources. Suddenly, an idea took root: nuclear strike would disproportionately impact Black people, brown people, and low-income individuals.

North Korea won’t target the plain sight racists of Portland, Oregon, the violently microaggressive liberals of the rural Northwest, or the white-hooded klansmen of Diamondhead, Mississippi. No, under the instruction of the supreme leader Kim Jong-un, North Korea will likely strike densely populated urban areas, such as Los Angeles, Chicago, Washington D.C., and New York City. These locations stand-out as targets for a nuclear strike because they are densely populated U.S. population centers. Attacking the heart of the nation or populous cities would translate to more casualties. With that in mind, it’s not lost on me that the most populous cities in the United States boast sizeable diverse populations, or more plainly put: Black populations.

This shit stresses me out! There’s a creeping chill that follows me, a silent alarm that rings each time my Google alert chimes letting me know that Donald Trump has yet again provoked Kim Jong-Un, a man who allegedly killed his very own uncle. I’ve grown so pressed by the idea of nuclear holocaust that my partner and I started gathering non-perishables, candlesticks, a hand-crank radio, and other must-buy items that can be banked in a shopping cart. The practice of preparing for a nuclear holocaust sometimes feels comical, particularly when acknowledging that there has long been a war on Black people in this country.

Blackness is bittersweet in flavor. We are blessed with the melanized skin, the MacGyver-like inventiveness of our foremothers, and our blinding brightness—but the anti-blackness that we experience is also blinding as well as stifling. We are stuck by rigged systems, punished with the prison industrial complex, housing discrimination, pay discrimination, and worse. We get side-eyes from strangers when we’re “loitering,” and the police will pull us over for driving “too fast” in a residential neighborhood. We get murdered for holding cell phones while standing in our grandmother’s backyard.

The racism that strung up our ancestors, kept them sequestered to the back of the bus and kept them in separate and unequal schools still lives. It lives, and it’s more palpable than dormant. To me, this means one thing: Trump’s America isn’t an unfortunate circumstance, it’s a homecoming event that’s hundreds of years in the making, no matter how many times my white friends’ say, “He’s not my president.”

In light of this homecoming, we now flirt with a new, larger fear of a Black genocide. America has always worked towards Black eradication through a steady stream of life-threatening inequality, but nuclear war on American soil would be swift. And for this reason I’ve grown tired of whiteness being at the center of the nuclear conversation. The race-neutral approach to the dialogue, and a tendency to continue to promote the idea that missiles will land in suburban and rural backyards, instead of inner-city playgrounds, is false.

“The Day After,” the iconic, highest-rated television film in history, aired November 20, 1983. More than 100 million people tuned in to watch a film postulating a war between the Soviet Union and the United States. The film, which would go on to affect President Ronald Reagan and policymakers’ nuclear intentions, shows the “true effects of nuclear war on average American citizens.” The Soviet-targeted areas featured in the film include Higginsville, Kansas City, Sedalia, Missouri, as well as El Dorado Springs, Missouri. They depict the destruction of the central United States, and viewers watch as full-scale nuclear war transforms middle America into a burned wasteland. Yet unsurprisingly, the devastation from the attack is completely white-washed, leaving out the more likely victims which are the more densely populated (Black) areas.

Death tolls would be high for white populations, yes, but large-scale losses of Black and brown folks would outpace that number, due to placement and poverty. That number would be pushed higher by limited access to premium health care, wealth, and resources. The effects of radiation sickness, burns, compounded injuries, and malnutrition would throttle Black and brown communities and would mark us for generations. It’s for that reason that we have to do more to foster disaster preparedness among Black people where we can. Black people deserve the space to explore nuclear unease, even if we have competing threats, anxieties, and worries.

Jacqui Patterson, Director of the Environmental and Climate Justice Initiative, once stated:

African American communities are disproportionately vulnerable to and impacted by natural (and unnatural) catastrophes. Our socio-economic vulnerability is based on multiple factors including our lack of wealth to cushion us, our disproportionate representation in lower quality housing stock, and our relative lack of mobility, etc.

### AT: Extinction First

#### Racism should be treated as an existential risk---eliminating personhood causes psychic trauma and is the basis for literal extermination

John Preston 17, Professor of Education within UEL's Cass School of Education and Communities, 4/20/17, "Rethinking Existential Threats and Education", Competence Based Education and Training (CBET) and the End of Human Learning, pp 61-93, <https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-55110-4_3>

\*BAME = Black, Asian, and Minority Ethnic

After Marxism, the second existential threat is one of negation and elimination of the subject and here I shall consider conceptions of this from CRT and black existentialism.

Various contemporary educational theories consider the equity and social justice implications of different forms of education with regard to race. The work of Sleeter and Grant (2007) makes the ethical and pragmatic case for multicultural social justice as a key value of education. This has been followed in contemporary work that attempts to consider the various dimensions of social justice. For example, Bhopal and Shain (2014), consider the twin axis of recognition and redistribution as goals of education. Other work examines the role of social distancing from the ‘Other’ by white students as a dynamic process in which Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) and working-class students are disadvantaged. In many ways denial of social justice in terms of lack of resources, recognition or access to social space can be considered to be a form of dehumanisation. However, whilst work on social justice and education might consider the lack of humanity in these systems of oppression (applying concepts such as ‘bare life’, Lewis 2006; or ‘othering’ Lebowitz 2016) they do not consider directly existential threats. Threats to humanity on the basis of difference may arise from totalitarianism as much as through war and threats to the environment. The various genocides which have taken place throughout human history have often had a racial, or ethnic, cleansing purpose to them. They have been eugenic threats that are based upon spurious ideas of genetic and moral superiority. Writers on race from Fanon to Du Bois have considered that the threat posed to racial groups may be existential and that there is a short step from psychic, to real extermination. The negation of individuals through economic, social and psychological processes allows for their physical extermination. Du Bois (2014) deals explicitly with existential threat in his short story ‘The Comet’ where humanity is almost wiped out by a threat from space, leaving only a small number of people to carry on. As one of the survivors of the comet is an African American, this leads Du Bois to consider the state of race relations in the USA. The implication of the story is that the existential threat of the comet (which allows the African American character to live in a world entirely free of racial prejudice) allows release from the existential threat of eugenic attitudes. Building on Du Bois, in other work (Preston 2012), I have considered the ways in which preparation for threats, including existential threats such as pandemics and nuclear war, has been in many ways eugenic in that it prioritises the survival of some more than others based upon criteria which include race and ethnicity (Preston 2012). Preparing for disasters and emergencies often prioritises the interests of white people above those of other ethnic minorities. One reason for this is tacit intentionality which means that policymakers and practitioners do not consider human diversity in considering how people may respond to disaster. Policy is often biased as policymakers expect that people will be ‘like me’ which (at least in the UK and USA) means they will often be white, middle-class, educated, English-speaking men. In planning for threats, there will be various ways in which such biases are included. For example, they may not consider publishing advice in a number of languages, the resources necessary to survive a disaster, the mobility of people and the attitudes of emergency responders. This is unwitting prejudice in that by not considering diversity they are actually making it less likely for BAME people to survive, or protect themselves against, the disaster.

Although these biases may lead to a gradient in terms of survival by different groups in a disaster, they do not appear to relate to existential threat. However, existential threat can be interpreted in a different way in perspectives from critical whiteness studies and CRT.

In critical whiteness studies, whiteness is taken to be not a racial identity, but rather a system of power and oppression (Leonardo 2009). Whiteness was created as an identity not simply as a mode of social classification but as a way of exploiting and controlling others. There are obviously periods in history where this was objectively the case. During slavery in the USA, for example, whiteness was used as a means to distinguish between those people who had the right to own property (whites) and those who could not (Africans), Moreover, whiteness was the obverse of property in that only Africans could ‘be’ assets or property. Enslaved Africans were therefore treated as property and did not have access to the basic rights which would constitute humanity in American society (such as access to education, the right to own property, the right to decide who they should have relationships with). There are obviously parallels between this experience and holocaust when Jewish people (and other individuals) were dehumanised by the Nazis and denied access to basic resources. During imperialism there was also a period whereby other races were categorised to be less worthy than white people and this provided the justification for colonial control, exploitation and often extermination.

Advocates of whiteness studies go further than this and consider that whiteness is not merely a past system of oppression, but a continuing system of white supremacy (Leonardo 2009). The economy and society is comprised in such a way that white people will usually benefit, and BAME people will usually not. This is not only an economic and social system but also a psychological system whereby existence as a full human depends upon one’s racial categorisation. This idea has its roots in the work of Fanon (1986) who wrote that black identity was shaped by the white gaze, but also contemporary writers also consider the notion of whiteness as ‘death’, a categorisation that is rooted in past oppression and extermination, whose remnants exist to this day. This perspective on race and existence leads us to consider what is meant by life, and whether we are not currently living to our full potential (as Marxists would also propose) when existential threat is actually amongst us. For Marxists this would be the expansion of the ‘social universe’ of capitalism that flows between and through us, ‘capitalising humanity’. For critical whiteness studies, this existential threat would be one of whiteness and the negation of existence for a racially classified group of people.

In order to make this idea of constant existential threat more tangible (although the term is not used) critical race theorists use what are known as ‘counter-stories’ to consider how racial dynamics might develop in the future, or to highlight inequalities in the present (Delgado 1996). Derrick Bell (1992) who is considered to be the founder of CRT, uses a much cited counter-story ‘The Space Traders’ to consider the ways in which black people’s lives are classed as being not equal to those of whites in the USA. In ‘The Space Traders’ a race of aliens offer the USA a trade: all of America’s black citizens in return for unlimited, environmentally friendly, energy and technology. After some debate, the American people vote on the proposal and decide to give up all of America’s black citizens to the space traders in return for the futuristic technical goods. Of course, Bell is proposing an analogy between slavery in the past and the present situation of black people in the USA, and perhaps even suggesting that such a thing might happen again. On another level, though, there is also the idea that the existence of black people in America is categorised at a different level of metaphysical worth to that of white people. That life could be traded so cheaply, even plausibly (in the thought experiment) makes us pause for thought in terms of how we classify existential threat.

Although the relationship between CRT and black existentialism may not always seem obvious we can see that there is a nihilistic streak in the work of Bell (1992) with regard to the prospects for survival. In addition, the drawing on the work of Fanon by authors who use CRT as part of their work which shows the perpetual violence encountered by people of colour in education as well as the enduring influence of Du Bois on CRT (Delgado and Stefancic 2001) shows the close connection between the two theories. What links CRT and black existentialism is a basic concern with existence and the meaning of human life under constant threat that can be thought to underpin any concern with social justice. From CRT and black existentialism, we therefore see that existential threat is one of negation through economic, social and political systems and there are degrees of graduation between these forms of existential threats and actual genocide or extermination. The links between these points and CBET might be considered as obtuse but, as we shall see in the next chapter, systems of education can play a role in forms of negation. Obviously, there are social justice implications in the way in which people are treated in terms of race and ethnicity in education. The ‘triaging’ by race and ethnicity of access to education courses, the ways in which certain groups are rationed access to educational routes and the fragility of links between education and the labour market for BAME groups are all part of marginalisation, in which vocational education plays a large part. As part of this process, and probably not coincidentally, these groups are also more likely to find themselves in vocational, CBET courses. However, social justice is not the whole story, and there is a more profound form of equality associated with the right to existence. It is this that CBET threatens through the reduction of the subject to a digital organism as I will show in the next chapter.

## White allies good

#### It is essential for white scholars to interrupt “politics of forgetting” and recognizing white privilege in IR scholarship

**Guerra,**Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro Senior Field Assistant **21** (Lucas, 2021, Security Dialogue 2021, Vol. 52(S) 28–37 "Security as white privilege: Racializing whiteness in critical security studies", https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/09670106211027797?journalCode=sdib accessed on 7-9-2022, hooch//cs)

Considering the ideas discussed in this section, I believe that it is fundamentally important to interrupt the ‘politics of forgetting’ whiteness and white privilege’s weight in our knowledge production. As Barbara Applebaum (2010: 9) argues, ‘for white people, it is impossible to gain an understanding of systemic racism without naming whiteness and understanding how whiteness works’. Therefore, marking and naming whiteness and acknowledging it as the dominant part of racial oppressive systems is fundamentally necessary (Ribeiro, 2019b; Roediger, 2002). Recognizing our complicity with racial systems of oppression is just a small, though necessary, first step if white people are to take responsibility for our power positions within systems of racial oppression, including our knowledge (re)production activities (Applebaum, 2010; Ignatiev, 1997; Ribeiro, 2019b). This first step would be severely incomplete, however, if it is not accompanied by an ‘engagement with the critical anti-racist work of those positioned as racially subordinate in a white supremacist system’ (Howard, 2004: 75). I seek to take these elements seriously in the discussion that follows.

# AFF

## Framework

### AT: Framework is Racist

#### Arguments stand or fall based on whether they are good – nothing more nothing less – framework isn’t policing

Anderson, Professor of Humanities and English at Brown University, 6

[Amanda Anderson , Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Humanities and English at Brown University, Spring 2006, “Reply to My Critic(s),” Criticism, Vol. 48, No. 2, p. 281-290, AMM]

Lets first examine the claim that my book is "unwittingly" inviting a resurrection of the "Enlightenment-equals-totalitarianism position." How, one wonders, could a book promoting argument and debate, and promoting reason-giving practices as a kind of common ground that should prevail over assertions of cultural authenticity, somehow come to be seen as a dangerous resurgence of bad Enlightenment? Robbins tells us why: I want "argument on my own terms"-that is, I want to impose reason on people, which is a form of power and oppression. But what can this possibly mean? Arguments stand or fall based on whether they are successful and persuasive, even an argument in favor of argument. It simply is not the case that an argument in favor of the importance of reasoned debate to liberal democracy is tantamount to oppressive power. To assume so is to assume, in the manner of Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, that reason is itself violent, inherently, and that it will always mask power and enforce exclusions. But to assume this is to assume the very view of Enlightenment reason that Robbins claims we are "thankfully" well rid of. (I leave to the side the idea that any individual can proclaim that a debate is over, thankfully or not.) But perhaps Robbins will say, "I am not imagining that your argument is directly oppressive, but that what you argue for would be, if it were enforced." Yet my book doesn't imagine or suggest it is enforceable; I simply argue in favor of, I promote, an ethos of argument within a liberal democratic and proceduralist framework. As much as Robbins would like to think so, neither I nor the books I write can be cast as an arm of the police. Robbins wants to imagine a far more direct line of influence from criticism to political reality, however, and this is why it can be such a bad thing to suggest norms of argument. Watch as the gloves come off: Faced with the prospect of submitting to her version of argument roughly, Habermass version-and of being thus authorized to disagree only about other, smaller things, some may feel that there will have been an end to argument, or an end to the arguments they find most interesting. With current events in mind, I would be surprised if there were no recourse to the metaphor of a regular army facing a guerilla insurrection, hinting that Anderson wants to force her opponents to dress in uniform, reside in well-demarcated camps and capitals that can be bombed, fight by the rules of states (whether the states themselves abide by these rules or not), and so on-in short, that she wants to get the battle onto a terrain where her side will be assured of having the upper hand. Lets leave to the side the fact that this is a disowned hypothetical criticism. (As in, "Well, okay, yes, those are my gloves, but those are somebody elses hands they will have come off of.") Because far more interesting, actually, is the sudden elevation of stakes. It is a symptom of the sorry state of affairs in our profession that it plays out repeatedly this tragicomic tendency to give a grandiose political meaning to every object it analyzes or confronts. We have evidence of how desperate the situation is when we see it in a critic as thoughtful as Bruce Robbins, where it emerges as the need to allegorize a point about an argument in such a way that it gets cast as the equivalent of war atrocities. It is especially ironic in light of the fact that to the extent that I do give examples of the importance of liberal democratic proceduralism, I invoke the disregard of the protocols of international adjudication in the days leading up to the invasion of Iraq; I also speak about concerns with voting transparency. It is hard for me to see how my argument about proceduralism can be associated with the policies of the Bush administration when that administration has exhibited a flagrant disregard of democratic procedure and the rule of law. I happen to think that a renewed focus on proceduralism is a timely venture, which is why I spend so much time discussing it in my final chapter. But I hasten to add that I am not interested in imagining that proceduralism is the sole political response to the needs of cultural criticism in our time: my goal in the book is to argue for a liberal democratic culture of argument, and to suggest ways in which argument is not served by trumping appeals to identity and charismatic authority. I fully admit that my examples are less political events than academic debates; for those uninterested in the shape of intellectual arguments, and eager for more direct and sustained discussion of contemporary politics, the approach will disappoint. Moreover, there will always be a tendency for a proceduralist to under-specify substance, and that is partly a principled decision, since the point is that agreements, compromises, and policies get worked out through the communicative and political process. My book is mainly concentrated on evaluating forms of arguments and appeals to ethos, both those that count as a form of trump card or distortion, and those that flesh out an understanding of argument as a universalist practice. There is an intermittent appeal to larger concerns in the political democratic culture, and that is because I see connections between the ideal of argument and the ideal of deliberative democracy. But there is clearly, and indeed necessarily, significant room for further elaboration here.

### Framework Key to Democracy

#### Effective argumentation is better able to create broader inclusion---radical rejection of existing systems as exclusionary is ineffective and reductionist

Anderson, Professor of Humanities and English at Brown University, 6

[Amanda Anderson , Andrew W. Mellon Professor of Humanities and English at Brown University, Spring 2006, “Reply to My Critic(s),” Criticism, Vol. 48, No. 2, p. 281-290, AMM]

In closing, I'd like to speak briefly to the question of proceduralism's relevance to democratic vitality. One important way of extending the proceduralist arguments put forth by Habeimas is to work on how institutions and practices might better promote participation in democratic life. The apathy and nonparticipation plaguing democratic institutions in the United States is a serious problem, and can be separated from the more romantic theoretical investments in a refusal to accept the terms of what counts as argument, or in assertions of inassimilable difference. With respect to the latter, which is often glorified precisely as the moment when politics or democracy is truly occurring, I would say, on the contrary democracy is not happening then-rather, the limits or deficiencies of an actually existing democracy are making themselves felt. Acknowledging struggle, conflict, and exclusion is vital to democracy, but insisting that exclusion is not so much a persistent challenge for modern liberal democracies but rather inherent to the modern liberal-democratic political form as such seems to me precisely to remain stalled in a romantic critique of Enlightenment. It all comes down to a question of whether one wants to work with the ideals of democracy or see them as essentially normative in a negative sense: this has been the legacy of a certain critique of Enlightenment, and it is astonishingly persistent in the left quarters in the academy. One hears it clearly when Robbins makes confident reference to liberalisms tendency to ignore "the founding acts of violence on which a social order is based." One encounters it in the current vogue for the work of Giorgio Agamben and Carl Schmitt. Saying that a state of exception defines modernity or is internal to the law itself may help to sharpen your diagnoses of certain historical conditions, but if absolutized as it is in these accounts, it gives you nothing but a negative diagnostic and a compensatory flight to a realm entirely other-the kind of mystical, Utopian impulse that flees from these conditions rather than confronts and fights them on terms that derive from the settled-if constantly evolving-normative basis of democratic modernity. If one is outraged by the flagrant disregard of democratic procedures in the current U.S. political regime, then one needs to be able to coherently say why democratic procedures matter, what principles underwrite them, and what historical movements and institutions have helped us to secure and support them. Argument as a critical practice and as a key component of democratic institutions and public debate has a vital role to play in such a task.

## Link Answers

### No Link – Faulty Assumptions

#### No Link - The K makes broad, faulty assertions about the nature of security studies

**Waever** University of Copenhagen **and Buzan** London School of Economics and Political Science**, 20** (Ole and Barry, 2020, Security Dialogue2020, Vol. 51(4) 386–394, "Racism and responsibility –The critical limits of deepfake methodology in security studies: A reply to Howell and RichterMontpetit", https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0967010620916153?journalCode=sdib accessed on 7-12-2022, hooch//cs)

*H&RM=Howell and Richter-Montpetit*

One assertion is central to H&RM’s article, dominating the abstract: that the concepts of securitization and desecuritization are distributed in time and space so that securitization is a threatening re-regression lurking in a backward black Africa, while desecuritization is a reasoned, liberal, civilized dialogue characteristic of Europe (and our prescribed future). We already debunked their attempt to pose Europe as the poster child for desecuritization. H&RM depict Africa as the essence of securitization, but offer no reason why Africa should be seen as constitutive for the theory. The foundational misunderstanding in H&RM’s article on which their whole argument hangs is an alleged ‘conceptualization of “normal politics” as reasoned, civilized dialogue’ (H&RM, 2020: 3 [1]). In Buzan et al. (1998), we write: Of course, places do exist where secrecy or violation of rights is the rule and where security arguments are not needed to legitimize such acts. The earlier illustrations were for a liberal-democratic society; in other societies there will also be ‘rules,’ as there are in any society, and when a securitizing actor uses a rhetoric of existential threat and thereby takes an issue out of what under those conditions is ‘normal politics,’ we have a case of securitization. (Buzan et al., 1998: 24–25, emphasis added)

Thus, quite explicitly, ‘normal politics’ is not a politics with some specific attributes (‘liberal’, ‘civilized’, ‘reasoned’); it is whatever passed as normal until an exception was installed through securitization. H&RM do not consult the existing secondary literature on this, but instead repeatedly restate their own (false) definition that ‘normal politics’ means reasoned, liberal, civilized dialogue. From there, they associate freely into this being ‘a teleological hierarchy of civilizational advancement from securitization towards politicization’ (H&RM, 2020: 8 [6]). This characterization they support with a reference to pp. 53 and 69 in the Framework book. It looks damning when H&RM write thus and back it with a reference; but, if you read those pages, there is absolutely no hint of securitization-to-politicization being cast in evolutionary or civilizational terms. Their article contains dozens of similar instances, where they make a reference to our texts but what you find there is not what they claim.

Significantly, their definition of ‘normal politics’ could not work for securitization theory, because, as argued very strongly by Wæver (2011, 2015), the theory needs a clean concept of securitization as a distinct operation that is contrasted simply to the non-securitized (called ‘normal politics’), not a substantial concept of ‘normal politics’ as holding particular teleological (e.g. liberal democratic) qualities. Securitization is an ‘operation’ that is available for deployment and contestation in all societies at all times. The unprofessional citation practices of H&RM are the smaller problem; the big one is that they don’t read. They inject elements into the theory that both aren’t there and couldn’t be there. Methodology matters.

H&RM avoid understanding the theory they are attacking. On the second page of their article, they state that securitization theory has been attractive because ‘it provides a clear set of steps and standards for . . . deciding whether [the referent objects] should indeed be “securitized”’ (H&RM, 2020: 4 [2]). No. The theory does not aim to guide when something ‘should be securitized’. It is a framework for analysing what happens when something is securitized and the politics of struggles over this act. It is argued systematically in all the major works (and has been a common target of criticism) that securitization theory cannot and will not prescribe when something ‘should be securitized’. H&RM make no attempt to present the securitization theory project, its animating agenda, and the political or academic setting into which the texts intervened. If they had explained what the theory and the key texts were designed to achieve, they simply could not argue as they do

### No Link - Security not Racist

#### No link- racism isn’t the foundation of security studies

**Waever** University of Copenhagen **and Buzan** London School of Economics and Political Science**, 20** (Ole and Barry, 2020, Security Dialogue2020, Vol. 51(4) 386–394, "Racism and responsibility –The critical limits of deepfake methodology in security studies: A reply to Howell and RichterMontpetit", https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0967010620916153?journalCode=sdib accessed on 7-12-2022, hooch//cs)

*H&RM=Howell and Richter-Montpetit*

H&RM generally use quotations radically out of context. They never study what is done in the texts they are ‘reading’. They say nothing about their own methodology or data selection and give no principles for interpretation. They do not define racism (see response by Lene Hansen [2020]), and they don’t discuss at all what it means to read a theory and judge whether it is racist. Given that this is the theme of the article, it is disturbing that Security Dialogue has published it. Despite H&RM’s repeated assertions about something being ‘foundational’ to securitization theory, they do not follow any standards for how to find what is ‘foundational’ for, or ‘structures’, a theory. If there is a methodology at play, it is deepfake in the sense that if you break a corpus of text down into small fragments, you can reassemble it to say anything you want. Deepfake as analogy does not imply any claim about intentional falsehood. The analogy is to the technique: making somebody ‘speak’ by using splinters from them reassembled to produce meaning disconnected from the original texts. H&RM present no theoretical framework. We can’t backtrack their theoretical position from scattered citations. Impressive forerunners do exactly what they don’t: Stoler (1995) and Mills (1997) trace meticulously how their analysed theorists struggle to do specific things, and then what role race plays in enabling this. H&RM, in contrast, ignore what securitization theory attempts and how it works.

### No Link – Security Intersectional

#### Generic link homogenizes international relations, prefer situated and empirical evidence

Gomes, Federal University of Santa Maria Brazil Social Sciences Professor and Marques, Federal University International Relations researcher, 21 (Mariana Selister and Renata Rodrigues , “Can securitization theory be saved from itself? A decolonial and feminist intervention”, Security Dialogue 2021, Vol. 52(S) 78-87, EBSCO, GDI access 7/12/22)

The concept of intersectionality is essential for understanding the main structures of modem society - patriarchy, racism, and capitalism - that demarcate people’s lives and political processes, and, consequently, the dynamics of international security. These social structures that interact with each other create the categories of women, race, and class (Davis, 1981) that segregate and hier- archize social groups. In dialogue with intersectional theory, decolonial feminism (Lugones, 2010) places these three dimensions in an international perspective, emphasizing the idea of coloniality. Thus, patriarchy, racism, and capitalism are the main social structures strongly demarcated by historical colonialism and its roots in the economy, politics and culture that persist to the present day, establishing what Lugones defines as the ‘colonial/modem gender system’.

Although these concepts can lead to different paths of analysis, their epistemological common ground allows us to advocate that coloniality, racialization, and genderization are products of his- torical constmctions, neither universal nor essential. Culturally and historically situated analysis of securitization processes has the capacity to incorporate social classification configurations such as racialization and genderization, although we do not see this happening very often. We intend to illustrate in the next section how the conduct of empirical research plays a decisive role in efforts to analyze the social configurations of power in securitization processes.

## Impacts

### Case Outweighs – Extinction

#### Existential threats outweigh – correct cognitive biases against them

Farquhar et al 17 (Sebastian, former head of the global priorities project, “Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance.” Global Priorities Project, 2017, <https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf>, Accessed 7/17/20, GDI – JMoore)

1.2. THE ETHICS OF EXISTENTIAL RISK

In his book Reasons and Persons, Oxford philosopher Derek Parfit advanced an influential argument about the importance of avoiding extinction:

I believe that if we destroy mankind, as we now can, this outcome will be much worse than most people think. Compare three outcomes:

(1) Peace.

(2) A nuclear war that kills 99% of the world’s ex- isting population.

(3) A nuclear war that kills 100%.

(2) would be worse than (1), and (3) would be worse than (2). Which is the greater of these two differences? Most people believe that the greater difference is between (1) and (2). I believe that the difference between (2) and (3) is very much greater. ... The Earth will remain habitable for at least another billion years. Civilization began only a few thousand years ago. If we do not destroy mankind, these few thousand years may be only a tiny fraction of the whole of civilized human history. The difference between (2) and (3) may thus be the difference between this tiny fraction and all of the rest of this history. If we compare this possible his- tory to a day, what has occurred so far is only a fraction of a second.65

In this argument, it seems that Parfit is assuming that the survivors of a nuclear war that kills 99% of the population would eventually be able to recover civilisation without long-term effect. As we have seen, this may not be a safe assumption – but for the purposes of this thought experiment, the point stands. What makes existential catastrophes especially bad is that they would “destroy the future,” as another Oxford philosopher, Nick Bostrom, puts it.66 This future could potentially be extremely long and full of flourishing, and would therefore have extremely large value. In standard risk analysis, when working out how to respond to risk, we work out the expected value of risk reduction, by weighing the probability that an action will prevent an adverse event against the severity of the event. Because the value of pre- venting existential catastrophe is so vast, even a tiny probability of prevention has huge expected value.67

Of course, there is persisting reasonable disagreement about ethics and there are a number of ways one might resist this conclusion.68 Therefore, it would be unjustified to be overconfident in Parfit and Bostrom’s argument.

In some areas, government policy does give significant weight to future generations. For example, in assessing the risks of nuclear waste storage, governments have considered timeframes of thousands, hundreds of thousands, and even a million years.69 Justifications for this policy usually appeal to principles of intergenerational equity according to which future generations ought to get as much protection as current generations.70 Similarly, widely accepted norms of sustainable development require development that meets the needs of the current generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.71

However, when it comes to existential risk, it would seem that we fail to live up to principles of intergenerational equity. Existential catastrophe would not only give future generations less than the current generations; it would give them nothing. Indeed, reducing existential risk plausibly has a quite low cost for us in comparison with the huge expected value it has for future generations. In spite of this, relatively little is done to reduce existential risk. Unless we give up on norms of intergenerational equity, they give us a strong case for significantly increasing our efforts to reduce existential risks.

1.3. WHY EXISTENTIAL RISKS MAY BE SYSTEMATICALLY UNDERINVESTED IN, AND THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

In spite of the importance of existential risk re- duction, it probably receives less attention than is warranted. As a result, concerted international co- operation is required if we are to receive adequate protection from existential risks.

1.3.1. Why existential risks are likely to be underinvested in

There are several reasons why existential risk re- duction is likely to be underinvested in. Firstly, it is a global public good. Economic theory predicts that such goods tend to be underprovided. The benefits of existential risk reduction are widely and indivisibly dispersed around the globe from the countries responsible for taking action. Consequently, a country which reduces existential risk gains only a small portion of the benefits but bears the full brunt of the costs. Countries thus have strong incentives to free ride, receiving the benefits of risk reduction without contributing. As a result, too few do what is in the common interest.

Secondly, as already suggested above, existential risk reduction is an intergenerational public good: most of the benefits are enjoyed by future generations who have no say in the political process. For these goods, the problem is temporal free riding: the current generation enjoys the benefits of inaction while future generations bear the costs.

Thirdly, many existential risks, such as machine superintelligence, engineered pandemics, and solar geoengineering, pose an unprecedented and uncertain future threat. Consequently, it is hard to develop a satisfactory governance regime for them: there are few existing governance instruments which can be applied to these risks, and it is unclear what shape new instruments should take. In this way, our position with regard to these emerging risks is comparable to the one we faced when nuclear weapons first became available.

Cognitive biases also lead people to underestimate existential risks. Since there have not been any catastrophes of this magnitude, these risks are not salient to politicians and the public.72 This is an example of the misapplication of the availability heuristic, a mental shortcut which assumes that something is important only if it can be readily recalled.

Another cognitive bias affecting perceptions of existential risk is scope neglect. In a seminal 1992 study, three groups were asked how much they would be willing to pay to save 2,000, 20,000 or 200,000 birds from drowning in uncovered oil ponds. The groups answered $80, $78, and $88, respectively.73 In this case, the size of the benefits had little effect on the scale of the preferred response. People be- come numbed to the effect of saving lives when the numbers get too large. 74 Scope neglect is a particularly acute problem for existential risk because the numbers at stake are so large. Due to scope neglect, decision-makers are prone to treat existential risks in a similar way to problems which are less severe by many orders of magnitude. A wide range of other cognitive biases are likely to affect the evaluation of existential risks.75

### Case Outweighs – Russia Adv

#### The K sanitizes russian authoritarianism

**Dearment,**senior reporter at MedCity News covering biotech **22** (Alaric Dearment, , 2-14-2022,  Above the Law, "Russia Plays Western ‘Anti-War’ Left For Fools - Above the Law", https://abovethelaw.com/2022/02/russia-plays-western-anti-war-left-for-fools/ accessed on 7-12-2022, hooch//cs)

The basic premise of these ideas is that the US and NATO should do nothing substantial to deter Russia from invading and then sit on their hands if it actually does invade. The bigger question is why so many leftists who claim to be anti-war and anti-imperialist would give succor to Russia as it engages in the very warmongering and imperialism they claim to deplore.

One possible reason is a longstanding binary worldview that sees the US as the main cause of the world’s problems and so irredeemably evil that it praises any nation opposing its interests – e.g., the Soviet Union during the Cold War, Russia in the present, China, Venezuela or Syria. This inevitably leads to double standards when it comes to imperialism and human rights abuses and a tendency to blame the US and its allies first.

The Iraq war didn’t help either, giving rise to isolationism and kneejerk cynicism about American foreign policy whereby anything emanating from the Pentagon or State Department is assumed to be a lie. But unlike Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction, Russia’s forces amassed along Ukraine’s border are clearly visible.

Another is Russian propaganda, disseminated by state-owned outlets like RT and Sputnik. They have been tremendously successful at pumping pro-Russian ideas into Western political discourse while also promoting anti-system populist politics aimed at exacerbating divisions and destabilizing democracies. Kremlin propagandists can count every Westerner sincerely arguing Russia has “legitimate concerns” about “NATO expansion” as a success story.

But a larger reason is a failure to admit what Russia actually is and always has been, which is a colonial empire, every bit as much as its Spanish, British and French counterparts. The differences are that it was an empire of land rather than sea, and that with the collapse of the monarchy in 1917 it slapped a left-wing revolutionary coat of paint onto a state that remained just as imperialist as when the tsars ruled from Petrograd.

That’s why Georgia’s first tenure as a democratic republic after declaring independence in 1918 lasted only three years, ending with the Red Army invading and taking over the country in 1921. Armenia and independence movements in Central Asia experienced similar fates.

Consequently, the decolonization that Spain, the UK and other European powers underwent after World War II didn’t come to Russia until 1991, when the Soviet Union collapsed. That decolonization is what Putin referred to as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century” in 2005.

But where other former European colonial powers are content to let their former colonies govern their own affairs, Putin cannot tolerate former Russian colonies doing the same. That’s why pro-democratic uprisings in post-Soviet countries – most recently Belarus and Kazakhstan – scare him so much and is likely the reason he has his eyes on Ukraine. After all, a Ukraine that is free, democratic and prosperous and enjoys close ties with the West threatens his ill-gotten power and wealth, as it might cause Russians to start asking why they can’t have democracy and prosperity too.

If a war breaks out in Europe, it will happen because a predatory, kleptocratic mafia state presided over by a psychopathic dictator started it. It will be because all the diplomacy in the world could not stop Putin’s revanchist desire to restore Soviet power. Undermining efforts to prevent that from happening or punish Putin’s regime if he does invade isn’t anti-war.

### Case Outweighs - War turns Racism

#### War outweighs and turns every impact

Horgan 14 (John, “War Is Our Most Urgent Problem--Let’s Solve It.” Scientific America, 8/12/20, <https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/cross-check/war-is-our-most-urgent-problem-let-8217-s-solve-it/>, Accessed 7/17/20, GDI – JMoore)

Is there a more urgent problem in the world today than war? And when I say "war" in this post, I mean also militarism, the culture of war, the armies, arms, industries, policies, plans, propaganda, prejudices, rationalizations that make lethal group conflict not only possible but also likely.

My answer to the above question: No, there is no more urgent problem than war. Not climate change, pollution, overpopulation, oppression, poverty, inequality, hunger, disease.

If you seek solutions to any of these problems, you should also devote at least some effort to ending war, for several reasons. First, war exacerbates or perpetuates our other problems, either directly or by draining precious resources away from their solution. War subverts democracy and promotes tyranny and fanaticism; kills and sickens and impoverishes people; ravages nature. War is a keystone problem, the eradication of which would make our other social problems much more tractable.

Second, war is more readily solvable than many other human afflictions. War is not like a hurricane, earthquake or Ebola plague, a natural disaster foisted on us by forces beyond our control. War is entirely our creation, the product of human choices. War could end tomorrow if a relatively small group of people around the world chose to end it.

Third, more than any of our other problems, war represents a horrific moral crime. Particularly when carried out by the U.S. and other nations, or by groups that aspire to or claim the legitimacy of states, war makes hypocrites of us and makes a mockery of human progress. We cannot claim to be civilized as long as war or even the threat of war persists.

Yes, annual war casualties have declined sharply since the cataclysmic first half of the 20th century. Over the last few decades, war has killed far fewer people than cancer or automobile accidents. But in our heavily—and nuclear—armed world, war is a few decisions away from becoming exponentially more destructive. And even the killing of a single child by a U.S. drone, Israeli rocket or Syrian tank is an abomination that corrupts us all.

## Permutation

### Perm – Do Both: Eclecticism

#### Perm – Do Both – Security is contingent not a fixed construct, approaching perm as eclecticism best way to evaluate and synthesize disparate paradigms.

Makinda, Murdoch University, International Relations and Security Studies Professor, 21 (Samuel M., Perth, Australia, “Critical security studies, racism and eclecticism”, Security Dialogue 2021, Vol. 52(S) 142-151, EBSCO)

I argue here that one of the appropriate reparative possibilities for critical security studies lies in eclecticism. Those who have employed eclecticism in the past have described it as a process through which scholars trespass paradigmatic boundaries and combine insights from different par- adigms to analyse a given problem (Makinda, 2000a; Sil and Katzenstein, 2010). For example, Katzenstein and Sil have argued that ‘eclecticism is distinguished by the fact that features of analy- ses in theories initially embedded in separate research traditions can be separated from their respective foundations, translated meaningfully, and recombined as part of an original permuta- tion of concepts, methods, analytics, and empirics’ (Katzenstein and Sil, 2008: 110-111, emphasis in original). Earlier, I had defined eclecticism ‘as a process through which a theorist constructs a coherent analytical approach by utilizing, synthesizing and reflecting on insights from disparate paradigms’ (Makinda, 2000b: 398). I posited that eclecticists would need to meet some conditions. ‘First, they would need to recognize, but at the same time refuse to be confined by, paradigmatic horizons’ (Makinda, 2000b: 400). Explaining that eclecticism had the potential to emancipate scholars from paradigmatic constraints, I argued that the refusal by eclecticists ‘to be bound by paradigmatic boundaries requires acknowledgement that these socio-mental constrictions are not fixed, but contingent’ (Makinda, 2000b: 400). I added that eclecticism could be used to ‘explore the possibilities of pursuing an [international relations] discipline that takes account of the percep- tions of us/them, self/other and inside/outside in non-European traditions’ (Makinda, 2000b: 399).

### Perm – Do Both: Eclecticism – 1AR

#### Claims to alt exclusivity turns the K

Makinda, Murdoch University, International Relations and Security Studies Professor, 21 (Samuel M., Perth, Australia, “Critical security studies, racism and eclecticism”, Security Dialogue 2021, Vol. 52(S) 142-151, EBSCO)

While critical security studies emerged from a cross-fertilization of ideas, cultures and traditions representing different parts of the world, it has increasingly been made to identify itself with European values, traditions and thoughts that go back to the critiques of modernity and the Enlightenment. This identification with one source of ideas has meant that critical security studies continues to exclude from the conversation a large part of the world that gave birth to it. The con- clusion is that critical security studies has not only missed the benefits that come with the cross- fertilization of ideas, but also alienated itself from its own foundations. Moreover, by aspiring to become a paradigm that competes with other security studies para- digms for hegemony, critical security studies has unwittingly compromised some of its principles and ethical commitments. The strength of critical security studies comes from its ability to expose the forces of oppression and domination, but it cannot do so effectively when it is promoting the hegemony of ideas associated with Gramsci and the Frankfurt School. It also cannot consistently seek to eliminate exclusion and advocate inclusion when it is establishing its own strict boundary lines.

#### Perm solves -

Makinda, Murdoch University, International Relations and Security Studies Professor, 21 (Samuel M., Perth, Australia, “Critical security studies, racism and eclecticism”, Security Dialogue 2021, Vol. 52(S) 142-151, EBSCO)

I recommend eclecticism as a reparative possibility for critical security studies through which the competing research programmes would be on a par. One of its benefits is that it can provide a platform for negotiating over, and mediating, the competing normative and political agendas that underpin paradigms. As Neufeld (1993) has argued, reflexivity acknowledges that differences between international relations paradigms are inherently normative and that ‘reasoned assessment’ can adjudicate between competing normative claims. With such an approach, it would be our hon- esty, our willingness to engage in dialogue with those who may disagree with us and our readiness to acknowledge our debts to fellow scholars that will pave the way for a robust, inclusive and ethi- cal critical security studies.

### Perm – Do Both (Abolition)

#### Perm – Do Both – Embrace vulnerability and fugitivity challenges colonial impulse to mastery, collapsing activism and academia

Manchanda, Queen Mary University London International Politics Senior Lecturer, 21 (Dr Nivi, “The banalization of race in international security studies: From absolution to abolition”, Security Dialogue 2021, Vol. 52(S) 49-59, EBSCO, GDI access 7/12/22)

In the third and final instance, and somewhat counter-intuitively, international security studies can turn to alternate modes of knowing that reject the foreclosure inherent in colonial and raced understandings of concepts such as ‘liberty’ and ‘security’. Bamor Hesse (2014: 288) ventures that the cherished notion of ‘liberty’ emerges through a ‘hegemony of Western formulation’ that denies its ‘indebtedness to Western colonialism’. This holds equally true for ‘security’ and for synthetic accounts of ‘ontological insecurity’, ‘securitization theory’ and ‘deterrence’ at the crux of the (sub) discipline. One way out of this impasse is for international security studies to be open to what Julietta Singh (2017: 21) has called a ‘vulnerable reading’. A vulnerable reading of international security studies’ own history and the challenges it faces both in its theory and in practice would go against its colonial impulse towards ‘mastery’ (J. Singh, 2017) and instead expand the conditions of possibility for the field. Pushing further, embracing ‘vulnerability’ as a strategy would mount a wholesale challenge to the conventional objectives of international security studies and its auxil- iary concept ‘resilience’. Vulnerability necessarily engenders exposure, as opposed to foreclosure. In the context of a pandemic, it might entail pushing back against medical police (McQuade and Neocleous, 2020) and resisting greater border violence, even as they appear warranted. This ‘open- ing up’ of international security studies both politically and strategically is not a panacea, but can function as an important remedial step. Coupled with an engagement with the Black radical tradi- tion’s notion of ‘fugitivity’- a form of ‘political escape from the Western hegemony’ (Hesse, 2014: 302) and the colonial architecture of knowledge - vulnerability proffers a question if not an answer: what does it mean to escape from immurement by conventional (read: raced) notions of security?

Nonetheless, if de-raced notions of security offer only a contradiction, then to begin to answer the question one must once again turn to abolition. Abolition looks at connections - between polic- ing and border violence, between the incarceration of indigenous populations, detainees and people of colour and their continued dispossession, expropriation and extraction. Robin Kelley (2020) succinctly captures its tenor thus: ‘Abolition works to dismantle systems that have caused harm, namely police and prisons, and reallocate funds to social and economic resources, and to develop new systems of community-controlled public safety and restorative justice’. This purposeful diversion of funds, resources and other energies away from the structural violence of state-sponsored militarism, to alternate political projects, requires astute research and scholarly analysis. By continuing to uphold the tactical separation of ‘activism’ and ‘academia’ and subli- mating ‘race’ as an exclusive concern of the former domain, in keeping with its political theory and international relations antecedents, international security studies ensures racial events remain for- ever ‘banalized’. Challenging this assumed incommensurability and putting activism, policy and scholarship back in their relational context would allow international security studies to also dis- card some of its ahistoricity, specifically with regard to its colonial roots.

These strategies are not light-touch; they cannot be simply appropriated and tacked on in an attempt to shed the anachronism of international security studies, but require a fundamental - and relational - volte face that many would no doubt argue is impossible for a discipline so steeped in, and governed by, the logics of coloniality. Indeed, as we have seen, ‘security’ is a key node in the racialized theoretical apparatus of not only international relations but also political theory. Nevertheless, a sustained effort to undo and unlearn - to denaturalize - the categories of both the ‘lecture hall’ and the ‘professional journal’, to perform what Harney and Moten (2013: 36) call ‘the enactment of a security breach’ ad nauseam, can fashion a break from international security stud- ies’ racial filiation. A ‘decolonial’ discipline may not be achievable, but an anti-racist one is not just possible but also essential. The politics of recognition and repentance is not enough. To paraphrase Ruth Wilson Gilmore (forthcoming): in order to change security studies, we have to change everything.

### Perm – Non-Reformist Reform (Abolition)

#### Perm – do the aff as non-reformist reform Reform and abolition operate on a continuum – pragmaticism and calls for abolition not mutually exclusive. Filter the link debate through question of quantification of how the aff worsens the status quo outlined by both the k and the aff

\*disorientation is generative and resolves the residual link

**Ben‑Moshe, 2018**

(Liat - Criminology, Law and Justice, University of Illinois- Chicago, “Dis‑epistemologies of Abolition” Critical Criminology (2018) 26:341–355, August 3 2018 <https://doi.org/10.1007/s10612-018-9403-1> accessed GDI-TM)

A related critique posed against abolition, is that carceral abolition also actively opposes certain kinds of solutions and desires. Abolition critiques the carceral system and carceral logics, but also critiques efforts to reform carceral sites, because some of the factors lead- ing to the growth of the carceral State were the direct result of attempts to reform the sys- tem. This is also directly linked to the lineage of abolition of slavery. As Kim Gilmore (2000) explains, “The connections between slavery and imprisonment have been used by abolitionists as a historical explanation and as part of a radical political strategy that ques- tions the feasibility of “reform” as an appropriate response to prison expansion.”

In practice, reform and abolition are on a continuum. For example, in Politics of Abo- lition, Mathiesen (1974) follows Andre Gorz’s distinction between reformist and ‘non- reformist’ reforms. Reformist reforms are situated in the status quo, so that any changes are made within or against this existing framework. Non reformist reforms imagine a different horizon and are not limited by a discussion of what is possible at present. Mathiesen states

that non-reformist reforms that are effective need to be of the abolishing kind. The question is what kinds of reforms are sought and whether they will strengthen the system in the long run (Ben-Moshe 2013; Kaba 2014). For instance, fighting for adequate health care for pris- oners is something abolitionists often support, as a non-reformist reform. However, some initiatives such as mental health jails are opposed by abolitionists, as these would only expand the scope of incarceration in the long haul.

But, critics say, if everything offered can be conceived as being reformist, what solu- tions does the abolitionist offer? I suggest that this question is rooted in the kind of episte- mological assumptions that are better abandoned by abolitionists. This demand only makes sense if it is engrained in privileged positionality and not in intersectional subjugated knowledge, or maroonage, as those already oppressed do not feel secure in the first place. In short, as Ahmed (2010a) explains, this is the work of the feminist killjoy: “Feminists, by declaring themselves feminists, are already read as destroying something that is thought of by others not only as being good but as the cause of happiness” (2010a: 581). Feminists (and other affect aliens, as Ahmed refers to them, including abolitionists) “hence brings others down, not only by talking about unhappy topics such as sexism but by exposing how happiness is sustained, by erasing the signs of not getting along” (2010a: 582). If we take this one step further to intersectional struggles “The angry black woman can be described as a killjoy; she may even kill feminist joy, for example, by pointing out forms of racism within feminist politics” (2010a: 583).

The call of “don’t talk about it unless you have a solution” assumes there is a monolithic answer to the question of ‘what is to be done’. As Davis (2003) contends, as abolitionists, thinking about substitutions to prisons or incarceration is inapt. Instead we should concep- tualize a world without the footprint of the prison. That is exactly the problem with car- ceral locales—such as detention centers, psych hospitals, prisons—they become catch all solutions to diverse social issues. One of the difficulties of conceptualizing a world without prisons is that many think about a monolithic system that will replace the punitive one we have now. Instead, we will need to deal with to handle certain harms and their effects in a myriad of ways.

Abolitionists work on a case by case basis in their campaigns, research and calls for action. They are often in a position of not knowing what to do. This seeming chasm between pragmatism and vision for the future of a non-carceral society are not necessar- ily binary opposites, especially if we think about it through the duality of the both/and approach suggested by Harbin (2016) in relation to the epistemology of disorientation as being generative.

## Alternative

### Alternative Fails – Rejection Bad

#### Essentializing critiques of security studies restricts productive engagements with the field

**van Munster**, Danish Institute for International Studies**, 21** (Rens, 2021,  Security Dialogue 2021, Vol. 52(S) 88–97, "On whiteness in criticalsecurity studies: The case of nuclear weapons", https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/09670106211015029?journalCode=sdib accessed on 7-12-2022, hooch//cs)

Following Bhambra, Howell and Richter-Montpetit’s diagnosis is driven by a suspicion that central approaches in critical security studies may inadvertently reproduce racialized forms of exclusion and violence. Suspicion has a rich history in critical theorizing. Paul Ricœur (1970) famously coined the notion of ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ to denote an analytical ethos that he associated with Sigmund Freud, Karl Marx and Friedrich Nietzsche. In his view, these authors shared a commitment towards exposing the truth hidden beneath the surface appearance of reality. Things, in other words, are not what they seem. The hermeneutics of suspicion continues to play a significant role today – for example, in the idea of speaking truth to power – and informs various international relations approaches, including some forms of realist theory. In critical security studies, however, the hermeneutics of suspicion has given way to a different form of suspicion, one that does not seek to uncover the real intentions or interests behind or beneath discourse but instead explores the systematic reproduction of violence and exclusions through discourse and practice. It is a form of critique that is suspicious about the context, uptake and circulation of concepts and theories, and what is lost, marginalized or silenced in the (re)production of that knowledge. Howell and Richter-Montpetit are explicit that their analysis is of the latter kind. Their claim is not that critical security studies scholars secretly pursue a racist agenda under the veneer of science, but that central concepts in critical security studies, such as biopolitics or securitization, perform racial work and, in doing so, contribute to the reproduction of racial hierarchies and white supremacy

Bearing in mind that international relations theory, including critical international relations theory, has contributed to the reproduction and hence naturalization of whiteness in world politics, a healthy dose of suspicion about epistemic racism and methodological whiteness is clearly warranted (see, for example, Hobson, 2007; Sabaratnam, 2020; Vitalis, 2015). Yet there are also some in-built limits to the critical ethos of suspicion. In Ricœur’s original formulation, the limit is that of a structural paranoia grounded in a profound mistrust of reality. Paranoia can be a productive force, but is also unidirectional, anticipatory and elitist (the claim to have privileged access to a truth hidden from others) (for a discussion, see Sedgwick, 1997). The kind of suspicion Howell and RichterMontpetit subscribe to seeks to transcend the limits of paranoia. It abandons the idea of a layered reality and sidesteps the issue of intentions and interests (Howell and Richter-Montpetit, 2020: 4). Still, similar problems remain. In particular, the fallacy of essentialism looms large. In Howell and Richter-Montpetit’s analysis, such essentialism manifests itself in their conviction that the epistemic racism they identify in the Copenhagen School is inescapable and automatically reproduced with every attempt at rearticulation. For them, any recuperation of securitization theory is doomed to repeat the original sin of racism – just as securitization theory itself cannot but repeat the racism present in the work of authors on which it draws (Howell and Richter-Montpetit, 2020: 7–9). It is worth citing their conclusion in length:

Once classic securitization theory is stripped of its racist conceptual and methodological apparatus . . . there is very little left. Perhaps what remains is simply the word ‘securitization’. But even this word is potentially problematic, because inherent in it is a temporal move from normal politics towards the (exceptional) violence of security. Authors attempting to recuperate the term ‘securitization’ must take care not to indulge in white nostalgia for a better, more innocent time: a time that does not exist for those who have been subject to colonialism or the racial contract on scales from the local to the global – that is to say, the majority of the world’s people. Such a recuperative intellectual project, if at all possible, has yet to be articulated. (Howell and Richter-Montpetit, 2020: 17)

Suspicion can serve the critical objective of historicizing and contextualizing seemingly abstract or neutral concepts such as securitization or biopolitics, but here it transforms into an essentialist argument that instead fixes the meaning and character of words, concepts and theories across time and space. Characterized by a unidirectional anticipation of the future, such a view entails that structural forms of injustice, such as epistemic racism, can be simply presumed to follow every time the ‘S-word’ is uttered. As an intellectual strategy, such a finalistic version of suspicion does not serve the field of critical security studies well. Indeed, Howell and Richter-Montpetit fail to acknowledge that almost every empirical ‘application’ of securitization theory has involved a serious rearticulation of its core concepts and their relations. These rearticulations could, of course, reproduce problematic assumptions about race that taint the empirical analysis or foreclose important avenues of inquiry, but this is not a matter that can be adjudicated in advance. Nor is it true that such recuperative projects do not exist. For example, Claudia Aradau’s (2004) radical rearticulation of desecuritization seems to avoid the pitfalls Howell and Richter-Montpetit associate with the Copenhagen School. Her work, as well as that of others, shows that thinking with a theory often also involves thinking against that theory and illustrates how new or more progressive interpretations often cannot exist without prior ones.

In addition, the risk of confirmation bias – the tendency for an analyst to read selectively and overlook or exclude examples that do not fit her or his assumptions – looms large in such essentialist forms of suspicion. Despite significant differences in tone, both Lene Hansen’s (2020) rejoinder and the response by Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan (2020) point out that Howell and RichterMontpetit’s analysis of securitization theory suffers from this methodological fallacy. Howell and Richter-Montpetit’s critique of Foucauldian security studies admittedly leaves more room for recuperative readings,4 but at times runs up against similar problems. For example, it is not evident on the basis of what criteria the field of Foucauldian security studies is delineated, and at times it appears set up in such a way as to corroborate pre-existing suspicions.5 To be sure, theories and concepts may at times come with heavy historical baggage that overdetermines their meaning. Still, even then, the criticality of a rearticulation depends not just on the theories and thinkers invoked, but also on what such an engagement forecloses or opens up. Suspicion is an indispensable part of critical theorizing but can also unduly restrict productive engagements with prior work, including critical security studies’ own intellectual ancestry.

### Alternative Fails – No Real World Solvency

#### No Alternative spillover – won’t change real world policymaking

Satoh, Co-Director IAFOR Research Centre, Osaka School of International Public Policy, 21 (Haruko, Osaka University “Great power relations and threats to the liberal international order”, Hiroshima Peace Research Journal, <https://www.peace.hiroshima-cu.ac.jp/wp/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/HPI-Journal-Vol-8.pdf#page=54>, GDO accessed 7/8/22)

Needless to say, the theoretical and philosophical discussions for this less state-centric definition of security are anchored in the English school and liberal internationalists. But more often than not their contribution is obscured by the disagreements within the aca- demic discipline of international relations theory, if they are not pitted against the dominant realists and neo-realists to compete for an authoritative voice. A discernable challenge is how much impact the academic, theoretical debates have on policymakers, particularly those in the foreign and security policy community of great powers. This is not to say that the theoretical world that offers a more nuanced approach to international relations has had no bearing on the real policy world and conducts of great powers. Nor do the realists, particularly prevalent in the US, only see the world in the classical balance of military power terms, if only because of the “discovery” of the utility of power of persuasion, or soft power, as an effective tool of American diplomacy in winning friends in the Cold War. But in mainstream policy discussions about geopolitical competition between the US and China, there appears little room for nuance.

### Alternative Fails - Flawed Methodologies

#### Reject the K- their foundational authors based their work on numerous flawed methodologies

**Waever** University of Copenhagen **and Buzan** London School of Economics and Political Science**, 20** (Ole and Barry, 2020, Security Dialogue2020, Vol. 51(4) 386–394, "Racism and responsibility –The critical limits of deepfake methodology in security studies: A reply to Howell and RichterMontpetit", https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0967010620916153?journalCode=sdib accessed on 7-12-2022, hooch//cs)

*H&RM=Howell and Richter-Montpetit*

Replying, we face a difficult dilemma. The methodology and academic standards of the H&RM piece are so profoundly and systematically flawed as to void the authors’ argument, and we think the lack of credible supporting evidence makes their charge libellous. To properly demonstrate the depth and extent of H&RM’s errors and misrepresentations requires a full, point-by-point critique. Yet, during a lengthy correspondence with Security Dialogue, the editors insisted that if we submitted our critique as a reply it should comply with the standard length of 4,000 words2 and refused simultaneous publication with H&RM’s article. They claimed to see no difference between a charge of racism and normal academic disputes about facts, methods or theories, and therefore no case for amending their normal practice. They furthermore insisted on reviewing our reply: the editors want to be judge and jury as well as defendants. Consequently, we are reluctant to publish this reply in Security Dialogue at all. Within a 4,000-word limit, we can hardly begin to lay out the full details of H&RM’s poor scholarship, let alone explore the more general, and very serious, questions this affair raises for the discipline of international relations and the fight against racism. There is a case for denying the authors and Security Dialogue the oxygen of discussion that they seem to hope for in publishing such toxic and outlandish charges. We decided to offer a short reply in Security Dialogue only to state our principled views and to open a portal from the epicentre of the affair to a detailed reply.

What follows addresses only highlights of the catalogue of methodological and conceptual errors in H&RM’s article. The full reply, which interested readers hopefully will consult, leaves almost nothing of H&RM’s argument standing. This dispiriting affair raises important questions for the discipline of international relations that we can only hint at here but address in our longer reply: • How can and should international relations take on structural/systemic racism? • What are criteria for evidence by which one can identify the inner logic of a theory in order to critique its foundations? • How well or badly do H&RM reflect the background literatures they draw upon? • What can securitization theory actually do and not do when applied to the scourge of racism? • Is racism such a uniquely damaging force that the academic struggle against it warrants violating scholarly norms and potentially sacrificing the private and professional integrity of non-racist colleagues? • What are the responsibilities of academic journals when confronted with works like H&RM’s article?

H&RM’s article could perhaps best be used as a teaching tool for how not to make an academic argument. The kind of deepfake methodology it employs should have no place in academic debates and should certainly not be published in a reputable journal. The errors come in various forms of which we can here only give the flavour.

If H&RM deem various classical authors (Arendt, Schmitt, Hobbes, Durkheim, Foucault) racist, then securitization theory, and by implication the present authors, are also racist for citing them. This destructive tactic is the main basis for their charge against us of civilizationism (H&RM, 2020: 7–11 [5–9]). By this standard, it would be hard to find anyone in international relations who did not qualify as racist. Aside from the considerable room for contesting whether some of these authors (e.g. Arendt) qualify as racist, there is the question of whether tinges of racism, or even wholesale embracing of it, should disqualify a thinker’s work in toto. H&RM’s mode of presenting these accusations implies that everybody should ignore in their entirety the works of key thinkers, both Western and non-Western, up to 1945, who lived in times when racism was a widely accepted norm in most societies and who did not go out of their way to contest that norm. This requirement would eliminate most of the intellectual legacy of the humanities and social sciences. Do we as a discipline become better at analysing politics by leaving out references to Hobbes, because if we cite him our writings become racist? ‘Don’t engage with the tradition. Start anew every time.’ This is the unarticulated argument in H&RM’s article. A presentist and anti-intellectual future looms large. If you who are reading this have ever cited anybody who might have been inspired by someone who can be seen as racist, be prepared for your turn in the dock.

H&RM mobilize Foucauldian security studies as a source of authority against us, but their own previous round of racism-busting was targeted at Foucauldian security studies (Howell and RichterMontpetit, 2019). Now the scene gets not only absurd but authoritarian. You become a racist if you use any source that H&RM deem to be racist. They themselves draw on something they deemed racist in previous work. Since they are not self-labelling as racists, this places interpretative power with the accuser.

H&RM write that ‘much orthodox and critical Western social and political thought is predicated upon epistemological and ontological premises that are not simply Eurocentric but racist, specifically white supremacist’ (H&RM, 2020: 4 [2]). Then, H&RM should explore the entanglement of international relations in this system and its implications. Instead of analysing securitization theory in relation to such a systemic understanding, H&RM imitate a close reading of securitization theory, pretending to make their points from our texts, while de facto reaching their conclusions from anywhere but our texts themselves.

### Alternative Fails – Can’t Escape Link

#### Alternative scholarship can’t escape dilemma of security focus

Coleman, University of Sussex International Relations Professor, 21 (Lara Montesinos, “Racism! What do you mean? From Howell and Richter-Montpetit’s underestimation of the problem, towards situating security through struggle”, Security Dialogue 2021, Vol. 52(S) 69-77, EBSCO, GDI access 7/12/22)

Howell and Richter-Montpetit seek to extend this important work to security studies. However, the question is whether security studies faces specific challenges in addressing its colonial intellectual foundations, which arise from its very self-definition as a field. Security has long been ‘the supreme concept of bourgeois society’ (Neocleous, 2008: 11). The epistemic conditions of even the most critical scholarship continue to be shaped not only by the neoliberal academy, with its racialized, class-based and gendered obstacles to admittance, but also by what we look for when we are part of part of a ‘we’ (see Foucault, 1984: 385), organized around the problematization of security. Disciplines, after all, revolve around the problems that they generate - problems that, in their very framing, imply particular ontological assumptions.

What is remarkable about critical security studies is that scholars - particularly those working in a Foucauldian tradition - acknowledge that the liberal preoccupation with security serves to mask relations of power and violence. They acknowledge that it is not ‘all about security’, but still re-centre security in the very process of calling it into question. The risk is that the (liberal) identi- fication of normality with peace and neutrality is reinforced, that an ideological fantasy is solidi- fied by its constant repetition in practice (Coleman and Rosenow, 2016: 214). Even when liberal accounts of politics are subject to critique, starting from a concern with security (even broadly conceived) can still mean that other relations of violence fade out of view. The world is, in effect, collapsed into a disciplinary perspective (see Gordon, 2011: 99).

### Alternative Offense – Turns K

#### Alt fails and triggers the impact- the kritik waters down anti-racist discourse

**Waever** University of Copenhagen **and Buzan** London School of Economics and Political Science**, 20** (Ole and Barry, 2020, Security Dialogue2020, Vol. 51(4) 386–394, "Racism and responsibility –The critical limits of deepfake methodology in security studies: A reply to Howell and RichterMontpetit", https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0967010620916153?journalCode=sdib accessed on 7-12-2022, hooch//cs)

*H&RM=Howell and Richter-Montpetit*

This is only a taster of all that is academically flawed about H&RM’s article, and we hope readers will now turn to our longer reply. H&RM’s sloppy scholarship and thorough misrepresentations of what they attack discredit both them and Security Dialogue. There is no basis for H&RM’s overarching charge of the theory being racist other than their assertion that all Western social science is systemically racist. Racism is an accusation that should not be made lightly, because being branded as racist obviously has severe human and social costs. To accuse peers in the discipline of racism should be a difficult decision, strongly conditioned by the credibility of the evidence and the specificity of the charge. H&RM present no politico-academic reasoning explaining their decision to cross what is usually a clear line for academic debate. By publishing the article, Security Dialogue supports this transgression. H&RM write in a straightforward, declaratory/authoritative style, as though their article simply presents ‘how it really is’, not a complex decision involving concerns about responsibility and effects. This is doubly puzzling given that our main texts include explicit ethical and political self-reflections about the possible value and risks involved in coining concepts and shaping theories in particular ways (contra H&RM’s unfounded postulate that we present the theory as ‘neutral’; see H&RM, 2020: 3, 11, 16 [1, 9, 14]).

H&RM’s article is dangerously counterproductive to the important task of dealing with systemic racism in international relations. Debasing the currency of academic analysis will steer the discipline into a post-truth direction antithetical to its epistemological integrity and social purpose. The power of racism in the world today and its partaking in our discipline are far too serious to be channelled into polemics against made-up targets. H&RM water down the meaning of racism so that it captures practically everyone in social science. Having deemed postcolonial scholarship not radical enough, they have set up a machine that will judge any theory racist unless it foregrounds race in their specific jargon of ‘methodological whiteness’ and ‘antiblack racism’. Any theory not centred on racism in their sense is racist – not just more or less capable of analysing racism, but ‘racist’, ‘antiblack’ and ‘white supremacist’. International relations certainly needs to engage the question of racism – both as crucial in world politics and as an internal challenge entrenched within the historical constitution of the discipline – but not like this.

We think Security Dialogue should retract the article because its deepfake methodology can be used to ‘prove’ anything. H&RM’s practices, like falsely attributed quotes and systematic disregard of countervailing evidence, void their central argument and amount to serious academic misconduct. Such flawed work should not warrant publication in a leading academic journal.